Walter v. McCarvel

• Decision Date: 29 May 1941
• Citation: 34 N.E.2d 677,309 Mass. 260
• Parties: WALTER v. McCARVEL et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

309 Mass. 260

34 N.E.2d 677

WALTER

v.McCARVEL et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 29, 1941.

Suit by Karl J. P. Walter against Frank McCarvel and others to enjoin defendants, as representing officers and members of unincorporated labor union, from attempting to enforce closed shop provisions of contract with manufacturer, or in the alternative, for an order requiring defendants to admit plaintiff to membership in the union. From a decree of dismissal, plaintiff appeals.

Decree affirmed.Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Greenhalge, Judge.

Argued before FIELD, C. J., and DONAHUE, QUA, DOLAN, and COX, JJ.

R. B. Owen, of Boston, for plaintiff.

S. S. Grant and F. F. Cohen, both of Boston, for defendants.

COX, Justice.

This is a bill in equity brought against some of the officers of the United Packing House Workers of America, Local 11, an unincorporated voluntary labor organization, hereinafter referred to as the union, not only individually, but as fairly representing the officers and members as a class. The defendants' demurrer was sustained by interlocutory decree, and the plaintiff appealed from a final decree dismissing the bill without prejudice. Although no appeal from the interlocutory decree was taken, its correctness is open for consideration upon the appeal from the final decree. Gibbons v. Gibbons, 296 Mass. 89, 4 N.E.2d 1019.

The bill alleges that the plaintiff, who at no time has ever been a member of the union, obtained employment with a corporation engaged in the manufacture of meat products in Somerville in this Commonwealth at a time when there was in effect between the corporation and union a contract, which, among other things, provided that ‘3. The employer agrees that it shall be a condition of employment that all present employees are and shall remain members of the union in good standing during their term of employment. The employer further agrees that during the period of the agreement it shall be a condition of employment for all new employees to become members of the union within 21 days from the date of employment and that they shall remain members of the union in good standing thereafter. The employer also agrees not to continue in its employ after notification of the union any employee who has failed to become or to remain a member of the union as aforesaid. The employer shall be under no obligation to reinstate any worker discharged at the request of the union for violation of the foregoing provision if the job of the worker has been filled. 4. The employer shall have the right during the life of this agreeement to hire such employees as it may from time to time and as are in its judgment best qualified to do the work required of them. 5. It is agreed that the first 21 days of any worker's employment shall be considered a trial period within which time the employer is to judge the competency of the worker.’

The bill further alleges, in the fourth paragraph, that this contract, and in particular its provisions requiring membership in the union as a condition of continued employment of the corporation, ‘was intended by the said union and in fact constituted a part of a general plan, scheme, and conspiracy on the part of said union whereby * * * [it] either by itself or its affiliates has obtained a control and monopoly over the labor market in the entire industry relating to the manufacture of * * * meat products throughout the community known as Greater Boston comprising a considerable area in and about the City of Boston, Massachusetts; that said contract has operated in the said community to seriously deter and prevent workmen from obtaining or continuing in their employment in the said industry which industry is of considerable proportions, and has resulted in an unlawful monopoly and illegal restraint of trade on the part of said union with respect to the employment of labor in the said industry and community.’

It is alleged in the fifth paragraph of the bill that, notwithstanding the ‘illegality’ of said contract, the defendants and the union have, through malice and with the object of injuring the plaintiff and causing his discharge, threatened to call a strike against his employer, and have thereby, through violence and threats thereof, coerced the corporation into discharging him against its will ‘in accordance with the provisions of said illegal contract relating to a closed shop,’ with resulting damages to the plaintiff.

The bill alleges in the sixth paragraph that, if the contract is legal, the plaintiff is entitled, as a member of the class for whose benefit and said ‘closed shop’ provisions in the contract were made, to become a member of said union and to be retained or reinstated in his employment by the corporation; that, at or about the time he entered the employ of the corporation, he made application in good faith to the union and requested that he might be alleged to becomea member, and that he was then a competent workman and was and still is able, ready and willing to comply with all legal provisions incorporated in the laws and by-laws of said union; but that the defendants and the union, ‘without right and without justifying cause, arbitrarily and maliciously refused to accept * * * [him] as a member * * *, in violation of their duty toward * * * [him], and with the express purpose of injuring * * * [him] and depriving him of his employment’; and that, by reason of the defendants' refusal to admit him to membership, he was unable to comply with the provisions of the contract regarding membership, and, as a result thereof, was discharged by the corporation upon the demand of the defendants.

There are allegations as to the damages that the plaintiff has sustained. One prayer is that the defendants be enjoined from attempting in any way to enforce said ‘closed shop’ provisions, and another is that, in the event that these provisions are legal, the defendants be ordered to perform specifically their obligations thereunder and admit the plaintiff to membership in the union.

It is unnecessary to consider the eleven grounds of the demurrer, all of which are open on appeal, Maguire v. Buckley, 301 Mass. 355, 359, 17 N.E.2d 170, for we are of opinion that the demurrer was rightly sustained on the second ground, namely, that the matters alleged in the bill are not such as to entitle the plaintiff to relief in equity.

The plaintiff concedes that a closed shop agreement is legal as against a workman whose right to obtain employment, as distinguished from a right under an already existing contract of employment, is interfered with. See Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 166, 104 N.E. 717, L.R.A.1915A, 1217, Ann.Cas.1915C, 810;Shinsky v. O'Neil, 232 Mass. 99, 102, 121 N.E. 790, and cases cited; Goyette v. C. V. Watson Co., 245 Mass. 577, 589, 590, 140 N.E. 285;Simon v. Schwachman, 301 Mass. 573, 577, 578, 18 N.E.2d 1, and cases cited. But the plaintiff contends (1) that closed shop agreements are not legal where they are a part of a general policy to create a monopoly in the labor market, and (2) that a union that has a closed...