Warren v. C.O. (In re C.O.)
| Decision Date | 18 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | H047087 |
| Citation | 71 Cal.App.5th 894,286 Cal.Rptr.3d 710 |
| Parties | CONSERVATORSHIP OF the Person of C.O. Mary Ann Warren, as Public Guardian, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. C.O., Objector and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Joseph Vincent Doyle, by appointment of the Court of Appeal under the Sixth District Appellate Program, for Objector and Appellant.
James R. Williams, County Counsel, Howard G. Frank, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.
Following a court trial, the trial court found objector and appellant C.O.1 to be gravely disabled within the meaning of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act) ( Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.2 ). The court reappointed the Santa Clara County Public Guardian (public guardian) as C.O.'s conservator. On appeal from that judgment, C.O. contends the trial court prejudicially erred when it failed to advise him on the record of his right to a jury trial and did not obtain from him a personal waiver of that right. C.O. asserts the trial court erred under the LPS Act, as well as violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment.
Prior to the events at issue in this appeal, C.O. had been placed under an LPS conservatorship with the public guardian as conservator.3 On March 8, 2019, the public guardian petitioned for reappointment as LPS conservator for C.O., alleging he was still gravely disabled and, as the result of a mental disorder, unable to provide for his own basic needs for food, clothing, or shelter. ( § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).)
The trial court issued a written citation for conservatorship ( § 5350 ; Prob. Code, § 1823 ), which was served on C.O. The written citation ordered C.O. to appear at a hearing on April 25, 2019, and stated, inter alia: C.O. did not request a jury trial.
On April 25, 2019, the trial court held an initial hearing on a number of conservatorship matters, including the public guardian's reappointment petition for C.O. C.O. was represented by appointed counsel from the public defender's office. Before C.O. was personally present in the courtroom, C.O.'s attorney stated to the trial court:
C.O.'s attorney informed the trial court he would get C.O., who was "right outside." Once C.O. was in the courtroom, his attorney stated (in C.O.'s presence): The trial court set the matter for a court trial.
The trial court did not advise C.O. on the record of his right to a jury trial or elicit a personal waiver of that right from him. Neither C.O. nor his attorney requested a jury trial.
The trial court conducted the court trial approximately one month later. Neither C.O. nor his attorney at any point during the trial requested a jury trial, and neither objected to the court trial. The public guardian presented two witnesses, an expert psychologist who had interviewed C.O. and C.O. himself. C.O.'s attorney cross-examined both the expert and C.O. At the conclusion of the court trial, the trial court stated that it found "beyond a reasonable doubt, that [C.O.] has both been advised in writ[ ]ing of his right to a jury trial [and] that he remains a gravel[ ]y disabled person under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 5008 [, subdivision] (H)(1)(A)." The trial court granted the LPS petition for reappointment and found by "clear and convincing evidence that [C.O.] [was] unable to understand the risks and benefits of an alternative to medical treatment related to his grave disability."4
C.O. timely appealed the May 23, 2019 judgment.
C.O. contends the trial court violated his statutory rights, as well as his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection, by failing to advise him on the record of his jury trial right and by failing to take a personal waiver of those rights. He argues that these errors require automatic reversal of the judgment. The public guardian contends no error occurred and observes the appeal is moot. The public guardian furthermore claims C.O. forfeited his constitutional challenges by failing to raise them below. We first turn to the questions of mootness and forfeiture.
Pursuant to section 5361, the conservatorship order at issue automatically expired in May 2020. (See Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 152, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 424, 225 P.3d 554 ( John L. ).) C.O. acknowledges that the LPS conservatorship at issue here expired by operation of law but argues this court should not dismiss his appeal as moot.
When a challenged conservatorship has ended, the appeal of that conservatorship is "technically moot." (See Conservatorship of K.P. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 695, 705, fn. 3, 280 Cal.Rptr.3d 298, 489 P.3d 296 ( K.P. ).) Nevertheless, a reviewing court has the discretion to decide an otherwise moot case if " ‘it raises important issues that are capable of repetition but likely to evade review.’ " ( John L., supra , 48 Cal.4th at p. 142, fn. 2, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 424, 225 P.3d 554 ; see also Conservatorship of George H. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 157, 161, fn. 2, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 666.) We decide this standard is met here and decline to dismiss the appeal as moot.
The public guardian argues C.O. forfeited his jury trial claims because he failed to raise them in the trial court and fully participated in the court trial. C.O. acknowledges, and the record before us supports, that neither he nor his appointed trial counsel presented to the trial court the claims he now asserts.
As a general rule, "a party may forfeit [the] right to present a claim of error to the appellate court if he did not do enough to ‘prevent[ ]’ or ‘correct[ ]’ the claimed error in the trial court." ( People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 948 P.2d 429.) The forfeiture doctrine is not absolute, however, as we are "generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party." ( Ibid. )
We elect to decide the merits of C.O.'s claims. There are no disputed facts at issue and the parties agree, as do we, that our review of his claims are de novo (see part II.C.1., post ). Under these circumstances, we exercise our discretion to address the merits, notwithstanding C.O.'s failure to raise the claims in the trial court. (See Conservatorship of Bryan S. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 190, 194, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 195 ( Bryan S. ).)5
The statutory and constitutional claims presented here are legal issues subject to de novo review. ( John L., supra , 48 Cal.4th at p. 143, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 424, 225 P.3d 554.) "We consider individual statutes in the context of the entire Act so that each part may be harmonized and given effect." ( K.P., supra , 11 Cal.5th at p. 706, 280 Cal.Rptr.3d 298, 489 P.3d 296.)
The LPS Act, enacted in 1967, "governs the involuntary treatment of the mentally ill in California." ( Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 1008, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 40, 884 P.2d 988.) The act ( K.P., supra , 11 Cal.5th at p. 703, 280 Cal.Rptr.3d 298, 489 P.3d 296.)
Section 5350 addresses the procedure for establishing an LPS conservatorship. It states in relevant part: ( § 5350.)
Division 4 of the Probate Code–incorporated by reference into section 5350 –includes Probate Code section 1828. That statute provides in relevant part "before the establishment of a conservatorship of the person or estate, or both, the court shall inform the proposed conservatee of ... [¶] ... [¶] ... the right ... to have the matter of the establishment of the conservatorship tried by jury." ( Prob. Code, § 1828, subd. (a)(6) ) (hereafter Prob. Code, § 1828(a)(6).) Additionally, the trial court must "[a]fter the court so informs the proposed conservatee ..., consult the proposed conservatee to determine the proposed conservatee's opinion" regarding "[t]he establishment of the conservatorship." ( Prob. Code, § 1828, subd. (b)(1).)
A hearing to reestablish a conservatorship is largely conducted according to the same rules that govern the initial...
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