Warrichaiet v. Jansen
| Decision Date | 28 July 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-CV-905.,05-CV-905. |
| Citation | 441 F.Supp.2d 989 |
| Parties | Arnold WARRICHAIET, Petitioner, v. Michael JANSEN, Oconto County Sheriff, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
Robert R. Henak, Henak Law Office, Milwaukee, WI, for Petitioner.
Daniel J. O'Brien, Wisconsin Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Madison, WI, for Respondent.
Petitioner Arnold Warrichaiet ("Warrichaiet") seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his February 25, 2003, convictions for assault on a law enforcement officer and disorderly conduct. In lieu of a withheld sentence on the assault charge, Warrichaiet was sentenced to a term of four years probation that included six months work release as a condition, together with a concurrent sentence of 90 days in jail on the disorderly conduct charge. Because the court concludes it is likely that improperly introduced extraneous information had a substantial and injurious influence in determining the jury's verdict, the court is obliged to grant the writ.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals set forth a thorough statement of the pertinent facts in its decision dated March 1, 2005.
On Thanksgiving Day 2001, a number of people had gathered at Francis' [Arnold Warrichaiet's Father's] home, initially congregating near their vehicles parked on the road. Department of Natural Resources Wardens Frederick Peters and Michael Kitt had driven past and noted the group. The wardens parked and approached the group, inquiring how hunting was going. The wardens then specifically asked whether anyone had shot a deer, and several group members stated that no one had. The crowd gradually drifted closer to the residence, while Peters began walking along the road and looking into the parked vehicles for weapons in plain sight.
Peters then observed a deer carcass hanging in an open storage shed farther back on the property. He asked the group whose it was, but no one claimed ownership. Peters testified he was concerned that the deer might not be properly registered and decided to inspect the carcass. Members of the group initially demanded a search warrant, which Peters denied he needed. The group would not relent, so Peters went to his vehicle and called for assistance.
When Peters returned from his vehicle, Francis' grandson Phillip said he had shot the deer and then offered his license, carcass tag, and registration tag. Peters nonetheless insisted upon inspecting the carcass and asked someone to accompany him from the residence to the shed. At that point, Arnold, Francis, and other family members stepped in front of Peters to block his progress.
Arnold contends that Peters grabbed him by the shoulder to push him aside. Arnold raised his hands without touching Peters, who allegedly grabbed Arnold and dragged him across the lawn to arrest him for obstruction. Peters testified that Arnold first made a gesture as if he were going to push Peters, who then grabbed Arnold by the shoulder to deflect him and move him out of the way. Arnold then apparently attempted to break away from Peters' grasp, prompting the warden to reach for his pepper spray. Arnold punched Peters below the left eye.
By this point, other officers and wardens had arrived on the scene, including Peters' supervisor, Warden Robert Goerlinger. Goerlinger began photographing the area, ostensibly to document the assault on Peters. However, he also began photographing the shed, some forty-five yards away from the area of the assault. Francis demanded a warrant and, when that was not produced, he slapped at Goerlinger and his camera. Goerlinger ceased his investigation to prevent further confrontations or injury to the wardens.
Ultimately, Francis was charged with resisting Warden Kitt, obstructing Warden Goerlinger, obstructing Warden Peters, and disorderly conduct. Arnold was charged with assault on a law enforcement officer, resisting arrest, obstructing an officer, and disorderly conduct. The cases were joined for trial. The court dismissed Arnold's obstruction charge and the jury acquitted him on the resisting charge, but he was convicted of assault and disorderly conduct. . . .
State v. Warrichaiet, 2005 WI App 88, ¶¶ 2-7, 281 Wis.2d 271, 695 N.W.2d 903 (2005).
Warrichaiet raises four claims in his federal habeas petition: (1) insufficiency of the evidence on the assault charge; (2) insufficiency of the evidence on the disorderly conduct charge; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel arising from trial counsel's failure to request particular jury instructions relating to the disorderly conduct charge; and (4) the jury's verdict was based upon extraneous information after a juror mentioned during deliberations that Warrichaiet had been in a bar fight.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals addressed the merits of each of these claims in its March 1, 2005, decision. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected Warrichaiet's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of the assault and disorderly conduct charges after concluding that a rational jury could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for both charges based upon the evidence presented at trial. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals also held that Warrichaiet did not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's performance. Finally, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that the jury in Warrichaiet's trial was not prejudiced when one of the jurors mentioned during deliberations that Warrichaiet had been in a bar fight.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, governs the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. Under § 2254(d), if a constitutional claim was adjudicated on the merits by the state courts, a federal court may only grant habeas relief based on that claim if the state court's decision is "contrary to" or "an unreasonable application of" clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, or if the state court's determination of the facts was unreasonable in light of the evidence presented. Id. A state court decision must be more than incorrect from the point of view of the federal court; AEDPA requires that it be "unreasonable," which means something like lying well outside the boundaries of permissible differences of opinion. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410-12, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), the district court shall entertain an application for the writ on behalf of a state prisoner "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The conditions set forth in § 2254(a) are satisfied when the district court concludes there has been a violation of federal law and that the violation played a causal role in the state prisoner's custody. See Aleman v. Sternes, 320 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir.2003). When the court considers whether the conditions set forth in § 2254(a) are satisfied, the court is required under the AEDPA to review the state court's adjudication on the merits deferentially and set the state court decision aside only if the court committed unreasonable error. Ward v. Sternes, 334 F.3d 696, 704 (7th Cir.2003). Findings of fact made by the state courts are presumed correct and are rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Foster v. Schomig, 223 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir.2000).
Warrichaiet challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of the assault charge. On direct appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reviewed Warrichaiet's sufficiency claim under the standard enunciated in State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis.2d 493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Wis.1990): "an appellate court may not reverse a conviction unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and the conviction, is so insufficient in probative value and force that it can be said as a matter of law that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Wisconsin effectively duplicates the U.S. Supreme Court standard for sufficiency challenges. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Warrichaiet does not claim that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard. Rather, Warrichaiet claims that the Court of Appeals applied the standard unreasonably.
Warrichaiet was charged with battery to a law enforcement officer, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.20(2) (2005). Wisconsin defines the crime of battery to a law enforcement officer as follows: "Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to a law enforcement officer ... acting in an official capacity and the person knows or has reason to know that the victim is a law enforcement officer ... by an act done without the consent of the person so injured, is guilty of a Class H felony." Id. Warrichaiet does not dispute Peters' qualification as a law enforcement officer. However, Warrichaiet claims that there is insufficient evidence to convict him of the assault charge because he claims he acted in self-defense under Wis. Stat. § 939.48, an affirmative defense he asserts the state failed to disprove. Under Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1), an actor "may intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference" with his or her person. Id. Warrichaiet argues that his use of force was justified by Peters'"unlawful assault" of grabbing his shoulder to move him as well as the subsequent events.
Warrichaiet argues that the state's evidence and Peters' own testimony reflect that Peters initiated the physical contact, grabbing Warrichaiet to shove him aside so Peters could search the shed. Warrichaiet asserts that no evidence permits a reasonable inference that it was Warrichaiet who initiated the physical confrontation. Warrichaiet states that...
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Jones v. United States
...v. Doerr, 229 Wis.2d 616, 599 N.W.2d 897, 899 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (defendant kicked officer in the shin); see Warrichaiet v. Jansen, 441 F.Supp.2d 989, 992 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (defendant punched officer in the eye and tried to break away).In arguing that § 940.20(2) criminalizes conduct falli......