Goyette v. C.V. Watson Co.

• Decision Date: 11 June 1923
• Parties: GOYETTE v. C. V. WATSON CO. LOVELY et al. v. GILL et al. KNIPE BROS., Inc., v. WHITE et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

245 Mass. 577

140 N.E. 285

GOYETTE

v.C. V. WATSON CO.

LOVELY et al.

v.GILL et al.

KNIPE BROS., Inc.,

v.WHITE et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 11, 1923.

Appeal from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County.

Report from Superior Court, Essex County; William Cushing Wait, Judge.

Appeal from Superior Court, Essex County; P. M. Keating, Judge.

Suits by Joseph C. Goyette against the C. V. Watson Company, by Collis Lovely and another, General President and General Secretary-Treasurer of the Boot & Shoe Workers' Union, against Austin E. Gill and others, and by Knipe Bros., Inc., against George White and others. From a decree dismissing the bill in the first suit, plaintiff appeals. On report in the second suit, for determination by the full court after the overruling of demurrers to the bill of complaint. From a final decree in favor of plaintiff in the third suit, defendants appeal. Decree in the first suit affirmed, interlocutory decree overruling demurrer entered in the second suit, and decree in the third suit modified and affirmed.

The first suit was brought to enjoin defendant, its officers, agents, and servants, from violating an alleged verbal and written agreement between defendant and the Shoe Workers' Protective Union, of which plaintiff was a member and general business agent, and for an accounting. The case was referred to a master, whose report was confirmed. Exhibit C, mentioned in the opinion, provided that the prices set forth in a price list signed by the union and the company, dated July 19, 1920, and expiring July 18, 1921, should continue in effect until the signing of a new list, and that prices then being paid and not appearing on any signed list should also remain in effect; that for work considered new a price agreed upon should be paid, and that, if such prices should be in excess of or less than the prices subsequently agreed upon between the union and a manufacturers' association, the excess should be collectible from the operators to whom paid, or the deficit should be paid by the company.

In the second suit plaintiff sought to enjoin members of the Shoe Workers' Protective Union from interfering with contracts of the Boot & Shoe Workers' Union by threats, intimidation, etc., and from interfering with members of such union desirous of entering or continuing employment, or having entered employment, in manufacturing establishments in Haverhill, and from obstructing, threatening, intimidating, or interfering with such members in entering or leaving the premises of such establishments, etc., and to restrain the defendants George Newburgh and others, doing business as the Triangle Shoe Company, from violating and terminating their contract with the Boot & Shoe Workers' Union. The contract between the Boot & Shoe Workers' Union and the Triangle Shoe Company provided that, in consideration of the right to use the union stamp, the shoe company would hire only members of such union in good standing, and not retain any worker objectionable to the union, and make no discrimination against any member because of his activity in union affairs; that all questions of wages or labor which could not be mutually agreed upon should be submitted to the state board of conciliation and arbitration, and that the decision of such board should be final and binding. The defendants named as members of the Shoe Workers' Protective Union demurred on the grounds that plaintiffs had stated no case entitling them to relief in equity; that plaintiffs had a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law; that the bill disclosed that plaintiffs themselves, or certain of their members, did the acts alleged to have been a breach of the contract; that the bill was multifarious; that its allegations were so vague, indefinite, unspecific, and uncertain that defendants were not sufficiently apprised thereby of the nature of the case against them; that the contract was void and illegal, because against public policy, in restraint of trade, lacking in mutuality, unconscionable, in contravention of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8820-8823, 8827-8830), and in contravention of G. L. c. 93; that it did not appear from the bill what authority the parties signing the contract had to execute it; and that it did not appear that plaintiffs had any authority to bring the suit. The defendants Newburgh and others demurred on the ground that plaintiffs had stated no case entitling them to relief in equity against such defendants, and that the allegations were so vague, indefinite, ambiguous, and uncertain that defendants could not ascertain the meaning thereof, or obtain sufficient information therefrom as to the case which they were required to answer.

The plaintiff in the third case sought to enjoin members of both the Shoe Workers' Protective Union and the Boot & Shoe Workers' Union from interfering with its business by threats, parades, picketing, or other acts of intimidation, from interfering with persons in its employ, or desirous of entering the same, from obstructing, threatening, intimidating, or interfering with any such persons while entering or leaving plaintiff's premises, and from preventing any such persons from entering or continuing in plaintiff's employment by threats, abusive language, outcries, or other acts of intimidation, or by any scheme or conspiracy. The final decree in such case was in part as follows:

‘The above-entitled cause came on to be heard at this sitting and was argued by counsel, and thereupon, upon consideration thereof, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the strike instituted and maintained by the defendants, officers and members of the Shoe Workers' Protective Union, is illegal, and said defendants, officers and members of the Shoe Workers' Protective Union, both known and unknown, individually and collectively, be and they hereby are permanently enjoined from interfering with the plaintiff's business by threats, patrols, picketing, or acts of intimidation; from interfering with any person or persons who are now or may hereafter be in the employ of the plaintiff; from threatening or in any way interfering with any such person or persons while entering or leaving plaintiff's premises; from preventing any such person or persons from entering or continuing in the plaintiff's employment by threats, acts, or intimidation, or by any scheme or conspiracy for the purpose of annoying, hindering, interfering with, or preventing any such person or persons from entering or continuing in the plaintiff's employment.’F. W. & E. R. Mansfield, of Boston, for plaintiff Goyette.

C. H. Poor and E. S. Abbott, both of Haverhill, for defendant C. V. Watson Co.

H. B. Ehrmann and Goulston & Storrs, all of Boston, for plaintiffs Lovely and others.

F. W. Mansfield and E. R. Mansfield, both of Boston, for labor defendants on demurrer.

Hurlburt, Jones & Hall, of Boston, F. H. Tilton, of Haverhill, and F. P. Garland and A. B. Tyler, both of Brookline, for plaintiff Knipe Bros., Inc.

F. W. & E. R. Mansfield, of Boston, for defendants White and others.

BRALEY, J.

These cases relate to controversies arising out of alleged contracts of employment largely of the same general tenor between voluntary organizations which are described as labor unions and their employers, or between rival unions where one union seeks supremacy in the employment of labor in their particular field of work in the city of Haverhill. The bill in the first case was filed May 5, 1922. The material allegations are that on April 16, 1919, the Shoe Workers' Protective Union entered into a written agreement, a copy of which is annexed, marked Exhibit A, wherein the defendant agreed to hire only members of the union, and if such members were not available it could employ other persons until such time as union men were available, if notice was given to nonunion employees that they were hired subject to such conditions. The parties in addition to this agreement entered into subsidiary agreements regulating prices and conditions of employment in certain departments of the defendant's factory, one of which, dated July 19, 1920, applied to the stitching department, and is referred to as Exhibit B. But as this agreement was limited in time, the parties verbally and by Exhibit C agreed that the conditions named in Exhibit B should be continued in full force until a new agreement was consummated. The defendant is charged with having refused ‘to carry out the terms and conditions of the old agreement’ and with having ‘violated the terms of the verbal and written agreement,’ by refusing to pay the price named in Exhibit B for new work. It also is alleged that the employees are not permitted to have a shop committee; that the business agent is not allowed to visit the factory during working hours, while prices for defective new work have been fixed by the defendant without consultation with the Shoe Workers' Protective Union, or the Stitchers' Union whose members ‘are put to work without a permit from the union,’ and ‘work having no piece price is not paid for by the hour’ at the rate stipulated under the head of ‘Remarks' in Exhibit B, but ‘the price paid is less than the piece price.’ The prayers for relief are that the defendant may be enjoined from violating the terms of the verbal and written agreements and for an accounting and the assessment of damages.

It was agreed at the hearing before the master that Exhibit A was terminated April 15, 1922, and the bill states that Exhibit B ‘expired by its own limitation’ July 18, 1921. But it is contended that the conditions of employment shown under the head of ‘Remarks' in Exhibit B were to continue in effect until ‘the signing of a new list’ as provided in Exhibit C. It is found, however, that no written agreement was ever entered into after the expiration of Exhibit B. The plaintiff also claimed that an oral agreement extending the conditions for a period...