Warren v. Sharp
| Decision Date | 21 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 28562.,28562. |
| Citation | 139 Idaho 599,83 P.3d 773 |
| Parties | Bonnie Thompson WARREN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Lily M. SHARP, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Elam & Burke, P.A. Boise, for appellant. Jeffrey A. Thomson argued.
Arthur M. Bistline, Coeur d'Alene, argued for respondent.
Two automobile accidents occurred on Highway 200 on January 7, 1997, in the late afternoon. The first was a one-car accident, which left Lily Sharp's vehicle in a snow bank with her vehicle facing traffic. The second involved Glenn Warren's vehicle striking Stephanie Waterman's vehicle, which resulted in Glenn Warren's death. Bonnie Warren, the widow, brought this action against Sharp alleging Sharp's negligence was a proximate cause of Glenn Warren's death. After trial, a jury found no negligence on the part of Sharp. This case comes before the Court following the district court's grant of a motion for new trial. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
On January 7, 1997, Lily Sharp was traveling westbound on Highway 200. Sometime between 4:30 and 4:45 p.m., Sharp lost control of her vehicle and eventually came to rest facing eastbound in a snow bank on the westbound shoulder of the road. Shortly thereafter, Glenn Warren was traveling westbound on Highway 200. Warren's vehicle lost control and struck Stephanie Waterman's vehicle, which was traveling in the opposite eastbound lane. Glenn Warren died as a result of the accident.
Glenn Warren's wife, Bonnie Thompson Warren ("Warren"), filed a complaint alleging Lily Sharp's negligence was the proximate cause of her husband's death. Prior to trial, Sharp filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the opinions of Warren's accident reconstruction expert. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion. A five-day jury trial began on September 24, 2001, with the jury returning a verdict finding no negligence by Sharp.
On October 11, 2001, Warren filed a motion for new trial before judgment was entered. Judgment was entered on October 18, 2001, against Warren, dismissing the claims against Sharp. Later, on April 4, 2002, the district court granted the motion for new trial based upon I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6). Sharp appeals the grant of the motion for new trial and the denial of her motion in limine.
1. Did the district court err in granting Warren's motion for new trial?
2. Did the district court err in denying Sharp's motion in limine?
3. Is Warren entitled to attorney fees on appeal?
The standard of review which is to be exercised by an appellate court reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for new trial is well settled. Because the trial court is in a far better position to weigh the persuasiveness of all the evidence and the demeanor, credibility, and testimony of witnesses, this Court has consistently held that the trial court's grant or denial of such motions must be upheld unless the court has manifestly abused the wide discretion vested in it.
Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 850, 840 P.2d 392, 394 (1992) (citations omitted).
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the Court inquires: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by exercise of reason. Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A. 138 Idaho 589, 592, 67 P.3d 68, 71 (2003) (citing State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 962 P.2d 1026 (1998); Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)).
Sharp contends first that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion for new trial, which was untimely filed. The filing of the motion occurred seven days before entry of the judgment and was premature. Sharp also argues that, if the motion is deemed timely, the district court failed to act within its discretion in granting a new trial.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(b) provides for the timing of a motion for new trial as "[a] motion for a new trial shall be served not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the judgment." In this case, the motion for new trial was filed by Warren on October 11, 2001, seven days before entry of the judgment by the district court, but after the jury's September 28, 2001, verdict. Sharp contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion for new trial, which was not filed in compliance with the Rule. Sharp argues that the district court is divested of jurisdiction to rule on the motion unless the motion is filed following the entry of judgment.
Warren contests Sharp's assertion that a premature motion divests the court of jurisdiction, which has no basis in law. Moreover, Warren maintains that Sharp should not be able to raise the timeliness of the motion for new trial for the first time on appeal.
"While ordinarily this Court will not consider issues that were not raised in the trial court, it will address issues raised for the first time on appeal concerning jurisdiction, failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and constitutionality." Nycum v. Triangle Dairy Co., 109 Idaho 858, 862, 712 P.2d 559, 562 (1985). Sharp contends the issue of untimely motions is jurisdictional and thus properly raised on appeal. To support her contention, Sharp cites Nixon v. Tongren, 33 Idaho 287, 289, 193 P. 731, 732 (1920), O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 116 Idaho 507, 509, 777 P.2d 729, 731 (1989) and Syth v. Parke, 121 Idaho 162, 165, 823 P.2d 766, 769 (1991). However, in each of these cases, the motion was filed after the time provided by the rules.
The only case cited by Sharp to discuss the premature filing of a motion for new trial is Forsman v. Holbrook, 47 Idaho 241, 274 P. 111 (1929). In Forsman, which was decided prior to the adoption of the rules of civil procedure, the relevant statute cited:
The party intending to move for a new trial must within 10 days after the verdict of the jury, if that action were tried by a jury, or after notice of the decision of the court or referee, if the action were tried without a jury, file with the clerk and serve upon the adverse party a notice of his motion designating the grounds upon which the motion will be made, and whether the same will be made upon affidavits, or the records and files in the action, or the minutes of the court.
47 Idaho at 244, 274 P. at 111. The Court found that the motion for new trial filed prior to the issuance of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in a court trial was premature and "that the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain the motion for new trial." Id. at 246, 274 P. at 112.
Unlike in Forsman, this case was tried before a jury, which had rendered a verdict prior to the filing of Warren's motion for new trial. See 47 Idaho at 246, 274 P. at 112. Had this filing been under the rule in Forsman, the motion for new trial would have been timely as it was filed within ten days of the jury's verdict. For purposes of the filing of the motion for new trial in this case, the final judgment was nothing more than a ministerial reflection of the known jury decision. There could be no prejudice accrued by the early filing, both parties knowing the final outcome of the case. We conclude that the language of I.R.C.P. 59(d) only precludes motions filed later than 14 days after judgment from being heard. The district court did not err in ruling on the motion for new trial.
This Court reviews the grant of a motion for a new trial based upon I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) under an abuse of discretion standard. Sheridan v. St. Lukes Reg'l Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 781, 25 P.3d 88, 94 (2001). The district court properly perceived the grant of the motion for new trial was within its discretion. See Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). This Court then reviews the district court's actions to determine whether it acted within its boundaries and consistent with the applicable legal standards. Id.
On review of whether the district court acted within its boundaries and consistent with applicable legal standards in granting a new trial, this Court uses a two-prong test. Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 781, 25 P.3d 88, 94 (2001). Burggraf v. Chaffin, 121 Idaho 171, 174, 823 P.2d 775, 778 (1991) (citations omitted). The second prong "requires more than a mere possibility; there must be a probability that a different result would be obtained in a new trial." Sheridan, 135 Idaho at 782, 25 P.3d at 95.
Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 850, 840 P.2d 392, 394 (1992). Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 763, 727 P.2d 1187, 1195 (1986...
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