Ward v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 19567
| Decision Date | 30 June 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 19567,19567 |
| Citation | 567 S.W.2d 934 |
| Parties | Gloria WARD, Appellant, v. CHARTER OAK FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Ralph C. Jones, Carter, Jones, Magee, Rudberg, Moss & Mayes, Dallas, for appellant.
David R. Noteware, Thompson, Knight, Simmons & Bullion, Dallas, for appellee.
This is a worker's compensation case. Gloria Ward appeals from the trial court's judgment sustaining Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing the cause. The dismissal was based upon Ward's failure to timely file her notice of appeal from a ruling of the Industrial Accident Board. Since we conclude that Ward has not complied with the requirements of the worker's compensation laws, we affirm.
The sole question on this appeal is whether Ward has complied with the provisions of Section 5 of Article 8307, Texas Revised Civil Statutes, which provides, in applicable part:
Any interested party who is not willing and does not consent to abide by the final ruling and decision of (the Industrial Accident Board) shall, within twenty (20) days after the rendition of said final ruling and decision by said Board, file with the Board notice that he will not abide by said final ruling and decision.
In the present case, the Board entered its award on June 28, 1977, and Ward mailed her notice of appeal to the Board on July 12, 1977. The envelope containing the notice was received in Austin on July 15, 1977, marked "postage due: 11 cents" and returned to the sender. Charter Oak concedes that no postage was actually due, and that the letter was thus erroneously returned. The letter was returned to the offices of Ward's attorneys on July 18, 1977. Again, her attorneys mailed the notice to the Board. The notice was finally received by the Board on July 20, 1977, two days after the expiration of the twenty-day filing period.
Ward argues that she has substantially complied with the requirements of Article 8307 by using due diligence in mailing her notice to the Board a full six days before it was due. She urges that she should not be penalized for the error of the postal authorities in improperly refusing to deliver the letter. In support of this contention, she cites Tate v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 32 S.W.2d 932 (Tex.Civ.App. Beaumont 1930, writ ref'd) and Travelers Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 131 S.W.2d 242 (), which hold that when an aggrieved party uses reasonable diligence to comply with the timing requirements of Article 8307 by mailing the notification in ample time for it to be received and filed by the Board, the party is not to be charged with any delay in delivery caused by circumstances beyond his control. These decisions were based upon the principle that the worker's compensation laws are to be liberally construed to effectuate the remedies which they grant.
Although Ward's argument is persuasive, it cannot be accepted. In 1938, our supreme court made its last definitive statement on this subject by refusing the writ of error in Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Millican, 115 S.W.2d 464 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1938, writ ref'd). In that case, a party mailed his notice of appeal to the Board in time for it to be timely filed; however, the notice was not delivered to the Board until the twentieth day, which was a Sunday. The Board filed the notice the following day. On appeal from a judgment favorable to the claimant, the insurer argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to render its judgment because of the claimant's failure to timely file notice of appeal. The San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals agreed, stating:
The Workmen's Compensation Act having created the rights to be enforced and provided the remedy therefor, each step in the progress of the maturity of the claim from the time of the injury to its final adjudication is a mandatory requirement, necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction by the first and succeeding statutory agencies. (115 S.W.2d at 465) (emphasis added)
As we noted above, this holding was specifically approved by...
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Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. LaCoke, 8600
...Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Cook, 55 S.W.2d 205 (Tex.Civ.App. Waco 1932, no writ). . . ." In the recent case of Ward v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 567 S.W.2d 934 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1978, no writ), the employee selected the mails as the mode of delivery of her notice of appeal to the In......
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...later decision in Olson, we do not regard Hart as authoritative on this question. As we stated in Ward v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co., 567 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1978), rev'd on other grounds 579 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. 1979), we are bound by the supreme court authority, and as an......
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Ward v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co.
...court found that Ward had not filed timely notice and dismissed the cause for want of jurisdiction. The court of civil appeals affirmed. 567 S.W.2d 934. We reverse the judgments of the courts below and remand the cause to the trial Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company issued a worker's compen......