Warwick v. Warwick

Decision Date11 April 1989
Docket NumberC5-88-2456,Nos. C4-88-2173,s. C4-88-2173
Citation438 N.W.2d 673
PartiesIn re the Marriage of Richard C. WARWICK, petitioner, Appellant, v. Ann WARWICK, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1. The trial court did not err in its consideration of the referee's findings.

2. The trial court award of $350 monthly maintenance was not an abuse of discretion.

3. Postponement of respondent's obligation to pay off appellant's lien on the former marital homestead was not an abuse of discretion.

4. State and federal constitutional prohibitions against involuntary servitude are not violated by trial court's order that appellant seek and obtain employment.

5. State constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for indebtedness is not violated by trial court contempt order threatening appellant with incarceration for failure to meet maintenance and support obligations.

Richard G. Nadler, Michael K. Hoverson, Richard G. Nadler and Associates, St. Paul, for appellant.

William E. Haugh, Jr., Sarah J. Batzli, Collins, Buckley, Sauntry & Haugh, St. Paul, for respondent.

Heard, considered and decided by HUSPENI, P.J., and CRIPPEN and KALITOWSKI, JJ.

OPINION

HUSPENI, Judge.

Appellant, Richard C. Warwick, alleging that the referee's findings were correct, appeals the trial court's vacation of those findings, the trial court's award of rehabilitative maintenance to respondent Ann Warwick and the postponement of respondent's obligation to pay off appellant's lien on the former marital homestead. We affirm.

FACTS

The parties were married in July 1971. Respondent paid for living expenses while appellant completed his undergraduate education. Appellant's tuition was paid by the G.I. Bill. In 1976 appellant obtained employment, the parties' first child was born and respondent agreed to become a full-time homemaker. Additional children were born to the parties in 1978 and 1980.

The parties separated in June 1981 and the marriage was dissolved June 10, 1983. At that time, appellant earned approximately $24,000 per year as a Minneapolis building inspector. By stipulation, respondent was granted custody of the children and was granted fee interest in the homestead subject to appellant's lien for half of the homestead's equity. The decree required that appellant's lien be paid when respondent sold the house or in June 1992, whichever occurred first. Also, while respondent did not request maintenance at the time of dissolution, for "tax reasons" appellant's financial obligations under the decree were as follows:

                                           Child Support  Maintenance
                May 1, 1983"April 1, 1984  $200           $300
                May 1, 1984"May 1, 1988    $250           $250
                June 1, 1988               $467           -
                

Additionally, the decree established child support and maintenance obligations and specifically reserved respondent's right to request rehabilitative maintenance until June 1, 1988. It stated:

rehabilitative spousal maintenance shall be independent of the spousal maintenance and child support awards hereinabove and otherwise herein payable.

Because appellant did not make support and maintenance payments, Ramsey County instituted wage withholding. 1 However, in September 1986 appellant resigned from his job (then paying $28,000 per year) claiming he was "burned out" and that he wanted to become an independent building inspector.

Since his resignation, appellant has paid no support or maintenance. In February 1988 Ramsey County moved to find appellant in contempt for failure to meet his support and maintenance obligations. At the April 12, 1988 hearing, it was determined that appellant was in arrears $3,750 on his child support and $4,050 on his spousal maintenance through January 31, 1988. While appellant purchased a new van for his building inspection business, he had trouble accounting for the rest of the $26,000 pension distribution he received upon resigning his position as a city building inspector. Also, it was determined that appellant had approximately $3,000 in his checking account. Appellant alleged that he did not have sufficient income to meet his support and maintenance obligations because his business generated net monthly income of only $660.

Appellant was found in constructive contempt of court and was sentenced to 60 days in the workhouse, with execution of sentence stayed for two years contingent upon his compliance with a new payment schedule.

On April 26, 1988, respondent moved the court for rehabilitative spousal maintenance and a postponement of her obligation to satisfy appellant's lien on the homestead until the youngest child reaches age 18 as security for appellant's child care obligation. Having obtained a financial aid package which covered all her tuition at Hamline University, respondent sought rehabilitative maintenance to aid with the additional expenses associated with the completion of her undergraduate education. Respondent also has indicated that she wishes to attend Hamline University School of Law.

The referee denied respondent's request for rehabilitative maintenance indicating that appellant did not have sufficient income but did not rule on respondent's request for extending her obligation to pay off appellant's lien.

The district court, after consideration of additional memoranda, awarded respondent $350 per month in rehabilitative maintenance and extended her obligation to pay off appellant's lien to 1998. The trial court's order also directed appellant to get a job, report on his efforts to do so and found him in contempt for failing to make maintenance payments from February 1988 to April 1988. Appellant's incarceration was stayed upon his compliance with the terms of the order.

ISSUES

1. Did the trial court err in its consideration of the referee's findings?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding respondent $350 per month in rehabilitative maintenance?

3. Does postponing respondent's obligation to pay off appellant's lien on the homestead violate Minn.Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2?

4. Does the trial court's order requiring that appellant seek and obtain employment violate constitutional prohibitions against involuntary servitude?

5. Does the trial court's order threatening appellant with incarceration if he does not meet his support and maintenance obligations violate the state constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for indebtedness?

ANALYSIS
I.

The parties disagree regarding the trial court's scope of review of the referee's proposed findings and order and this court's scope of review of the trial court determinations.

With regard to a family court referee's proposed findings and order, "[t]he trial judge [is] completely free to exercise his judgment and discretion." LaBelle v. LaBelle, 296 Minn. 173, 176, 207 N.W.2d 291, 293 (1973).

Family court referees for the Second Judicial District are statutory, authorized by Minn.Stat. § 484.64, subd. 3 (1986). Second Judicial District Special Rule 17 §§ 1.06 and 1.07 provide for the routine reference of family court matters to referees. Minn.R.Civ.P. 53.02, however, indicates that "[a] reference to a referee shall be the exception and not the rule." Therefore, a conflict exists between the two rules. See Peterson v. Peterson, 308 Minn. 297, 302-03, 242 N.W.2d 88, 92-93 (1976). Noting that Second Judicial District Special Rule 17 § 1.01 states:

The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of Minnesota shall apply to practice in the Family Court Division except where in conflict with applicable statutes,

the Peterson court resolved the conflict stating:

Proceedings in the family court which involve the routine use of referees must * * * be regarded as special statutory proceedings.

Id. at 304, 242 N.W.2d at 93 (emphasis added). As a result,

all recommended findings and orders of a family court referee * * * are advisory only and possess no more than prima facie validity.

Id. Therefore, the "family court judge has the duty and ultimate responsibility for making an informed final and independent decision," id. at 306, 242 N.W.2d at 94, because the proposed findings and order of a family court referee will carry

only such weight and persuasive force as their merits demand and the properly exercised discretion of the family court judge warrants.

Id.

The Peterson analysis, originally limited to a custody context, was later expanded to "other matters before the family court." Berg v. Berg, 309 Minn. 281, 285, 244 N.W.2d 149, 151 (1976). Also, this court has made clear that "[t]he trial court judge may receive further evidence when reviewing the referee's report." In re Jensen, 414 N.W.2d 742, 744 (Minn.Ct.App.1987), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 15, 1988) (emphasis in original).

With regard to this court's review of the trial court's order,

[t]his court's scope of review * * * is rather narrow. The decision to modify a child support order lies in the broad and sound discretion of the trial court, and an appellate court will reverse for an abuse of that discretion only where it finds a "clearly erroneous conclusion that is against logic and the facts on record."

Olson v. Olson, 399 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (quoting Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn.1984)). We note that this scope of review is consistent with the recently amended Minn.R.Civ.P. 52.01 (effective Jan. 1, 1989) which, in part, states:

Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.

(Emphasis added.) Reprinted in 48 Minn.Stat.Ann. 219-220 (West Supp.1989).

Unless we determine them to be clearly erroneous, this court is bound by the trial court's findings of fact. See Peterson v. Peterson, 308 Minn. 297, 242 N.W.2d 88.

II.

Appellant argues that the trial court's award of $350 per month rehabilitative...

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