Wantou v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., L.L.C.

• Decision Date: 10 January 2022
• Docket Number: No. 20-40284,20-40284
• Citation: 23 F.4th 422
• Parties: Yves WANTOU, Plaintiff—Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. WAL-MART STORES TEXAS, L.L.C., Defendant—Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

23 F.4th 422

Yves WANTOU, Plaintiff—Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.WAL-MART STORES TEXAS, L.L.C., Defendant—Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 20-40284

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED January 10, 2022

Yves Wantou, Albany, FL, Pro Se.

Robert Brooks Gilbreath, Esq., Attorney, Hawkins Parnell & Young, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, Nancy Louise Waters, Esq., Attorney, James Nick Zoys, Geary, Porter & Donovan, P.C., Addison, TX, for Defendant—Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Gail S. Coleman, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of General Counsel/Appellate Services, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

Before Stewart, Ho, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Kurt D. Engelhardt, Circuit Judge

Both parties appeal certain rulings by the district court relative to the claims asserted by Plaintiff–Appellant/Cross-Appellee Yves Wantou against Wal-Mart Stores Texas, L.L.C., under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. , 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, and Texas law. We AFFIRM.

I.

Wantou, a pharmacist and black man from Cameroon, West Africa, filed suit against his former employer, Wal-Mart, contending that Wal-Mart intentionally subjected and/or allowed him to be subjected to discrimination based on race, color, and national origin, illegal harassment, and a hostile work environment. Wantou additionally claims that Wal-Mart retaliated against him for complaining about discrimination and asserting his rights. Specifically, Wantou's suit challenges his termination from employment, three written "coachings" (formal workplace disciplinary actions) that he received while employed by Wal-Mart, a threat of demotion, and Wal-Mart's alleged failure to pay him for approximately 24 hours of work. Based on these assertions, Wantou has requested relief in the form of back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and restitution under quantum meruit for unpaid work.

In the district court, all of Wantou's claims were dismissed by summary judgment except for his Title VII retaliation claims and his quantum meruit claim. The remaining claims were presented to a jury in October 2019. The jury rejected all but one claim—regarding the third coaching—for which it awarded $75,000 in punitive damages. The jury also provided an advisory verdict recommending an award of $32,240 in back pay and $0 in front pay. Post-trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of Wantou as to the third coaching, awarding $75,000 in punitive damages but only $5,177.50 as back pay. Attorney's fees also were awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) to Wantou as a prevailing party.

On appeal, Wantou challenges the jury's rejection of his Title VII retaliation claims regarding his termination and first and second coachings, and the jury's failure to award compensatory damages or restitution for unpaid work and other benefits. Wantou also contests the district court's front and back pay awards, the summary judgment dismissal of his discrimination and hostile work environment claims, and a number of the district court's rulings regarding proposed jury instructions, the admission of evidence, and limitations on trial time. Wal-Mart appeals all aspects of the district court's judgment and post-judgment rulings that are favorable to Wantou, in addition to arguing that punitive damages, if awarded, should be remitted to no more than $10,355.

II.

In this appeal, we are tasked with reviewing the district court's final judgment and rulings on the parties' motions asserted pursuant to Rules 49, 50, 51, 56, and 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary judgments rendered pursuant to Rule 56(b) are reviewed de novo, " ‘applying the same standard that the district court applied.’ " Aggreko, L.L.C. v. Chartis Specialty Ins. Co. , 942 F.3d 682, 687 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Smith v. Reg'l Transit Auth. , 827 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2016) ). "We may affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on any ground supported by the record and presented to the district court." Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co. , 784 F.3d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 2015).

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and "the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Material facts are those that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Leasehold Expense Recovery, Inc. v. Mothers Work, Inc. , 331 F.3d 452, 456 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "A genuine [dispute] of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P. , 864 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2017). All facts and reasonable inferences are construed in favor of the nonmovant, and the court should not weigh evidence or make credibility findings. Deville v. Marcantel , 567 F.3d 156, 163–64 (5th Cir. 2009). The resolution of a genuine dispute of material fact "is the exclusive province of the trier of fact and may not be decided at the summary judgment stage." Ramirez v. Landry's Seafood Inn & Oyster Bar , 280 F.3d 576, 578 n.3 (5th Cir. 2002).

Although Wantou's claims were presented to a jury, the jury's determinations regarding back pay and front pay are, in this context, only advisory. That is, back pay and front pay are equitable remedies determined by the court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2), (c). Thus, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and legal issues de novo. Gebreyesus v. F.C. Schaffer & Assocs., Inc. , 204 F.3d 639, 642 (5th Cir. 2000) (following a bench trial, we review the findings of fact for clear error and the legal issues de novo). "[F]actual findings made under an erroneous view of controlling legal principles are reviewed de novo." Walker v. Braus , 995 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1993).

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous "when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court, based on all the evidence, is left with the definitive and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Gebreyesus , 204 F.3d at 642 ; see also Anderson v. City of Bessemer , 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). Importantly, "[t]his standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently." Anderson , 470 U.S. at 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504.

Regarding the jury's verdict, both parties moved for judgments as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial. After a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial, judgments as a matter of law are appropriately rendered by the court only when "a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for a party on [an] issue." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). We review de novo the district court's ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, applying the same legal standard as the trial court. Flowers v. S. Reg'l Physician Servs. Inc. , 247 F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 2001). "[W]e consider all of the evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id. (quoting Brown v. Bryan Cnty. , 219 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 2000) ). Although our review is de novo, we recognize that "our standard of review with respect to a jury verdict is especially deferential." Id. Thus, a Rule 50 motion must be denied "unless the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in the movant's favor that reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion." Id. (internal quotation omitted). We reverse the denial of a Rule 50 motion only if the jury's factual findings are unsupported by substantial evidence or "the legal conclusions implied from the jury's verdict cannot in law be supported by those findings." Williams v. Manitowoc Cranes, L.L.C. , 898 F.3d 607, 614 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).

After a jury trial, Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes courts to grant motions for new trial for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. After a nonjury trial, Rule 59 allows new trials for any reason for which a rehearing has heretofore been granted in a suit in equity in federal court. Id. The district court's exercise of discretion in denying a motion for new trial or remittitur "can be set aside only upon a clear showing of abuse." Eiland v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. , 58 F.3d 176, 183 (5th Cir. 1995) ; see also Abner v. Kansas City S.R.R. Co. , 513 F.3d 154, 157 (5th Cir. 2008).

When reviewing a jury's conclusions, "we are bound to view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the jury's determination." Rideau v. Parkem Indus. Servs., Inc. , 917 F.2d 892, 897 (5th Cir. 1990). We defer to jury verdicts and interpret them "most favorabl[y] to upholding the jury's decision by a finding of consistency." Merritt Hawkins & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Gresham , 861 F.3d 143, 154 (5th Cir. 2017). We will reverse the denial of a motion for new trial "only when there is an absolute absence of evidence to support the jury's verdict." Williams , 898 F.3d at 614 (citation omitted). "However, when this court is left with the perception that the verdict is clearly excessive, deference must be abandoned." Eiland , 58 F.3d at 183. When "defects in the award are readily identifiable and measurable," remittitur ordinarily is appropriate. Matter of 3 Star Props., L.L.C. , 6 F.4th 595, 613 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Brunnemann v. Terra Int'l , Inc., 975 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1992) ). Constitutional challenges to the size of the punitive damages award are reviewed de novo. Lincoln v. Case , 340 F.3d 283, 294 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc. , 532 U.S. 424, 436,...