Warner v. State

• Decision Date: 22 April 1948
• Citation: 79 N.E.2d 459,297 N.Y. 395
• Parties: WARNER v. STATE.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

297 N.Y. 395

79 N.E.2d 459

WARNER

v.STATE.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 22, 1948.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Claim by Fred Warner against the State of New York to recover damages for false imprisonment. From a judgment in favor of defendant, entered July 7, 1947, 272 App.Div. 954, 71 N.Y.S.2d 559, upon an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department which reversed on the law and facts, a judgment in favor of claimant entered upon a decision of the Court of Claims (Lambiase, J., 189 Misc. 51, 68 N.Y.S.2d 60,) and which dismissed the claim, claimant appeals. Specified findings of fact contained in the decision of the Court of Claims were reversed, one finding was modified and new findings were made by the Appellate Division.

Judgment of appellate division reversed and decision of Court of Claims affirmed as modified.

DESMOND, THACHER and DYE, JJ., dissenting.

Where claimant was committed to state hospital for mentally ill pursuant to court order, and proceeding was initiated pursuant to statute to review order, state and hospital authorities could appeal from order adjudging claimant sane and directing claimant's release. Mental Hygiene Law, ss 74, 76. Joe Schapiro of Hamilton, for appellant.

Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Atty. Gen., (John R. Davison, Wendell P. Brown and Ronald E. Coleman, all of Albany, of counsel), for respondent.

FULD, Judge.

Fred Warner was a fairly successful farmer owning and operating a farm in Madison County, New York. He was married in 1924, and continued to live with his wife and one child until 1944, when the events which gave rise to this action occurred. His marital life had been increasingly disturbed by domestic troubles between himself on one side and his wife and mother-in-law on the other.

On June 18, 1944, the wife called upon the town health officer who happened to be the family physician and complained about claimant's behavior and mental condition. She described her husband as a man of peculiar traits and eccentricities ranging from argumentativeness and irritability to delusions that her hands ‘were poison’ and that it was necessary to lock the doors against thieves.

Without either seeing or examining claimant, the health officer telephoned the Marcy State Hospital, a State institution for the mentally ill, and forwarded to it a certificate requesting claimant's admission. Three days later, on June 21, claimant was interrupted at his work by a State trooper and three employees of the hospital. They took him, against his will, though without violence, to the institution in an ambulance. Upon arrival, he was given a cursory physical examination and admitted as appears from a hospital record then made and entitled ‘Admission Note’ ‘on an H. O. (Health Officer's) Certification.’ I merely note at this point that that certificate was concededly defective since it appeared on its face that the health officer had not, as section 72 of the Mental Hygiene Law, Consol.Laws. c. 27, required, personally examined the subject. Claimant, though he frequently demanded his release, remained in the hospital for two months. While there he was given, over his objection, several electric shock treatments which produced convulsions, broke his arm and injured his back.

On July 5, two weeks after claimant's admission in the manner related, a court order was signed, upon petition of the wife, directing his commitment to the institution. There is no doubt that that order was in form valid and proper, having been obtained in accordance with section 74 of the Mental Hygiene Law. During claimant's confinement, his sister initiated a proceeding, pursuant to section 76 of that law, to review the July court order, and on August 21, after a trial, a jury found him sane and the court entered an order so adjudging him and directing his release. The State and hospital authorities took no appeal although privileged so to do (People ex rel. Benson v. Burdick, 215 App.Div. 163, 165, 213 N.Y.S. 220, 222) and claimant returned to his home, to live and work there as he had before.

Some time after his release, claimant brought this action for false imprisonment, asserting that both the original arrest and the detention for the entire period between June 21 and August 21 were unlawful. The Court of Claims awarded some $6,000 in damages, including sums for personal injuries and loss of crops and livestock. Both State and claimant appealed; the latter contending that the damages awarded were inadequate, the State, that no cause of action was established. The Appellate Division, adopting the State's view, reversed and dismissed the claim.

We do not agree entirely with the determination made in either court. In our view, there was no warrant or justification for the original arrest or for the restraint up to July 5 and the claimant is entitled to damages therefor but the court order of July 5, being valid, authorized claimant's subsequent confinement and protected the State from any further liability for false imprisonment after that date. (See Douglas v. State of New York, 296 N.Y. 530, 68 N.E.2d 605, affirming 269 App.Div. 521, 56 N.Y.S.2d 245;Clark v. Nannery, 292 N.Y. 105, 108, 54 N.E.2d 31, 32;Hendrix v. Manhattan Beach Development Co., 181 App.Div. 111, 117, 168 N.Y.S. 316, 321; see, also, Restatement, Torts, s 122.) Claimant's contention, that, if the initial restraint was wrongful, the hospital was under the necessity of first releasing and then rearresting him if it chose to rely upon the court order, is without merit. (See Clark v. Nannery, supra, 292 N.Y. at page 108, 54 N.E.2d at page 32;Hendrix v. Manhattan Beach Development Co., supra, 181 App.Div. at page 117, 168 N.Y.S. at page 321;Gearity v. Strasbourger, 133 App.Div. 701, 704, 118 N.Y.S. 257, 259.)

The detention prior to July 5 must, however, stand upon a different footing; if without basis, the later court order will not absolve the State from liability already incurred (see Clark v. Nannery, supra, 292 N.Y. at page 108, 54 N.E.2d at page 32;Hendrix v. Manhattan Beach Development Co., supra, 181 App.Div. at page 117, 168 N.Y.S. at page 321;Ingo v. Koch, 2 Cir., 127 F.2d 667, 671), and, accordingly, we turn to a consideration of that original restraint.

It is settled that one who arrests or restrains another may be liable for pursuing illegal or improper procedure as well as for acting upon an insufficient or improper basis. (See Snead v. Bonnoil, 166 N.Y. 325, 328,59 N.E. 899, 900; MacDonnell v. McConville, 148 App.Div. 49, 53, 132 N.Y.S. 1085, 1088, affirmed 210 N.Y. 529, 103 N.E. 1126;Rutherford v. Holmes, 66 N.Y. 368, 372;Ingo v. Koch, supra, 127 F.2d at page 671; Look v. Dean and Look v. Choate, 108 Mass. 116, 121, 122, 123,11 Am.Rep. 323.) With that in mind, we examine the facts before the hospital officials on June 21 when claimant was first taken into custody to ascertain whether they and through them the State were justified in adopting the procedure they did to effect claimant's detention. We seek in vain a rule of common law or a provision of statute for such justification.

The common law recognized the power to restrain, summarily and without court process, an insane person who was dangerous at the moment. The power was to be exercised, however, only when ‘necessary to prevent the party from doing some immediate injury either to himself or others' (Anderdon v. Burrows, 4 Car. & P. 210, 213, 172 Eng.Reprint 674, 675) and ‘only when the urgency of the case demands immediate intervention.’ (Keleher v. Putnam, 60 N.H. 30, 31,49 Am.Rep. 304; see, also, Scott v. Wakem, 3 F. & F. 328, 334, 176 Eng.Reprint 147, 149; Look v. Dean, 108 Mass. 116, 120 et seq., 11 Am.Rep. 323;Witte v. Haben, 131 Minn. 71, 74, 154 N.W. 662, L.R.A.1916 C, 228, Ann.Cas.1917 D, 534; Colby v. Jackson, 12 N.H. 526, 530, 531; 9 Bac.Abr. (1876), Trespass, p. 469; Buswell, Law of Insanity (1885), s 23; Note, 56 Yale L.J. 1178, 1185.) On the other hand, insane persons who were not dangerous were ‘not liable to be thus arrested or restrained’. (Look v. Dean, supra, 108 Mass. at page 120, 11 Am.Rep., 323.) And upon one who did the restraining rested the burden of showing, in order to justify it, the urgency and necessity for the immediate restraint. (See Scott v. Wakem, supra; Emmerich v. Thorley, 35 App.Div. 452, 456, 54 N.Y.S. 791, 794;Crawford v. Brown, 321 Ill. 305, 316-318, 151 N.E. 911, 45 A.L.R. 1457;Maxwell v. Maxwell, 189 Iowa 7, 13, 177 N.W. 541, 10 A.L.R. 482;Boesch v. Kick, 97 N.J.L. 92, 96, 97, 116 A. 796.) Emmerich v. Thorley, supra relied upon by Judge Desmond in his dissenting opinion is a striking illustration of the sort of case wherein summary restraint is justifiable. There, the plaintiff who had been summarily and forcibly restrained was actually in the act of throwing herself out of a window to escape fancied pursuers and, as the court there noted, ‘it was only by the exertion of force by Mr. Thorley that she was overcome, and she was not quieted until her strength was exhausted’ (35 App.Div. at page 454, 54 N.Y.S. at page 792).

The State has enacted legislation dealing with the admission procedures to be followed in committing and confining the mentally ill (Mental Hygiene Law, art. 5), but that did not affect the existence of the common-law privilege of summary arrest and detention. The statute did not abolish or curtail the power in a proper case; nor did it, by the same token, enlarge the area of its exercise. As before, only where immediate and precipitate action is demanded to prevent present and imminent harm, may the power be exercised. In lesser emergencies, the statute points the swift and expeditious admission procedures to which resort must be had. It is by one of those methods that any party State or individual must move where something less than present and imminent danger threatens. In section 75 of the Mental Hygiene Law, for instance,...