Wang v. Diamond Hill Realty, LLC

• Decision Date: 09 April 2014
• Citation: 984 N.Y.S.2d 76,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 02429,116 A.D.3d 767
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Parties: XIA–PING WANG, respondent, v. DIAMOND HILL REALTY, LLC, et al., defendants, New York Food & Drink Flushing, Inc., appellant.

116 A.D.3d 767

984 N.Y.S.2d 76

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 02429

XIA–PING WANG, respondent,

v. DIAMOND HILL REALTY, LLC, et al., defendants,New York Food & Drink Flushing, Inc., appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

April 9, 2014.

Xian Fend Zou, Flushing, N.Y. (William X. Zou of counsel), for appellant.

Morris Duffy Alonso & Faley, New York, N.Y. (Anna J. Ervolina of counsel), for defendant Diamond Hill Realty, LLC.

RANDALL T. ENG, P.J., MARK C. DILLON, JOSEPH J. MALTESE, and COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant New York Food & Drink Flushing, Inc., appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (McDonald, J.), dated May 1, 2012, as denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiff allegedly slipped and/or tripped and fell at or near certain premises located in Flushing, which were owned by the defendant Diamond Hill Realty, LLC (hereinafter Diamond Hill). As a result, the plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, Diamond Hill and the defendant New York Food & Drink Flushing, Inc. (hereinafter New York Food), the alleged tenant of the premises. Prior to serving an answer, New York Food moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it, contending that, at the time of the accident, it had not yet taken possession of the premises because the premises were occupied by a holdover tenant. The Supreme Court denied the motion.

A motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) to dismiss a complaint on the ground that a defense is founded on documentary evidence may be appropriately granted where the documentary evidence utterly refutes the plaintiff's allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law ( see Goshen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 N.Y.2d 314, 326, 746 N.Y.S.2d 858, 774 N.E.2d 1190;Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511;Matter of White Plains Plaza Realty, LLC v. Cappelli Enters., Inc., 108 A.D.3d 634, 970 N.Y.S.2d 47;Palmieri v. Biggiani, 108 A.D.3d 604, 970 N.Y.S.2d 41;Shuttle Contr. Corp. v. Peikarian, 108 A.D.3d 516, 968 N.Y.S.2d 179). Materials that clearly qualify as “documentary evidence” include “documents reflecting out-of-court transactions such as mortgages, deeds, contracts, and any other papers, the contents of which are ‘essentially undeniable’ ” ( Sands Point Partners Private Client Group v. Fidelity Natl. Title Ins. Co., 99 A.D.3d 982, 984, 953 N.Y.S.2d 147, quoting Fontanetta v. John Doe 1, 73 A.D.3d 78, 83–84, 898 N.Y.S.2d 569;see David D. Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, CPLR C3211:10, at 22). Contrary to New York Food's contention, affidavits do not qualify as “documentary evidence” for purposes of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) ( see Flushing Sav. Bank, FSB v. Siunykalimi, 94 A.D.3d 807, 941 N.Y.S.2d 719;Fontanetta v. John Doe 1, 73 A.D.3d at 85–86, 898 N.Y.S.2d 569;Berger v. Temple Beth–El of Great Neck, 303 A.D.2d 346, 347, 756 N.Y.S.2d 94). Here, the affidavits submitted by New York Food were not proper documentary evidence, and its submission of the stipulation of settlement between Diamond Hill and the purported holdover tenant failed to conclusively establish that it was not in possession of the premises at the time of the accident.

“On a motion to dismiss [a] complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” ( Breytman v. Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 A.D.3d 703, 703–704, 864 N.Y.S.2d 70;see Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d at 87, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511). “Where a defendant has submitted evidentiary material in support of a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and the motion has not been converted to one for summary judgment ( cf.CPLR 3211 [c]...