Walton v. State

• Decision Date: 29 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. SC76695., No. SC78070
• Citation: 847 So.2d 438
• Parties: Jason Dirk WALTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Jason Dirk Walton, Petitioner, v. James V. Crosby, Jr., etc., Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

847 So.2d 438

Jason Dirk WALTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Jason Dirk Walton, Petitioner, v. James V. Crosby, Jr., etc., Respondent.

Nos. SC78070, SC76695.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 29, 2003.

Pamela H. Izakowitz, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel—South, Tampa, FL, for Appellant/Petitioner.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Kimbery Nolen Hopkins, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Appellee/Respondent.

REVISED ON REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

The opinion issued in this case on February 27, 2003, is withdrawn, and the following revised opinion is substituted in its place. Jason Dirk Walton appeals a final order of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit (Downey, J.) denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. This appeal is accompanied by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1) and (9) of the Florida Constitution.

Facts and Procedural History

On April 6, 1983, Jason Dirk Walton was indicted by a Pinellas County, Florida grand jury and charged with three counts of murder in the first degree. The facts surrounding the instant case are described in detail in the opinions of this Court addressing Walton's direct appeals. See Walton v. State, 481 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1985)

("Walton I"); Walton v. State, 547 So.2d 622 (Fla.1989)

("Walton II"). Walton pled not guilty and the case proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury recommended that Walton be sentenced to death for each of the three murders, and the judge followed the jury's recommendation.

An appeal was taken to this Court, and Walton's convictions were affirmed. However, this Court vacated Walton's death sentences because the State improperly used hearsay accounts during the penalty phase. Therefore, a new penalty proceeding was ordered. See Walton I, 481 So.2d at 1200

. Following Walton's second penalty proceeding, the jury again recommended three death sentences, each by a vote of nine to three. The trial court reimposed the death sentences, and on appeal, this Court affirmed. See generally Walton II, 547 So.2d at 623.

Walton's petition for certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court on January 8, 1990. See Walton v. Florida, 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S.Ct. 759, 107 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990). Shortly thereafter, a request by Walton for clemency was denied when Governor Bob Martinez signed a death warrant ordering Walton's execution on September 24, 1990. Subsequently, Walton's execution was stayed by order of this Court which allowed him to file a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850 by December 15, 1990. Walton timely filed such a motion attacking the validity of his convictions and sentences. Following a hearing on Walton's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Judge Brandt C. Downey III entered oral findings into the trial record and later formally denied Walton's motion in a written order. Walton appealed, and this Court reversed on the grounds that Walton was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to address the alleged failure of the State to produce certain public records. See Walton v. Dugger, 634 So.2d 1059 (Fla.1993)

.

This Court relinquished jurisdiction to the trial court to facilitate document production under Walton's public records requests and to allow for an evidentiary hearing on any claims resulting therefrom. See id. at 1062. Pending resolution of the public records claim, this Court reserved ruling on the remaining issues raised on appeal by Walton.¹ An evidentiary hearing on Walton's ineffective assistance of counsel claims was held on February 25 and 26, 1991. Following the conclusion of that hearing, the trial judge entered extensive findings into the record, and explicitly denied relief in a subsequent written order. Walton now appeals, reasserting his original claims and raising additional issues based upon evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing.² Walton has also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging ten bases for relief.³

Analysis

In the first of Walton's claims warranting discussion,⁴ he asserts that the trial court presiding over his resentencing proceedings improperly and unconstitutionally instructed the jury as to the aggravating factors they could consider in making their recommendation.⁵ Walton's resentencing jury was instructed on the aggravators of prior commission of a violent felony; commission of the murder while engaged in a robbery; commission for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest; commission for financial gain; that the crime was especially wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel (HAC); and commission in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner (CCP). The record reflects that the trial court instructed the jury in the following manner:

The aggravating circumstances you must consider are:

One, that the defendant has been previously convicted of another capital offense or of a felony involving the use of violence to some person.

Two, that the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed while he was engaged in or an accomplice in the crime of burglary or robbery.

Three, the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or affecting an escape from custody.

Four, the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed for financial gain.

Five, the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was especially wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel.

Six, the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense or [sic] moral or legal justification.

Following this set of instructions, the trial court gave a brief description of premeditation only, and did not inform the jury of any further narrowing requirements necessary to prove the existence of these aggravating factors.

The instructions given the jury in the instant case violated the precepts of the United States Supreme Court's Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), decision. In Espinosa, the Supreme Court held that "an aggravating circumstance is invalid ... if its description is so vague as to leave the sentencer without sufficient guidance for determining the presence or absence of the factor." 505 U.S. at 1081, 112 S.Ct. 2926. The Court then proceeded to declare the precise "especially wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel" instruction given Walton's jury in the instant case invalid under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 1082, 112 S.Ct. 2926.

Further, our decisions certainly require much more extensive instruction than was given in the instant case for application of the CCP aggravator. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85, 89 (Fla.1994)

(holding that proper application of the CCP aggravator requires proof "that the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection and not an act prompted by an emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage (cold); and that the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal incident (calculated); and that the defendant exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated); and that the defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification.") (citations omitted).

Because the instructions were clearly insufficient under the United States Supreme Court's, as well as this Court's, jurisprudence governing instructions designed to narrow the class of defendants constitutionally eligible for the death penalty, it is necessary for this Court to assess whether Walton should be granted retroactive relief. In the postconviction procedural setting before us today, it is dispositive that the defense did not register an objection to the jury instructions at trial. Because no objection was interposed during Walton's resentencing proceedings, Walton is foreclosed from claiming relief under Espinosa, as well as our decisions requiring more comprehensive jury instructions. This bar to requesting retroactive relief based upon subsequent changes in the law was set forth by this Court in a clear fashion in James v. State, 615 So.2d 668 (Fla.1993). In James, we held: "Claims that the [jury] instruction ... is unconstitutionally vague are procedurally barred unless a specific objection on that ground is made at trial and pursued on appeal." Id. at 669. In James, we concluded that the defendant's challenge to the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator was not barred, because he objected at trial, while his challenge to the cold, calculated, and premeditated jury instruction was barred because James failed to register an objection thereon during the trial. See id.; see also Clark v. Dugger, 559 So.2d 192, 193-94 (Fla.1990)

(holding that "an objection at trial is necessary to trigger... retroactivity"); Parker v. Dugger, 550 So.2d 459, 460 (Fla.1989) (same). Clearly, Walton's claim to relief under Espinosa is barred. No objection to the jury instructions was registered at trial, no claim regarding the instructions was raised on Walton's direct appeal, and none of the decisions upon which Walton now relies mandate retroactive application of their holdings. Indeed, "if punishment is ever to be imposed for society's most egregious crimes, the disposition of a particular case must at some point be considered final notwithstanding a comparison with other individual cases." Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922, 927 (Fla.1980). Walton's claim asserting an entitlement to a new trial based upon improper jury instructions is barred.

Walton's claims that his trial counsel and appellate counsel should have anticipated the above-cited jury instruction decisions are without merit. Because the Espinosa decision was delivered by the United States Supreme Court in 1992, and refinement of Florida's jury instructions by this Court began thereafter, trial and appellate counsel cannot be...