Warren v. Ballard
Decision Date | 15 March 1996 |
Docket Number | S95G1212,Nos. S95G1171,s. S95G1171 |
Citation | 467 S.E.2d 891,266 Ga. 408 |
Parties | WARREN v. BALLARD et al. SUBER v. LUKE et al. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Dade County Superior, Kristina Cook Connelly, Trial Judge.
Ronald W. Hallman, Hallman & Stewart, Claxton, Beryl H. Weiner, Weiner, Yancey, Dempsey & Diggs, Harry W. Weill, Weill & Weill, Kelly J. Peters, N. Mark Kinsman, for appellees.
Wilson R. Smith, Newton, Smith, Durden, Kaufold & Rice, Vidalia, for appellant in case no. S95G1212.
Although these two cases were not tried together in the trial court and were not heard together in the Court of Appeals, we granted certiorari in both to consider the same question, namely, when may a tort defendant elicit testimony regarding insurance coverage for purposes of impeachment. Ballard v. Warren, 217 Ga.App. 23(1), 456 S.E.2d 589 (1995); Luke v. Suber, 217 Ga.App. 84(1), 456 S.E.2d 598 (1995).
a. Warren v. Ballard centers around a three-vehicle accident which occurred on June 11, 1990, on I-24 in Dade County, between a car driven by Warren, a van driven by Ballard and a tractor-trailer owned by defendant Foster Trucking Company and operated by defendant Walls. At trial, Ballard admitted that he caused the accident by pulling from a road shoulder onto I-24 into the path of the other vehicles. Thus, the main issue at trial was that of damages, and the jury awarded Warren a verdict of $78,500 from Ballard.
During the course of the trial, Warren testified concerning the amount of her physical therapy costs: She also stated: Warren then read to the jury a list of her medical bills which totaled $6,287.22. Warren's husband testified: After the testimony, Ballard's counsel, in a side bar conference with the trial judge, sought to be allowed to cross-examine Warren and her husband as to whether they had received payments from State Farm, their insurance carrier. The trial court prohibited the defense attorney from inquiring about insurance benefits.
Although recognizing that a trial court has the discretion to balance the probative value of collateral source evidence against its prejudicial impact, the Court of Appeals held that the trial judge should have allowed cross-examination concerning collateral source evidence because Warren and her husband had given the jury a false impression that they incurred harm and hardship which they had not and in doing so had implied that they had no insurance coverage. Ballard v. Warren, 217 Ga.App. at 24-25, 456 S.E.2d 589.
b. In Suber v. Luke, a medical malpractice case, Marcus Luke testified on direct examination about medical bills in excess of $80,000.00 incurred as a result of Dr. Suber's alleged negligence in perforating Karen Luke's colon during a cesarean section delivery. Luke later testified that the baby, who was unharmed, had stayed in the hospital with his wife during her recovery period. In response to the question, "And what was your understanding of that?", Luke replied: Luke was then asked whether he had received a bill for the baby's stay in the hospital. He responded, Suber did not object to this testimony, but on cross-examination, sought to impeach it by establishing that Luke had medical insurance which paid the bills to which he referred. Suber's attorney contended that Luke's testimony had "opened the door" for proof of health insurance coverage. After discussion with counsel, the trial judge concluded that Luke's testimony could be impeached by proof of insurance coverage. The trial resulted in a jury verdict for Suber.
The Court of Appeals reversed and granted a new trial, holding that Luke's testimony did not "open the door" and that the prejudicial effect of admitting the evidence outweighed its relevancy for purposes of impeachment.
2. We turn now to a consideration of the general proposition whether collateral source evidence is admissible for impeachment in a case in which the plaintiff testifies to anxiety about payment of medical bills. We note that impeachment by evidence of collateral sources is only allowed if the false testimony is related to a material issue in the case. Waits v. Hardy, 214 Ga. 495, 496, 105 S.E.2d 719 (1958); Mann v. State, 124 Ga. 760, 53 S.E. 324 (1905). The question, then, is whether testimony regarding anxiety over payment of medical bills relates to a material issue. While evidence of the amount of medical bills may be admissible on a claim of pain and suffering to show the seriousness of the injury (see Melaver v. Garis, 110 Ga.App. 267, 138 S.E.2d 435 (1964)), we are aware of no authority which permits a recovery for anxiety, agony, or worry over the payment of medical bills. Since there can be no recovery for such anxiety, testimony concerning it does not relate to a material issue. That being so, there can be no impeachment of that testimony. Waits v. Hardy, supra. To the extent that Patterson v. Lauderback, 211 Ga.App. 891, 440 S.E.2d 673 (1994), and Moore v. Mellars, 208 Ga.App. 69, 430 S.E.2d 179 (1993), can be read to hold otherwise, they are overruled.
In neither of these appeals did the testimony relate to a material issue. Therefore, the defendant in neither case was entitled to impeach the testimony with collateral source evidence. The defendant is required in such circumstances to object to testimony regarding concern about payments of medical bills. Upon such objection, the trial court is obliged to exclude the testimony and, if requested, give curative instructions. In appropriate cases, other sanctions are available, such as rebuke of counsel, contempt of court, or even a mistrial with appropriate costs cast upon the plaintiff. The failure of the defendants in these cases to object constitutes waiver of the inadmissibility of the testimony. Seabrooks v. State, 251 Ga. 564, 567, 308 S.E.2d 160 (1983); Pulliam v. State, 236 Ga. 460, 224 S.E.2d 8 (1976). It follows that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the collateral source evidence was admissible in Warren, but was correct in ruling, albeit for an incorrect reason, that the evidence was not admissible in Luke.
Judgment reversed in Case No. S95G1171.
All the Justices concur, except FLETCHER, P.J., and SEARS, J., who dissent.
Judgment affirmed in Case No. S95G1212.
All the Justices concur, except FLETCHER, P.J., and SEARS, J., who concur specially.
SEARS, Justice, concurring specially in part and dissenting in part.
Today, the majority holds that neither defendant in these cases was entitled to offer evidence that the plaintiffs had received collateral source payments. The majority premises this holding on its conclusion that testimony regarding financial anxiety or distress created by the injuries inflicted upon a plaintiff is never admissible. I would hold that evidence of financial hardship is admissible on a plaintiff's claim of mental pain and suffering when the financial hardship is the immediate consequence of the plaintiff's injury. Further, I would hold that, although evidence of collateral source payments is generally inadmissible in a personal injury action, it can become admissible if a plaintiff offers evidence on a material issue in the case that evidence of collateral source benefits tends to impeach and if the trial court determines that the probative value of such evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. Applying these rules to the instant cases, I conclude that the defendant in Case No. S95G1171 should have the right to offer evidence of collateral source payments and that the defendant in Case No. S95G1212 should not. I therefore dissent to the majority's judgment in Case No. S95G1171 and concur specially in the judgment in Case No. S95G1212.
1. The majority errs in concluding that testimony of a plaintiff's financial hardship is never admissible in a personal injury action. Such evidence can be relevant to a plaintiff's claim for mental pain and suffering.
In a claim for mental pain and suffering, "[a]nxiety or worry proximately attributable to an injury is recoverable." 1 Further, in determining pain and suffering, the jury is 2 Moreover, we have specifically held that where a plaintiff's financial hardship is an immediate consequence of the plaintiff's injury, evidence of that hardship is relevant to a plaintiff's claim for pain and suffering. 3 For these reasons, I would hold that evidence of financial hardship created by a defendant's negligence is admissible in a plaintiff's personal injury action.
Further, numerous courts have recognized the relevance of a plaintiff's testimony that the injuries he has suffered have led to...
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