Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. La Rochelle

• Decision Date: 28 August 1979
• Docket Number: No. 19830,19830
• Citation: 587 S.W.2d 493
• Parties: FIDELITY & GUARANTY INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS, INC., Appellant, v. Michelle La ROCHELLE, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 493

587 S.W.2d 493

FIDELITY & GUARANTY INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS, INC., Appellant, v. Michelle La ROCHELLE, Appellee.

No. 19830.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

Aug. 28, 1979.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 2, 1979.

C. Edward Fowler, Jr., Milam Randolph Pharo, Bailey, Williams, Westfall, Lee & Fowler, Dallas, for appellant.

John T. McCully, Dallas, for appellee.

Before AKIN, ROBERTSON and CARVER, JJ.

ROBERTSON, Justice.

Appellee Michelle La Rochelle sued appellant Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. on a worker's compensation claim. Trial was to a jury which found in favor of the insured employee-appellee, and judgment was rendered on the verdict for her. On appeal, appellant asserts that a special issue concerning injury was not a correct issue, that appellee was not in the course of her employment and that there was no causal connection between the act and the injury. We hold that the special issue submitted by the trial court was not proper, but overrule appellant's other contentions, and, accordingly, we reverse and remand.

The record reflects that nine months before the injury claimed in the present case appellee injured her lower back while working for a different employer. Appellee's injury was diagnosed as a protruding disc. Although surgery was suggested, she opted for several months bed rest and later returned to work. In July of 1976, appellee became an employee of Del-Mar Scientifics, Inc., where she built monitors and detectors for hydrogen-sulfide gas. A ping-pong table was available to the employees for recreation during lunch and various other work breaks during the day. On November 8, 1976, during an afternoon work break, appellee engaged in a game of ping pong in the building next to the one in which she worked, but on her employer's premises. Shortly after the game, she experienced pain in her lower back. Appellee was again treated for a disc condition and this time underwent surgery. During the course of the operation, a degenerated disc condition was discovered, two discs were removed and a fusion was performed. Appellee initially filed a group-health insurance claim with Del-Mar's insurance carrier and a worker's compensation claim against her former employer, contending that the disc condition was the result of the earlier injury in February 1976. Appellee later filed this worker's compensation suit against Del-Mar and appellant, claiming that she had sustained an "accidental" injury during the course of her employment as a result of the November 8, 1976 ping pong game.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in submitting special issue no. 1 which stated:

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Michelle La Rochelle received an injury on or about November 8, 1976? "Injury" means damage or harm to the physical structure of the body and such diseases or infection as naturally result therefrom or the incitement, acceleration or aggravation of any disease, infirmity or condition previously or subsequently existing by reason of such damage or harm.

Appellant objected to the submission of this issue on the ground that it failed to inquire as to whether appellee received an "accidental" injury. A proposed special issue asking whether appellee's injury was accidental and containing a definition of accident was submitted by appellant to the court. The trial court overruled the appellant's objection and refused to submit its proposed special issue and its instruction defining "accidental" injury, which are as follows:

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that MICHELLE LA ROCHELLE received an accidental injury on or about November 19, 1976? Answer: "We do," or "We do not." In connection with this Special Issue, you are instructed that "Accidental" means an undesigned or unexpected occurrence, traceable to a definite time and place.

We conclude that Olson v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex.1972) is controlling; consequently, we hold that the trial court erred in refusing to submit appellant's proposed special issue and instruction. In Olson, the supreme court stated that to have an accidental injury there must be an undesigned, untoward event traceable to a definite time, place and cause. The cases that have followed Olson hold that the proper issue to submit is one inquiring whether the injury was accidental and should include a definition of "accidental." See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Contreras, 498 S.W.2d 419 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston (1st Dist.) 1973, writ ref'd n. r. e.); Northern Assurance Co. of America v. Taylor, 540 S.W.2d 832 (Tex.Civ.App. Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n. r. e.); Select Insurance Co. v. Patton, 506 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1974, no writ); Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Shreve, 551 S.W.2d 79 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston (1st Dist.) 1977, no writ). Appellee argues, nevertheless, that the Worker's Compensation Act does not require an injury to be accidental in origin and cites Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston 1958, writ ref'd n. r. e.), which states: "(T)hough many cases speak of an 'accidental' injury, there is nothing in the Worker's Compensation Act which requires that the injury be the result of an accident." In view of the supreme court's later decision in Olson, we do not regard Hart as authoritative on this question. As we stated in Ward v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co., 567 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1978), rev'd on other grounds 579 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. 1979), we are bound by the supreme court authority, and as an intermediate appellate court, we must defer to its judgment, although, in our opinion, this is an extraordinarily harsh result and places an additional burden on a claimant, not contemplated by the spirit of the Act. In this respect, the cases are legion that require the Act to be construed liberally so as to effectuate the beneficial purpose for which it was enacted. Brantley v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 536 S.W.2d 72 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston (1st Dist.) 1976, writ ref'd).

Since we have held that the trial judge erred in refusing appellant's special issue and have reversed and remanded for another trial, we must also address appellant's other points because if they have merit we would render judgment rather than remand. In this respect, appellant challenges the jury's finding that the injury occurred within the course of the employee's employment as not being supported by the evidence. We disagree. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 8309, § 1(4) (Vernon 1967) defines "compensable injury" to include:

All other injuries of every kind and character having to do with and originating in the work, business, trade or profession of the employer received by an employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer whether upon the employer's premises or elsewhere.

The question presented here is whether playing ping pong is an activity "having to do with and originating in the employer's business."

We conclude that a fact issue on this question is presented under the opinion of this court in Clevenger v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 396 S.W.2d 174 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n. r. e.). In that case the plaintiff sustained injuries while playing baseball at a company-sponsored picnic held at a location away from the employer's premises. At trial, the trial court sustained the defendant's motion for instructed verdict holding that the plaintiff was not within the course of his employment at the time of the injury. This court reversed and remanded, stating that the evidence was sufficient to submit an issue to the jury on whether the plaintiff sustained injuries while acting within the course of his employment. This court, quoting with approval Professor Larson in his treatise on Workmen's Compensation, stated the rule: "Recreational or social activities are within the course of employment when (1) they occur on the premises during a lunch or recreation period as a regular incident to the employment . . . ." 396 S.W.2d at 182. Here, appellee's employer Del-Mar gave its employees permission to play ping pong on the premises. The employer regulated where the ping pong table was placed and the times during which the employees could play. Ping pong games occurred regularly. We hold that these facts are sufficient to satisfy the definition of the course of employment approved by this court in Clevenger and, thus, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding that the injury occurred in the course of employment.

A factually similar case was before the Supreme Court of Connecticut in McNamara v. Town of Hamden, --- Conn. ---, 398 A.2d 1161 (Conn.1979). In McNamara, plaintiff's injuries occurred while he was engaged in a customary and permitted game of ping pong on the employer's premises prior to the appointed hour for the start of the work day, using equipment purchased by the employees. The court held that when determining whether the activity is incidental to the employment, the following rule should be applied: "If the activity is regularly engaged in on the employer's premises within the period of employment with the employer's approval or acquiescence, an injury occurring under those conditions shall be found to be compensable." The Connecticut court found that the plaintiff had been injured in the course and scope of his employment. In language directly applicable to the present case, that court stated:

The employer sanctioned the games by regulating the permitted playing times by allowing the equipment on the premises, and by setting aside actual work hours in the afternoon for the activity. The games occurred regularly on the premises of the employer. Those facts constitute a sufficient basis on which to conclude that the games were an incident of the employment under the test we now adopt. 398 A.2d at 1166.

We turn now to appellant's final contention that a causal connection...