Walton Lunch Co. v. Kearney

• Decision Date: 18 October 1920
• Citation: 128 N.E. 429,236 Mass. 310
• Parties: WALTON LUNCH CO. v. KEARNEY et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

236 Mass. 310

128 N.E. 429

WALTON LUNCH CO.

v.KEARNEY et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Oct. 18, 1920.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County; James B. Carroll, Judge.

Suit by the Walton Lunch Company against John J. Kearney and others and the officers and members of the Hotel & Restaurant Employés' International Alliance, Local No. 34, etc., resulting in final decree for plaintiff, and plaintiff appealed, the appeal being discharged and the case remitted for amendment of record, a petition for attachment for contempt against defendants being subsequently filed and the case reported by a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court to the full court on two questions. Final decree affirmed, and first question answered in the negative.H. A. Baker and J. J. Feely, both of Boston, for plaintiff.

Frederick W. Mansfield and Edmund R. Mansfield, both of Boston, for defendants.

RUGG, C. J.

This is a suit in equity by a corporation engaged in the restaurant business in Boston against named defendants as ‘officers and members of a voluntary unincorporated association known as the Hotel & Restaurant Employés' International Alliance Union Local No. 34.’ The case was tried before a single justice, who entered a final decree in favor of the plaintiff. This decree was simply one of perpetual injunction against certain acts and conduct. It did not declare whether the strike was legal or illegal. The plaintiff appealed and requested a report of the material facts. R. L. c. 159, § 23. In response to that request the single justice found that the strike was legal. A summary statement of the facts respecting that point is that in August, 1919, representatives of employés of the plaintiff sent to it for consideration a form of agreement, which if accepted would have established the principles of an absolute closed shop and which contained other provisions designed to effect changes in working conditions of its employés. On September 2, 1919, representatives of the employés and of the plaintiff met at the office of the latter and talked over the situation for about two hours. ‘At the conclusion of the discussion Mr. Walton [one of the representatives of the plaintiff] stated that the closed-shop clause was important; that it was a change of policy and that he wished time to think it over.’ It was then agreed that the conference should be renewed at the same place at a later specified time. At that time and place Walton, although in his office, ‘concealed that fact from those in charge of the office and from the representatives [of the employés] whom he had agreed to meet there.’

The finding that this was the cause of the strike cannot be overturned. The evidence is not reported. It is not inconsistent with other facts found. Upon familiar principles it must stand.

The ruling that a strike for this cause was justifiable was right. This is not a case of a mere refusal to meet employés for discussion of demands for change of wages or working conditions. It is not a declination to confer with strangers about the subject. It is a plain case of a breach of good faith and of square dealing between man and man by intentionally failing without apparent excuse and without notice to keep an engagement deliberately made for further consultation touching their contractual relations with each other. It does not appear that the strike was in violation of the terms of any contract between the plaintiff and its employés.

All the further findings of fact, which describe the means whereby the strike was prosecuted, are in these words:

‘On the day following the vote to strike and on every day and night thereafter until September 12, 1919, the patrol, in pursuance of their appointed duties, passed up and down on the sidewalk adjacent to the principal entrance to the several restaurants, uttering loud outcries to the effect that the ‘system’ was unfair to labor and should not receive the public patronage. In making their apportioned round the patrol divided and made an approach to the entrance to the stores from either side. They met at the entrance and made their turns as near within the entrance as it was physically possible to do. As the distance to be covered in every instance was short, the turnings were so frequent that nearly all persons seeking to enter the restaurants were incommoded and many were deterred and intimidated from attempting to approach the restaurants. Attracted by the noise and the outcries of the patrol, large and sympathetic crowds gathered on the sidewalk near the restaurant, blocked the passage to it, hooted, jeered, hollered at, and pushed, struck, and withheld would-be customers to a degree seriously to incommode all and to intimidate many persons who sought to pass by or make an entrance to the restaurant. These acts of bystanders were not discouraged by the representatives of the employés, and I find they had their tacit approval.'

The essential words of the final decree are that the defendants ‘are perpetually enjoined and restrained from interfering with the plaintiff's business by picketing in such a manner as to annoy, harass and intimidate the plaintiff's customers or intending customers, or his [its] present employés or those desirous of entering his [its] employment, or by inducing by any means whatever any employé now or hereafter under written contract of employment to violate said contract.’

There is no error of law in this decree. Although not minute as to details, it unmistakably enjoins in every particular all the acts and conduct of the defendants set forth in the findings of fact as means by which the strike was carried on. The scope of the decree is coextensive with findings as to methods used to enforce the strike. Forms of interference with the plaintiff's rights which are not found to have been practiced or threatened are not rightly included within the terms of an injunction. Aberthaw Construction Co. v. Cameron, 194 Mass. 208, 215, 80 N. E. 478,12 Am. St. Rep. 542;Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 262, 38 Sup. Ct. 65, 62 L. Ed. 260, L. R. A. 1918C, 497, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461, questions as to the lawfulness of any kind of picketing (Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077,35 L. R. A. 722, 57 Am. St. Rep. 443), and as to the interpretation of St. 1913, c. 690, are not raised upon this record.

The plaintiff's requests for rulings of law are not properly before us. It is not necessary to consider any question of practice connected therewith. So far as pertinent to issues raised on the record, the questions of law thereby sought to be presented have been dealt with. As applied to this record those numbered 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 were in effect granted by the entry of the decree and the others ought not to have been granted, the final decree should be affirmed.

About three weeks after the entry of the final decree a petition for attachment for contempt against the defendants was filed. The petition contained allegations charging as violations of the injunction the commission of certain crimes and other acts not criminal in their nature. The matter came on to be heard before another justice, who has reserved for our consideration in that connection the question whether St. 1911, c. 339, is constitutional. The pertinent part of the statute is in section 1, which is in these words:

‘The defendant in proceedings for violation of an injunction, where it appears from the petition filed in court alleging the violation, that the violation is an act which also would be a crime, shall have the right to trial by jury on the issue of fact only, as to whether he committed the acts alleged to constitute the said violation, and the said trial by jury shall take place forthwith, and if there is no sitting of a jury in the county where the contempt proceedings are to be heard, a venire shall issue to impanel a jury forthwith.’

It is provided by section 2 that the act shall not apply to the proceedings in the probate court.

[5] It is an essential element of a court that it possesses power to enforce its orders and to protect itself from having its authority flouted. It was said by Chief Justice Gray in Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass, 230, 238:

‘The summary power to commit and punish for contempts tending to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice is inherent in courts of chancery or other superior courts, as essential to the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority, and is part of the law of the land, within the meaning of Magna Charta and of the twelfth article of our Declaration of Rights.’

This statement is complete, unequivocal and binding upon us. To undertake to amplify or make it more clear by further discussion would be vain. Similar statements are to be found in the decisions of numerous other courts where the question has arisen. State v. Matthews, 37 N. H. 450;People v. Tool, 35 Colo. 225, 248, 86 Pac. 224, 229, 231, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 822, 117 Am. St. Rep. 198; Middlebrook v. State, 43 Conn. 257, 268, 21 Am. Rep. 650;In re Cooper, 32 Vt. 253, 257;Morrison v. McDonald, 21 Me. 550, 556;State v. Doty, 32 N. J. Law, 403, 90 Am. Dec. 671;State v. Calloway, 5 Cold. (Tenn.) 326, 331, 98 Am. Dec. 404; Ex parte McCown, 139 N. C. 95, 122, 123, 51 S. E. 957,2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 603;State v. Judge Civil District Court for Parish of Orleans, 45 La. Ann. 1250, 1262, 14 South. 310,40 Am. St. Rep. 282. In the opinion of Mr. Justice Lamar in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, at page 450, 31 Sup. Ct. 492, 501 (55 L. Ed. 797, 34 L. R. A. [N. S.] 874), occurs this language:

‘While it is sparingly to be used, yet the power of courts to punish for contempts is a necessary and integral part of the independence of the judiciary, and is absolutely essential to the performance of the duties imposed on them by law. Without it they are mere boards of arbitration whose judgments and decrees would be only...