Walton v. Donnelly

• Decision Date: 28 June 1921
• Docket Number: Case Number: 12265
• Citation: 1921 OK 258,83 Okla. 233,201 P. 367
• Parties: WALTON, Mayor, etc., of Oklahoma City, v. DONNELLY, Com'r, etc., of Oklahoma City, et al.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1921 OK 258

201 P. 367

83 Okla. 233

WALTON, Mayor, etc., of Oklahoma City, v. DONNELLY, Com'r, etc., of Oklahoma City, et al.

Case Number: 12265

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: June 28, 1921

Syllabus

¶0 1. Municipal Corporations -- Charter Provisions Superseding General State Laws. The provisions of the charter of Oklahoma City, adopted under the authority of section 3a, art. 18, of the Constitution and section 539, Rev. Laws 1910, supersede all laws of this state in conflict with such charter provisions, in so far as such laws relate to purely municipal matters.

2. Same -- "General State Laws of General Concern." Such charter provisions do not supersede the general laws of the state of general concern, in which the state has a sovereign interest, and where the provisions of said charter conflict with the general laws of the state of this character, such laws will prevail.

3. Same -- Official Duties Defined by Charter -- Power of Commissioners to Transfer Duties. Where an officer is created by city charter and the duties thereof are defined by that instrument, it is not within the power of the commissioners to transfer such duties to another office unless there is some specific provision in the charter authorizing such a transfer.

4. Statutes--City Charters--Constitutions--Construction--Intent. In the construction of constitutions, statutes, and city charters, the intent of the lawmakers, when ascertained, must govern.

5. Same--Construction of Statutes--Rule of Ejusdem Generis. General words in a statute must receive a general construction, unless there is something in it to restrain them, but in accordance with what is commonly known as the rule of ejusdem generis, where, in a statute, general words follow a designation of particular subjects or classes of persons, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be restricted by the particular designation, and to include only things or persons of the same kind, class, or nature as those specifically enumerated. Unless there is a clear manifestation of a contrary purpose.

6. Same--Uniform Meaning of Term Used in Different Parts of Statute. Where the same word or phrase is used in different parts of a statute, it will be presumed to be used in the same sense throughout; and where its meaning m one instance is clear, this meaning will be attached to it elsewhere, unless it clearly appears from the whole statute that it was the intention of the Legislature to use it in a different sense.

7 Same--General Words Following Particular Terms. General words do not explain or amplify particular terms preceding them, but are themselves restricted and explained by the particular terms.

8 Same -- Ambiguity -- Reasonable Construction. If there is doubt or ambiguity in a statute, it is the duty of a court in interpreting the same to give it the most reasonable and just interpretation as the legislative intent, rather than an interpretation unreasonable, unjust, or one that will lead to an absurdity.

9. Municipal Corporations -- Charter Provisions--Power of Commissioners to Transfer Mayor's Prescribed Duties. Section 11, art. 2, of the charter deals with the transfer of duties not elsewhere specifically named in the charter, and does not empower the board, of commissioners, by a vote of four out of five commissioners, to transfer the powers specifically granted to the mayor by section 6, art. 2, of the charter, of having charge of the department of public affairs, which includes the police department, city jail, etc., to some other department.

10. Same--Validity of Transfer--Injunction by Mayor. The mayor of Oklahoma City, who is made the chief executive thereof, and whose duty it is, by virtue of the charter and the statute of the state, to see that all laws of one state and ordinances of the city are observed within the city limits, must necessarily possess control and supervision over the police department and city jail. Held, a motion adopted by four votes of the commissioners of said city whereby they take from the mayor all control over the police department and city jail, and attempt to assign said duties to the control of some other office or department, is void; and held, further, injunction will lie on behalf of the mayor against the commissioners or commissioner from exercising control over the police department and city jail by virtue of said void proceedings.

Bayard T. Hainer and D. S. Levy, for plaintiff in error.

McAdams & Brady, Wright, Blinn & Gilmer, and Morgan & Deupree, for defendants in error. Giddings & Giddings, amici curiae.

MCNEILL, J.

¶1 The question for determination in this case is whether the commissioners of Oklahoma City, by a motion receiving the vote of four of the commissioners, can transfer the supervision and control of the police department and the city jail from the mayor. Oklahoma City has a commission form of government and is operated under a charter framed and adopted as provided by section 3-a, art. 18, of the Constitution of the state. The charter provides for the election of five commissioners, who shall serve four years, and said charter assigns certain duties and departments to each commissioner. The instant case deals only with the duties of the mayor, who is commissioner of public affairs, and we will refer only to the sections of the charter applicable thereto. Section 1, art. 2, provides:

"The elective officers of this city shall be five commissioners, i.e. the mayor, who is commissioner of public affairs; the commissioner of public safety, commissioner of accounting and finance, the commissioner of public works, and the commissioner of public property," etc.

¶2 Section 4, art. 2, provides as follows:

"The mayor, as such, shall be the chief executive officer of the city, and he shall see that the laws are enforced. In addition to other duties imposed upon him by the state and municipal laws, and the board of commissioners, he shall sign the commissions of all appointive officers," etc.

¶3 Section 6, art. 2, provides as follows:

"Commissioner of Public Affairs--The commissioner of public affairs shall be superintendent of and have charge of the department of public affairs, which shall include the police department, municipal counselor and assistant, municipal judge, city jail, and relation of the city to other municipalities."

¶4 The charter, under the Constitution and statutes of this state, becomes the organic law of the city, and in addition to creating the offices of the five commissioners, and assigning them their duties, gives to the commissioners certain legislative powers. On April 12, 1921, at a meeting of the commissioners it was moved by one commissioner and seconded by another that the police department and city jail, which are under the supervision of the mayor, who as we have seen should have charge of the police department and city jail under the charter, be assigned and transferred to the commissioner of accounting and finance, who should thereafter supervise and have charge of the police department and city jail, and said transfer to take effect from date, four commissioners voting in the affirmative and the mayor voting in the negative. The petition in this case sets out all of the different provisions of the city charter stated above and alleges that immediately after the passage of the motion above the commissioner of accounting and finance attempted to exercise supervision over the police department and the city jail. It is contended the action of the commissioners in transferring the supervision and charge of the police department from the mayor is void and in violation of sections 4 and 6, art. 2, of the city charter. The mayor, by his petition, asks to have the commissioner of finance and accounting enjoined from interfering with him in the performance of the duties assigned to him under the charter. To the petition, the commissioner of accounting and finance filed a demurrer, which was sustained by the trial court. The mayor elected to stand upon the petition and refused to plead further, and the court dismissed the case, and from said judgment an appeal has been prosecuted to this court. The only question involved is the force and effect of the motion, and its validity. Second, whether injunction is the proper remedy. It has been the uniform holding of this court that city charters become the organic law of the municipality, and supersede the laws of the state in conflict therewith in so far as they attempt to regulate purely municipal matters. See Owen v. Tulsa, 27 Okla. 264. 111 P. 320; Lackey v. Grant. 29 Okla. 255, 116 P. 913; Mitchell v. Carter, 31 Okla. 592, 122 P. 691; Burns v. Linn, 49 Okla. 526, 153 P. 826. The Constitution provides that the charter shall not be in conflict with the Constitution and statutes of the state, and it has been further held that such charter provisions, where they conflict with the general laws of the state in matters not purely municipal, must give way, and while they may run concurrently with the general laws of the state, they may not run counter thereto. Burns v. Linn. supra; Board of Education v. Best, 26 Okla. 366, 109 P. 563; State v. Cumings, 47 Okla. 44, 146 P. 161. In the case of Kemp v. City of Monett, (Mo. or. of App. of St. Louis) 69 S.W. 31. it was said:

"A 'charter' is the municipal organic law, which no ordinance may override."

¶5 The courts have uniformly held that where an office is created by the Constitution, and the duties assigned to it by the Constitution, the Legislature has no power to transfer those duties to some other office. The rule is stated as follows:

"Where an office is created by or imbedded in the Constitution, and the duties thereof are defined by that instrument, or where the office antedated the Constitution, and its duties were enumerated by the statute at the time the Constitution was adopted, or where the office owed its origin to the common law, and had certain well-recognized duties attached thereto, or

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