Warren v. Lewis
| Citation | 206 F.Supp.2d 917 |
| Decision Date | 21 June 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:02-0228.,3:02-0228. |
| Parties | Tommy Ray WARREN, Petitioner, v. Virginia LEWIS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Charles E. Walker, Nashville, TN, for Petitioner.
David H. Findley, Office of the Atty. Gen. and Reporter, Paul G. Summers, Atty. Gen. and Reporter, Nashville, TN, for Respondent, State of Tennessee.
Pending before this Court is Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and/ or For Judgment as a Matter of Law (Doc. No. 8), filed in response to Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1). Petitioner has now filed a response to Respondent's Motion (Doc. No. 20). For the reasons discuss below, Mr. Warren's Petition is granted in part and denied in part.
On April 12, 1993, Tommy Ray Warren entered a plea to two counts of first degree murder, and was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences. On January 23, 1996, Petitioner filed a petition for post conviction relief on the grounds that: (1) his guilty pleas were neither knowing nor voluntary because he was influenced by the specter of the death penalty; and (2) that his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to pursue the issue of Petitioner's alleged mental retardation. Circuit Court Judge Jim T. Hamilton denied Mr. Warren's post-conviction petition on March 8, 2002. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of Mr. Warren's petition on August 10, 2000. Warren v. State, No. M1999-1319-CCA-R3-PC, 2000 WL 1133558 (Tenn.Crim.App., August 10, 2000). The Court found that Petitioner's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, based on the testimony of Mr. Warren's attorney, Daniel Runde. The Court credited Mr. Runde's testimony that he scheduled a hearing on Mr. Warren's mental state, and explained the available options to Mr. Warren before Mr. Warren decided to plead guilty. Furthermore, the Court did not find any ineffectiveness of counsel, and noted that Mr. Warren did not show any prejudice. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied Warren's request to appeal on February 12, 2001 (Doc. No. 9, Addendum 4).
On February 4, 2002, Petitioner forwarded a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to this Court, accompanied by a note indicating that, "[t]he five-dollar filing free for a § 2255 petition is forthcoming." (Doc. No. 1). The Court received Mr. Warren's Petition on February 7, 2002. In a letter dated February 5, 2002, Petitioner wrote to the Clerk of this Court, indicating that a five dollar filing fee was enclosed. The Court did not receive a filing fee until February 28, 2002. A staff attorney for this Court returned Mr. Warren's petition on February 28, 2002, for failure to pay the statutory filing fee. This notice was sent out prior to receipt of the filing fee.
On March 5, 2002, Mr. Warren re-filed his petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court, based on the same grounds alleged on the State level. Petitioner seeks review of his 1993 conviction for two counts of first-degree murder.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a Petition for Habeas Corpus should be filed within one (1) year after final judgment on direct review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). However, the Supreme Court held that a Writ of Habeas Corpus is considered filed for AEDPA purposes on the date the Petitioner delivers the writ to the prison authorities. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 275, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988)(discussing the "prison mailbox rule"). Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit has held that, absent evident to the contrary, a petition is deemed "delivered" upon the prison authorities' receipt of the petition. Towns v. United States, 190 F.3d 468, 469 (6th Cir.1999). Absent evidence to the contrary, Courts will assume that a petitioner gave his petition to prison authorities on the date he or she signed it. See Neal v. Bock, 137 F.Supp.2d 879, 882 n. 1 (E.D.Mich.2001).
However, an application is filed with the Court when it is delivered to and accepted by the appropriate Court officer. An application is "properly filed", for the purpose of tolling AEDPA time limits, when it is both delivered to the appropriate Court officer and accepted in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000).
Nevertheless, a Court may equitably toll the AEDPA one-year limitations period. Dunlap v. United States, 250 F.3d 1001 (6th Cir.2001). The Dunlap Court adopted a five-factor test for determining whether equitable tolling is appropriate. The test was first set out in Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146 (6th Cir.1988), where the Sixth Circuit identified five factors to consider when determining the appropriateness of equitably tolling a state of limitations: (1) the petitioner's lack of notice of the filing requirements; (2) the petitioner's lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement; (3) diligence in pursuing one's rights; (4) absence of prejudice to the respondent; (5) the petitioner's reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the legal requirement for filing his claim. Dunlap, 250 F.3d at 1008 (citing Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2000)).
A district court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus pertaining to a claim adjudicated on the merit in State court, unless that court's adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
In order to present a successful Sixth Amendment claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must show that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," and that, "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different...." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The Supreme Court added that "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential ... [and] every effort [must be] made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight ... and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
In the context of a guilty plea, Sixth Circuit courts have indicated that the Petitioner must also show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 884 (6th Cir.1988)(citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)).
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution requires that a guilty plea must be a "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent act" by the defendant. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). The guilty plea must also be entered into competently. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396-97, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993).
A guilty plea constitutes a waiver of a number of constitutional rights, including the right to a trial by jury, the right to confront one's accuser, and the right against compulsory self-incrimination. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). Thus, a defendant's relinquishment of these important rights must be knowing and voluntary. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).
A guilty plea is considered knowing and voluntary if the defendant understands "the significance and consequences of a particular decision and ... the decision is uncoerced." Id. at 401 n. 12, 113 S.Ct. 2680 (citations omitted). Whether a guilty plea was knowing and voluntary is determined in light the totality of the circumstances. See Berry v. Mintzes, 726 F.2d 1142, 1149 (6th Cir.1984).
The competency standard for pleading guilty is identical to that for standing trial. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396-97, 113 S.Ct. 2680. The inquiry is "whether the defendant has `sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and has `a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'" Id., (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)).
The AEDPA one-year limitations period begins to run upon final judgment on direct review. In this case, the Tennessee Supreme Court's denial of Petitioner's request for an appeal (dated February 12, 2001) constitutes the start date of the one-year statute of limitations. Thus, Warren had until February 12, 2002 to file a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, unless this Court finds sufficient reason to equitably toll the limitations period.
The State argues that Mr. Warren's Petition is time-barred because his petition was received by the Special Needs Facility on March 4, 2002, and by this Court on March 5, 2002. Petitioner, through his appointed counsel, concedes that his petition was received on those dates. However, Petitioner urges this Court to follow a rule that would deem a petition "filed" upon a petitioner's signature, rather than receipt by either...
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