Washburn v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-1281 (TJK) |
| Decision Date | 11 March 2023 |
| Parties | CHOO WASHBURN, Plaintiff, v. U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiff sued the Office of Personnel Management, seeking to redirect federal-retirement benefit payments linked to her ex-husband's federal service that it is paying to her court-appointed guardian. But Congress has vested the exclusive power to decide such issues in other adjudicative bodies. So the Court must dismiss most of her claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. To the extent the Court has jurisdiction, it will dismiss her complaint for failing to state a claim.
Plaintiff alleges that the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) has failed to pay her benefits correctly. See ECF No. 27 (“Compl.”) at 5-12. She says her former husband, a retired federal employee, has benefits payable under the Civil Service Retirement System, Compl. at 6, and that she is entitled to roughly a third of those benefits, Compl. at 5. But OPM, she explains, is paying her share of those benefits to a person named Robert McCarthy instead. Compl. at 5-6.
She attributes those payments to computer hack, for which she says OPM is responsible.[1]See Compl. at 6. She asks the Court for a writ of mandamus compelling OPM to pay the annuity to her. See Compl. at 10-11.
But Plaintiff acknowledges that McCarthy is a court-appointed guardian of her property. See Compl. at 17 ¶ 19, 40 ¶ 9. A Maryland state court imposed that guardianship on Plaintiff after concluding that she was “unable to manage her property and affairs effectively.” Washburn v. McCarthy, No. 20-37, 2021 WL 4477449, at *1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Sept. 30, 2021) (quotation omitted). Plaintiff considers that order “absolutely WRONG.” Compl. at 17 ¶ 19.
Plaintiff further asserts entitlement to health-insurance coverage under a federal plan. See Compl. at 21-23. She also claims that she is owed another type of benefits, in part because her former husband did not disclose them during their divorce proceedings. See Compl. at 23-25.
Finally, Plaintiff has corresponded several times with OPM about her claims. See Compl. at 15, 17, 19-22, 24. At first, she says it paid her benefits appropriately under what Plaintiff describes as OPM's decision on her approved application. Compl. at 19-20. It is thus possible to construe her claims against OPM as being based on the agency's mistake, inadvertence, or failure to consider her position. But OPM says it has now rendered a final decision on her requests, insofar as they are within the agency's power. ECF No. 48-1 ¶ 4. OPM has concluded that it must pay benefits owed to Plaintiff to McCarthy as her representative payee under the guardianship order of the Maryland state court. ECF No. 48-2 at 6.
Plaintiff sued what she called the “Court Ordered Benefits Section” of OPM, asking for an order compelling the agency to record the disputed annuity as belonging to her and to make its payments directly to her. See ECF No. 1 at 2-4. She also requested orders directing other payments to her and directing the conversion of assets managed by McCarthy into other forms. See id. at 4-8. Plaintiff originally obtained a Clerk's Entry of Default, ECF No. 13, but that default was vacated with Plaintiff's consent after OPM appeared. See ECF Nos. 22-24; Min. Order of June 1, 2022. OPM moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, ECF No. 25, and Plaintiff amended her complaint in response, ECF No. 27. Because Plaintiff had the right to amend her pleading under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1)(B), the Court denied OPM's first motion to dismiss as moot. Min. Order of June 14, 2022.
Plaintiff then moved to “withdraw” part of her prior filings and to substitute new legal authorities in place of those already asserted. ECF No. 28. The Court construes that motion as one for further amendments of Plaintiff's complaint. The same day, Plaintiff filed another motion to “attach” various portions of her original complaint to her then-operative complaint, ECF No. 29, which the Court also construes as a motion to amend her complaint.
OPM reasserted its motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 31. It contends that the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”) divests this Court of jurisdiction in favor of an exhaustive administrative remedial scheme. See ECF No. 31-1 at 10-13. It also noted that- at that time-it had not yet “rendered a final decision” on Plaintiff's requests. Id. at 13-14. Plaintiff responded to that motion in part by moving for summary judgment. ECF No. 39. She also again asked to amend her operative complaint by appending some materials she had already filed. See ECF No. 40.
During further briefing on those motions, OPM notified the Court that it had rendered a final decision on Plaintiff's requests before the agency. ECF No. 48 at 9; see also ECF Nos. 48-1, 48-2. Seemingly based on that representation, Plaintiff moved to amend her complaint once more to add claims arising from what she calls OPM's false statements that it had rendered a final decision against her. See ECF No. 52 at 1-2.
Under Rule 12(b)(1), Plaintiff has the burden to establish the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006). That burden includes the obligation to “establish by a preponderance of the evidence” that a jurisdiction-stripping statute, such as the CSRA, does not preclude the Court's consideration of the case. See Martin v. EPA, 271 F.Supp.2d 38, 43 (D.D.C. 2002). In evaluating its jurisdiction at the pleading stage, the Court generally should “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and . . . grant[ Plaintiff] the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). That is particularly true here because Plaintiff proceeds pro se; the Court must “liberally construe[ ]” her filings and hold her to a “less stringent standard.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). But she still has the burden to prove subject-matter jurisdiction. Bickford v. United States, 808 F.Supp.2d 175, 179 (D.D.C. 2011). In evaluating whether she has met that burden, the Court may consider the allegations in her complaint, the undisputed facts in the record, and, if necessary, its resolution of disputed facts. Coal. for Underground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
To the extent the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction, the question is whether Plaintiff has stated a claim for which relief may be granted. OPM has not moved to dismiss on that basis, so the ordinary standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) does not apply.
See Baker v. Director, 916 F.2d 725, 726-27 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam). Still, after “taking all the material allegations of the complaint as admitted and construing them in [Plaintiff's] favor” the Court can dismiss a complaint sua sponte. Turan Petroleum, Inc. v. Ministry of Oil and Gas, 406 F.Supp.3d 1, 4 n.1 (D.D.C. 2019) (quotation omitted). Sua sponte dismissal is appropriate if it is “patently obvious” that Plaintiff cannot “prevail[ ] on the facts alleged in [her] complaint.” Baker, 916 F.2d at 727. That is so “when the established law plainly prohibits this kind of suit.” Jefferies v. District of Columbia, 916 F.Supp.2d 42, 47 (D.D.C. 2013).
Plaintiffs' filings are hard to decipher. She mentions several legal authorities, but their relationship to her claims is often unclear. Because she proceeds pro se, the Court will do its best to “infer the claims made wherever possible,” seeking to identify “all possible legal theories that could apply.” Davis v. United States, 973 F.Supp.2d 23, 26 (D.D.C. 2014). Moreover, the Court will consider the material in all of Plaintiff's filings, including her various amendment motions, in deciding whether she has established jurisdiction or stated a claim, not just that in her complaint. See Watson v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 249 F.Supp.3d 462, 464 (D.D.C. 2017); Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
This Court's power to decide an issue depends on whether there is a “live” dispute in which the parties retain a “legally cognizable interest.” See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 721, 726-27 (2013) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (per curiam)). The dispute must remain live “at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (quotation omitted). If a claim becomes “moot because it no longer presents a live controversy, the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the claim, and must dismiss it.” Han v. Lynch, 223 F.Supp.3d 95, 105 (D.D.C. 2016).
In very limited circumstances, federal courts have mandamus authority to order agencies to render a final decision. See generally Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 79-81 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Perhaps Plaintiff means to invoke that authority because she asks, several times, for various mandamus orders and appears to dispute that the agency has rendered a final decision against her. See e.g., Compl. at 10-11; ECF No. 39 at 12 ¶ 6; ECF No. 52 at 1-2. So construed, Plaintiff's claim is that OPM has unreasonably delayed in acting on the information she presented to it. See, e.g., Arab v. Blinken, 600 F.Supp.3d 59, 68-72 (D.D.C. 2022) (...
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