Wartluft v. Milton Hershey Sch.

• Decision Date: 13 August 2019
• Docket Number: 1:16-cv-2145
• Parties: Julie Ellen WARTLUFT et al., Plaintiffs, v. The MILTON HERSHEY SCHOOL AND SCHOOL TRUST et al., Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

400 F.Supp.3d 91

Julie Ellen WARTLUFT et al., Plaintiffs,

v.The MILTON HERSHEY SCHOOL AND SCHOOL TRUST et al., Defendants,

1:16-cv-2145

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed August 13, 2019

John J. Higson, Pro Hac Vice, Gregory F. Cirillo, John W. Schmehl, Margaret R. Spitzer, Dilworth Paxson LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Christine M. Wechsler, Elliott Greenleaf & Siedzikowski, PC, Kyle M. Elliott, Elliott Greenleaf P.C., Blue Bell, PA, Jarad W. Handelman, Elliott Greenleaf, P.C., Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

John E. Jones III, United States District Judge

Presently pending before the Court are two motions for judgment on the pleadings filed by Defendants the Milton Hershey School and the Hershey Trust Company ("the Motions"). (Docs. 240, 242). Both matters have been fully briefed, (Docs. 241, 242, 251, 252, 261, 262), and are ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the Motions shall be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The underlying facts of this case have been discussed at length in several previous Memoranda and Orders issued by this Court. (Docs. 62, 216, 230, 258). To reiterate, Defendants the Milton Hershey School and the Hershey Trust Company, as Trustee for the Milton Hershey School Trust (collectively, "Defendants" or "the School"), operate a cost-free, not-for-profit, residential academy. Plaintiffs Julie Wartluft ("Wartluft") and Frederick Bartels, Jr. ("Bartels") are the parents of Abrielle Kira Bartels ("Abrielle"), a former student.

In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that, despite knowing that Abrielle suffered from depression and suicidal ideations, Defendants discharged her from their care under a "shadow policy" which mandated that students be expelled from the School after two mental health hospitalizations, even if those hospitalizations were recommended by school staff. (Doc. 29 at ¶ 108). Abrielle committed suicide shortly after her discharge. Wartluft and Bartels, in their individual capacities and in their capacities as administrators of the Estate of Abrielle Kira Bartels ("the Estate"), sought damages.¹

Following several rulings from this Court,² the following counts alleged in Plaintiffs' amended complaint remain viable. In Count I, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated several provisions of the Fair Housing Act ("FHA") by dismissing Abrielle from the School and by barring her from entering what had been her home for several years and from participating in various school functions on the basis of her mental disability. In Count III, Plaintiffs aver that Defendants were negligent in dismissing Abrielle from their care thereby forcing her into an unstable environment resulting in her death. In Count V, Plaintiffs Wartluft and Bartels in their individual capacities (collectively, "Individual Plaintiffs") allege a wrongful death action, and in Count VI, the Estate, represented by the Individual Plaintiffs in their capacities as administrators of the Estate, alleges a survival action. In Counts IX and X, Plaintiffs allege intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In Count XI, Plaintiffs allege a civil conspiracy amongst the Defendants to endanger children under Pennsylvania law. In Count XII, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached their fiduciary duty of care and of good faith. In Count XIII, Plaintiffs aver that Defendants were negligent per se predicated upon asserted violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the FHA.

On April 18, 2019, Defendants filed two motions for judgment on the pleadings. The first sought judgment on the pleadings as to Wartluft and Bartels in their individual capacities. (Doc. 240). The second sought judgment on the pleadings as to the Estate. (Doc. 242). Both matters have been fully briefed, (Docs. 241, 242, 251, 252, 261, 262), and are ripe for disposition. As aforestated, and for the reasons that follow, the Motions shall be granted in part and denied in part.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). When, as here, the basis of the moving party's Rule 12(c) motion is that the plaintiff has allegedly failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the motion is properly analyzed under the same standard of review applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. See Revell v. Port Authority , 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2010) ("A motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the defense that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim is analyzed under the same standards that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.").

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd. , 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002) ). In resolving a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court generally should consider only the allegations in the complaint, as well as "documents that are attached or submitted with the complaint, ... and any matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case." Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist. , 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, "in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) ). While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss need not contain detailed factual allegations, it must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a civil plaintiff must allege facts that "raise a right to relief above the speculative level ...." Victaulic Co. v. Tieman , 499 F.3d 227, 235 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Accordingly, to satisfy the plausibility standard, the complaint must indicate that defendant's liability is more than a "sheer possibility." Iqbal , 129 S. Ct. at 1949. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ " Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Because the instant Motions overlap as to several lines of inquiry, for purposes of at least a modicum of brevity, we group relevant argument together and identify divergent issues where appropriate. We address Defendants' arguments as to each count in Plaintiffs' amended complaint seriatim .

a. Count I – Fair Housing Act

Defendants first argue that Count I should be dismissed as to both the Individual Defendants and the Estate. We first address Defendants' arguments as to the Individual Plaintiffs and then address Defendants' arguments as to the Estate.

1. Individual Plaintiffs' Claims under the Fair Housing Act

In their first issue, Defendants argue that the Individual Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they have Article III standing to pursue their claim under the FHA and that Count I must be dismissed to the extent it seeks a remedy on their behalf. Specifically, Defendants contend, although Plaintiffs' amended complaint outlines the harms that Abrielle allegedly suffered as a result of her dismissal from the School, Plaintiffs have failed to plead that Wartluft or Bartels suffered any injury sufficient to confer upon them Article III standing. (Doc. 241 at 11 (citing Fair Hous. Council v. Main Line Times , 141 F.3d 439, 441 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that a plaintiff must allege a "distinct and palpable' injury sufficient to satisfy Article III standing requirements under the Fair Housing Act"); O'Malley v. Brierley , 477 F.2d 785, 789 (3d Cir. 1973) ("[O]ne cannot sue for the deprivation of another's civil rights.")).

In response, the Individual Plaintiffs do not address Article III standing specifically. Rather, the Individual Plaintiffs contend that they are "aggrieved persons" under the Fair Housing Act who "have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice." (Doc. 252 at 16 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a) ) ("An aggrieved person may commence a civil action in an appropriate United States district court or State court not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice."); 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i)(1) (" ‘Aggrieved person’ includes any person who—(1) claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (2) believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur.")). The Individual Plaintiffs further argue that "[t]he Supreme Court has held that the definition of ‘aggrieved person’ reflects a congressional intent to expand standing under the FHA to the full extent permitted by the Constitution's Article III," (Doc. 252 at 16 (citing Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP , 562 U.S. 170, 176, 131 S.Ct. 863, 178 L.Ed.2d 694 (2011) ), and that the Fair Housing Act was intended to be "liberally construed." (Id. (citing San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles , 159 F.3d 470, 475 (9th Cir. 1998) ). In this case, Individual Plaintiffs conclude, Wartluft and...