Wasen A. v. Saul
| Decision Date | 31 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | Court File No. 18-cv-03242 (SRN/LIB) |
| Parties | Wasen A., Plaintiff, v. Andrew Saul, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Plaintiff, Wasen A. (hereinafter "Plaintiff"), seeks judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant") denying her application for disability benefits. This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.1. This Court has jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Both parties submitted cross-motions for summary judgment, [Docket Nos. 12, 14], and the Court took the matter under advisement on the written submissions.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, [Docket No. 12], be DENIED, and that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, [Docket No. 14], be GRANTED.
On July 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income. (Tr. 17).2 Plaintiff alleged that her disability began on January 1, 2015. (Tr. 17). The Commissioner initially denied Plaintiff's present claims on December 30, 2015, and again, upon reconsideration, on February 15, 2018. (Tr. 17). On March 7, 2016, Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. (Tr. 17).
Administrative Law Judge Virginia Kuhn (the "ALJ") conducted a hearing on February 15, 2018. (Tr. 17, 42). Plaintiff was represented by legal counsel at the administrative hearing. (Tr. 17, 42). Plaintiff, an impartial medical expert, Dr. Lace, and an impartial vocational expert ("VE"), Cheryl Zilka ("IVE Zilka"), testified at the hearing. (Tr. 17). On May 24, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's request for supplemental security income. (Tr. 17-31). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within meaning of the Social Security Act. (Tr. 31).
Plaintiff thereafter sought review of the decision by the Appeals Council. (Tr. 1, 165). Subsequently, on September 25, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (Tr. 1-5). Accordingly, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. See, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
On November 23, 2018, Plaintiff filed the present action. (Compl. [Docket No. 1]).
If a claimant's initial application for disability benefits is denied, she may request reconsideration of the decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.907-404.909. A claimant who is dissatisfiedwith the reconsidered decision may then obtain administrative review by an administrative law judge. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.929.
To determine the existence and extent of a claimant's disability, the ALJ must follow a five-step sequential analysis. This analysis requires the ALJ to make a series of factual findings regarding the claimant's impairments, residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. See, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); see also, Locher v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 1992). The Eighth Circuit has described this five-step process as follows:
The Commissioner of Social Security must evaluate: (1) whether the claimant is presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the regulations; (4) whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform.
Dixon v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2003).
If the claimant is dissatisfied with the ALJ's decision, she may request review by the Appeals Council, although the Appeals Council need not grant that request for review. See, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967-404.982. The decision of the Appeals Council (or, if the request for review is denied by the Appeals Council, then the decision of the ALJ) is final and binding upon the claimant, unless the matter is appealed to federal district court within sixty days after notice of the Appeals Council's action. See, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
In the present case, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled, (Tr. 1-5), thus making the ALJ's decision effectively the final decision of the Commissioner.
Judicial review of the administrative decision generally proceeds by considering the decision of the ALJ at each of the five steps. Judicial review of the decision to deny disability benefits, however, is constrained to a determination of whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bradley v. Astrue, 528 F.3d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 2008); Tellez v. Barnhart, 403 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 2005); Buckner v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 1006, 1012 (8th Cir. 2000) (). "Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion." Buckner, 213 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 2000)); Coleman v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2007).
In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the Court may not substitute its own judgment or findings of fact for that of the ALJ. Hilkemeyer v. Barnhart, 380 F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 2004). The possibility that the Court could draw two inconsistent conclusions from the same record does not prevent a particular finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Culbertson v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994). The Court should not reverse the Commissioner's finding merely because evidence may exist in the administrative record to support the opposite conclusion. Milam v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 2015); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993).
After balancing the evidence, if it is possible to reach two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the Commissioner's decision [through the ALJ], the court must affirm the decision. Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 1992). Thus, the court will not reverse the ALJ's "denial of benefits so long as the ALJ's decision falls withinthe 'available zone of choice.'" Bradley v. Astrue, 528 F.3d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 2008). The decision of the ALJ "is not outside the 'zone of choice' simply because [the Court] might have reached a different conclusion had [it] been the initial finder of fact." Id. "If, after reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the ALJ's findings, the court must affirm the ALJ's decision." Medhaug v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 805, 813 (8th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).
The claimant bears the burden under the Social Security Act of proving that she is disabled. See, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a); Whitman v. Colvin, 762 F.3d 701, 705 (8th Cir. 2014). Once the claimant has demonstrated she cannot perform prior work due to a disability, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant retains the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to engage in some other substantial, gainful activity. Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005).
Before beginning the five-step disability evaluation process in the present case, the ALJ first decided to admit some, but not all, of the untimely additional written evidence that Plaintiff submitted following the hearing. (Tr. 17). The ALJ decided not to admit a letter written by Dr. Beyzavi, dated February 15, 2018, (the "February Letter") finding that "it could have and should have been admitted in a timely fashion." (Tr. 17; see also, Tr. 38-39). Plaintiff challenges this decision. The ALJ also decided not to admit a letter written by Plaintiff's counsel, dated February 15, 2018. (Tr. 18). Plaintiff does not challenge this decision.
Thereafter, the ALJ made the following determinations during the five-step disability evaluation process.
At step one, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 30, 2015, Plaintiff's application date. (Tr. 20). This finding is not in dispute.
At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had "the following severe impairments: major depressive disorder; generalized anxiety disorder; posttraumatic stress disorder; and headaches." (Tr. 20). Plaintiff challenges the findings made by the ALJ at step two.
At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 21). Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have any impairment or combination of impairments which met or medically equaled listing 1.04, 11.02, 12.04, 12.06, or 12.15. (Tr. 21-24). Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ's findings at step three.
At step four, the ALJ made the following RFC determination:
[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: simple routine, repetitive types of tasks and instructions that are fixed and predictable from day to day and would align with a specific vocational preparation of a one or a two as defined in the Dictionary of...
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