Walters v. Leech, Docket No. 277180.

• Decision Date: 22 July 2008
• Docket Number: Docket No. 277180.
• Citation: 279 Mich. App. 707,761 N.W.2d 143
• Parties: WALTERS v. LEECH.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

761 N.W.2d 143

279 Mich. App. 707

WALTERS v. LEECH.

Docket No. 277180.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted July 2, 2008, at Grand Rapids.

Decided July 22, 2008, at 9:15 a.m.

Mika Meyers Beckett & Jones P.L.C., Caledonia, (by Elizabeth K. Bransdorfer) for Lori Walters.

Daniel J. Fojtik for the Kent County Friend of the Court.

Before: MURPHY, P.J., and BANDSTRA and BECKERING, JJ.

BECKERING, J.

Intervenor Kent County Friend of the Court (FOC) appeals by leave granted the trial court's March 15, 2007, order denying its motion to impose a child-support lien against real property owned by plaintiff and her spouse under a tenancy by the entirety. We affirm.

I

This matter involves a minor child, the parents of whom are plaintiff Lori Walters and defendant Brian K. Leech. The FOC represents that defendant has physical custody of the child, that plaintiff is obligated to pay child support, and that plaintiff has accumulated a support arrearage of $44,977.40. While attempting to recover the arrearage, the FOC located real property owned by plaintiff and her spouse. Plaintiff lives on the property with her spouse and their three children. In November 2006, the FOC filed a motion to impose a child-support lien against the property. A family-court referee subsequently signed a proposed lien order. Plaintiff filed a timely objection to the proposed order and, in March 2007, the trial court denied the FOC's motion for a lien against the property because plaintiff and her spouse own the property as tenants by the entirety. We subsequently granted the FOC's application for leave to appeal. Walters v. Leech, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 2, 2007 (Docket No. 277180).

The issue before us on appeal is whether the Support and Parenting Time Enforcement Act, MCL 552.601 et seq., specifically MCL 552.625a and 552.625b, allows child-support liens against property held as a tenancy by the entireties. This is an issue of first impression involving statutory interpretation and a question of jurisprudential significance.

II

The proper construction of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. Washburn v. Makedonsky, 271 Mich.App. 95, 98, 718 N.W.2d 842 (2006). As this Court stated in USAA Ins. Co. v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 220 Mich. App. 386, 389-390, 559 N.W.2d 98 (1996):

The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature in enacting a provision. Statutory language should be construed reasonably, keeping in mind the purpose of the statute. The first criterion in determining intent is the specific language of the statute. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is neither required nor permitted, and courts must apply the statute as written. However, if reasonable minds can differ regarding the meaning of a statute judicial construction is appropriate. [Citations omitted.]

Statutes that relate to the same subject or that share a common purpose are in pari materia and must be read together as one law, even if they contain no reference to one another and were enacted on different dates. State Treasurer v. Schuster, 456 Mich. 408, 417, 572 N.W.2d 628 (1998). "Statutes relate to the same subject if they relate to the same person or thing or the same class of persons or things." Houghton Lake Area Tourism & Convention Bureau v. Wood, 255 Mich.App. 127, 147, 662 N.W.2d 758 (2003). The object of the in pari materia rule is to give effect to the legislative intent expressed in harmonious statutes. People v. Webb, 458 Mich. 265, 274, 580 N.W.2d 884 (1998). If statutes lend themselves to a construction that avoids conflict, that construction should control. Id.; House Speaker v. State Administrative Bd., 441 Mich. 547, 568-569, 495 N.W.2d 539 (1993).

In construing the language of a statute, courts must also keep in mind that "the Legislature is deemed to act with an understanding of common law in existence before the legislation was enacted." Nation v. W. D. E. Electric Co., 454 Mich. 489, 494, 563 N.W.2d 233 (1997). As our Supreme Court stated in Wold Architects & Engineers v. Strat, 474 Mich. 223, 223-234, 713 N.W.2d 750 (2006):

The common law, which has been adopted as part of our jurisprudence, remains in force until amended or repealed. Whether a statutory scheme preempts, changes, or amends the common law is a question of legislative intent. ...

Michigan courts have uniformly held that legislative amendment of the common law is not lightly presumed. ...

* * *

The Legislature is presumed to know of the existence of the common law when it acts. [Id. at 233-234, 713 N.W.2d 750 (citations omitted).]

Further, "statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, and will not be extended by implication to abrogate established rules of common law." Nation, supra at 494, 563 N.W.2d 233 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, when an ambiguous statute contravenes the common law, courts must construe the statute so that it results in the least change in the common law. Id. But, when a comprehensive statute "prescribes in detail a course of conduct to pursue and the parties and things affected, and designates specific limitations and exceptions," the Legislature will generally "be found to have intended that the statute supersede and replace the common law dealing with the subject matter." Wold Architects & Engineers, supra at 233, 713 N.W.2d 750 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

III

Our longstanding common law provides that, when a deed is conveyed to a husband and wife, the property is held as a tenancy by the entirety. Morgan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 411 Mich. 267, 284, 307 N.W.2d 53 (1981) (opinion by FITZGERALD, J.). In a tenancy by the entirety, the husband and wife are considered one person in the law. Id. They cannot take the property in halves. Id. Rather, the property is seized by the entirety. Id. The consequence is that neither the husband nor the wife can dispose of the property without the assent of the other and the whole property must remain to the survivor. Id. Therefore, at the heart of a tenancy by the entirety is the right of survivorship, meaning that when one party dies, the other party automatically owns the whole property. 1 Cameron, Michigan Real Property Law (3d ed.), § 9.14, p. 328.

As a general proposition under the common law, property that is held as a tenancy by the entirety is not liable for the individual debts of either party.¹ Id. at § 9.16, p. 330; Rossman v. Hutchinson, 289 Mich. 577, 588, 286 N.W. 835 (1939) (stating that "[e]ntireties property is liable to execution for joint debts of husband and wife"). Our Legislature codified this proposition with respect to judgment liens in MCL 600.2807. MCL 600.2807 became effective September 1, 2004, and provides that "[a] judgment lien does not attach to an interest in real property owned as tenants by the entirety unless the underlying judgment is entered against both the husband and wife." MCL 600.2807(1).

MCL 552.625a and 552.625b provide for child-support liens against a payer's real and personal property. These sections were enacted in 1998 and amended in 2002 and 2004. The amendments became effective December 1, 2002, and January 1, 2006, respectively.

The current version of MCL 552.625a(1) states, in relevant part:

The amount of past due support that accrues under a judgment as provided in [MCL 552.603]² or under the law of another state constitutes a lien in favor of the recipient of support against the real and personal property of a payer. ... The lien is effective at the time that the support is due and unpaid and shall continue until the amount of past due support is paid in full or the lien is terminated by the title IV-D agency.

Pursuant to MCL 552.625b(4)(c), when a child-support lien arises against the real or personal property of a payer, the property is subject to seizure unless the payer responds by paying the arrearage or requesting a review of the lien order. Additionally, MCL 552.625b(8) provides that in order to enforce the lien, the real property may be sold. MCL 552.625a(6) provides exceptions to a lien under MCL 552.625a(1), listing real and personal property against which child-support liens may not arise. The Legislature did not include property held as a tenancy by the entirety in the list of exceptions. Subsection 6 was part of the amendment of MCL 552.625a that became effective January 1, 2006.

IV

In light of our longstanding common law regarding property held as a tenancy by the entirety, which was recently codified with respect to judgment liens in MCL 600.2807, and the plain language of MCL 552.625a and 552.625b, we conclude that child-support liens may not be imposed against property held as a tenancy by the entirety. Our conclusion is consistent with the common law, and gives effect to the legislative intent expressed in both MCL 600.2807 and the law on liens for child support articulated in MCL 552.625a and 552.625b.

In determining whether child-support liens may be imposed against property held as a tenancy by the entirety under MCL 552.625a and 552.625b, we must consider the common law in existence before the legislation was enacted. As we have already discussed, we must presume that the Legislature acted with an understanding of the common law, Nation, supra at 494, 563 N.W.2d 233, and that the common law remains in force unless it was intentionally amended or repealed, Wold Architects & Engineers, supra at 233, 713 N.W.2d 750. MCL 552.625a(1) states that a child-support lien may be imposed "against the real and personal property of a payer ...." (Emphasis added.) "Payer" is defined as "an individual who is ordered by the circuit court to pay support." MCL 552.602(v) (emphasis added). Under the common law, however, a husband and wife holding property as tenants by the entirety are considered one person in the law and the property...