Ward v. Procter & Gamble Paper Products Co.
| Decision Date | 10 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-1655,96-1655 |
| Parties | 73 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1182, 70 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,741 Gwendolyn WARD, Appellant, v. The PROCTER & GAMBLE PAPER PRODUCTS COMPANY, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
D. Eric Sowers, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellant.
Paula Finlay Luepke, St. Louis, MO, argued (James P. Mannion, Jr., on the brief), for appellee.
Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, MAGILL, Circuit Judge, and SACHS, 1 District Judge.
Gwendolyn Ward appeals the district court's 2 grant of summary judgment to her former employer, the Procter & Gamble Paper Products Company (the Plant), in Ward's Title VII employment discrimination suit. Because Ward failed to present evidence that the Plant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for discharging her are pretextual, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.
The Plant employed Ward, an African-American woman, from June 5, 1989, until she was dismissed on September 29, 1993. Ward worked on a manufacturing line as a technician. The Plant managed the production lines using a team-based work system which required employees to interact with each other.
Over time, Plant managers concluded that Ward was having difficulty interacting with her co-workers. In an employment evaluation, dated January 30, 1992, Ward's team manager instructed Ward that she needed to improve in the areas of teamwork and cooperation. Ward's team manager specifically noted that unresolved disputes with the team or team leader were more appropriately taken to management, rather than handled through disruptive confrontations on the manufacturing floor.
On August 31, 1992, Ward was involved in a confrontation with two white male employees in which she used foul language. Her fellow employees, rather than Ward, reported the incident to management. Immediately following the incident, Ward refused to discuss it with management and Ward was sent home for insubordination. Ward now claims that she was too upset to discuss the incident at the time and that the incident was the result of the two male employees' harassment of her. The Plant disciplined Ward for the incident by placing her on Level One probation. Level One is the lowest of the Plant's four levels of probation.
Ward completed ten months of probation without incident when the events occurred that precipitated her dismissal. On September 29, 1993, Ward was involved in an argument with her team leader, Sharon Heise. The argument began after Heise told Ward that the team had voted to move Ward off the team. The manner in which the argument escalated is in dispute, with Ward claiming that following mutual finger pointing Heise grabbed Ward's finger. However, there is no dispute that, in anger, Ward struck Heise. See Aff. of Gwendolyn Ward at 1, reprinted in Appellant's App. at 15; Dep. of Gwendolyn Ward at 25, reprinted in Appellant's App. at 42; Aff. of Reginald Gipson at 1, reprinted in Appellant's App. at 72. Heise did not reciprocate.
The nature of the contact is also unresolved. Ward states that she "hit [Heise] on the side of the arm, slapped her on the side of the arm." Dep. of Gwendolyn Ward at 18, reprinted in Appellant's App. at 39; see also Aff. of Gwendolyn Ward at 1, reprinted in Appellant's App. at 15. However, Linda Greaser, the Plant's employee relations manager, states in her affidavit that Heise told Greaser that Ward had "punched" her. Aff. of Linda Greaser at 2, reprinted in Appellant's App. at 59.
The incident was investigated by a group of two African-American and two white managers. They recommended that, because striking a fellow employee in anger violated the Plant's rules against fighting, Ward's employment be terminated. The Plant's manager, Joseph Doner, accepted the recommendation and made the decision to terminate Ward's employment.
Following her dismissal, Ward made a claim of sex and race discrimination to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC concluded that the evidence obtained during its investigation did not establish a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
On December 19, 1994, Ward brought suit in district court against the Plant under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-5 (1994), and the Civil Rights Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994), alleging that the termination of her employment was racially discriminatory. The district court, concluding that Ward had failed to make a prima facie case, granted the Plant's motion for summary judgment. Ward appeals.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard which governed the district court's decision. See Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., 55 F.3d 377, 379 (8th Cir.1995). Summary judgment is proper if, taking all the evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir.1995). A defendant who moves for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). However, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere denials or allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Tindle, 56 F.3d at 969 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).
Taking all the evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to Ward, the fact remains that Ward struck a fellow employee in anger. It is beyond question that an employee's striking of a fellow employee is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for dismissal. See John Giannopoulos v. Brach & Brock Confections, Inc., 109 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.1997) (); Witherspoon v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 814 F.Supp. 17, 20 (D.Md.1993) (); cf. Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir.1997) (); Kahn v. U.S. Secretary of Labor, 64 F.3d 271, 279 (7th Cir.1995) (); Ross v....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Dose v. Buena Vista University
...reasons for terminating an employee.'") (quoting Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 919 (8th Cir.2000)); Ward v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods., Co., 111 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir.1997) ("It is beyond question that an employee's striking of a fellow employee is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reaso......
-
Michaelson v. Waitt Broadcasting, Inc.
...[co-employees] were `similarly situated in all relevant respects'") (quoting Harvey, 38 F.3d at 972); Ward v. Procter & Gamble Paper Products Co., 111 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir.1997). Indeed, in Lynn, a panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals specifically rejected the contention that the ......
-
Whitley v. City of Portland, Civil No. 07-1114-AC.
...situated when they are involved in or accused of the same offense and are disciplined in different ways." Ward v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Co., 111 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir.1997) (internal quotations and citation omitted, emphasis in original). In Vasquez, the Ninth Circuit held that the......
-
Mercer v. City of Cedar Rapids
...situated is whether they have been accused of the same conduct, but treated differently. See, e.g., Ward v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Co., 111 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir.1997) (noting, in a Title VII race discrimination case, that "[e]mployees are similarly situated when they are involved i......