Washington Educ. Ass'n v. Smith, 15

• Decision Date: 24 December 1981
• Docket Number: No. 15,S,W,No. 4,No. 47164-9,15,4,47164-9
• Parties: , 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2700, 1 Ed. Law Rep. 1317 WASHINGTON EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; Washington Education Association/Association for Higher Education; Wenatchee Valley College Association for Higher Education; Skagit Valley College Association for Higher Education; and Washington Public Employees Association, Appellants, v. Orin SMITH, Director, Office of Fiscal Management; Office of Fiscal Management, an agency of the State of Washington; Community College Districtenatchee Valley College, an agency of the State of Washington; and the Board of Trustees Thereof; and Community College Districtkagit Valley College, an agency of the State of Washington, and the Board of Trustees Thereof, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 601

96 Wn.2d 601

638 P.2d 77, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2700,

1 Ed. Law Rep. 1317

WASHINGTON EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; Washington Education Association/Association for Higher Education; Wenatchee Valley College Association for Higher Education; Skagit Valley College Association for Higher Education; and Washington Public Employees Association, Appellants, v. Orin SMITH, Director, Office of Fiscal Management; Office of Fiscal Management, an agency of the State of Washington Community College District No. 15, Wenatchee Valley College an agency of the State of Washington; and the Board of Trustees Thereof; and Community College District No. 4 Skagit Valley College, an agency of the State of Washington and the Board of Trustees Thereof, Respondents.

No. 47164-9.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Dec. 24, 1981.

Watson, Grosse & Feinstein, C. Kenneth Grosse, Ronald E. Farley, Seattle, Audrey B. Eide, Olympia, for appellants.

Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Robert F. Hauth, Richard M. Montecucco, Asst. Attys. Gen., Olympia, for respondents.

DIMMICK, Justice.

This action for a declaratory judgment is to Appellant Washington Education Association (WEA) is an employee association representing teachers and other state workers. Appellant Washington Education Association/Association for Higher Education (WEA/AHE) is an affiliate of the WEA and represents the various local associations for higher education in the state. Appellant Washington Public Employees Association (WPEA) represents public employees including 4,000 state government workers and nonacademic staff at community colleges. Each has established a political action committee to endorse and support candidates for public office. The WEA's political action committee, "Political Unity of Leaders in State Education" (PULSE), is comprised of teachers and educators. "Political Action by Concerned Employees" (PACE), the WPEA's political action committee, consists of state and other public employees and their families, as well as interested parties. The funds collected by the two political action groups are used to support candidates for public office, in state as well as in federal elections. In addition, PULSE funds are given to the National Education Association's political committee.

determine whether the state budget director is authorized to permit voluntary payroll deductions for employees for the purpose of making direct contributions to the political action committee of the employees' labor associations. The trial court granted the State's cross motion for summary judgment holding there was no statutory authority for such a deduction nor any constitutional right for the political action committees to receive state funds from wages of the employees, nor any right for the employees to have their wages paid to someone other than themselves. We affirm.

These political action committees had received a large proportion of their funds by way of voluntary payroll deductions by their members. Some associations of college educators had this procedure written into their collective bargaining agreements. ¹ The PULSE membership fee is In 1978, Orin Smith, Director of the Office of Fiscal Management, requested an Attorney General opinion regarding the statutory authority, or constitutional requirement for these deductions. The Attorney General opinion concluded that the respondent director ² had no statutory authority to permit a state employee to establish a payroll deduction for the specified purpose of making a voluntary contribution to a labor union or other employee organization for political purposes. Attorney General Opinion, October 26, 1978. As a result, the director terminated these payroll deductions. In response, the appellants filed this suit for declaratory and injunctive relief on stipulated facts and affidavits.

$10 per year. PACE requires a minimum contribution of $10 per year. A 7-step process is involved in payroll deductions. As of January 1980, there were 76,874 state employees in 128 different agencies. Each payroll deduction represents additional cost to the state. The main personnel/payroll system has a maximum capability of handling ten deductions per individual. It is therefore possible that the addition of one more deduction for political contributions would cause some employees to exceed this maximum.

I

Appellants' major contention is that voluntary payroll deductions for political contributions by state employees are "clearly related to state employment" and therefore may be authorized by the budget director exercising his discretion pursuant to RCW 41.04.

RCW 41.04.230 authorizes state disbursing officials to deduct money from the salaries and wages of public officers or employees. Specifically, this statute permits deductions for (1) credit unions, (2) parking fees, (3) United States In addition, RCW 41.04.230 contains a general provision permitting deductions for activities "clearly related to state employment" which reads in pertinent part:

savings bonds, (4) board, lodging or uniforms, (5) membership dues to any professional organization formed primarily for public employees or college and university professors, (6) other labor or employee organization dues, (7) accident and casualty premiums, and (8) certain other insurance contributions. See also RCW 41.04.036 (permitting deductions for United Fund); RCW 41.04.233 (permitting deductions for health maintenance organizations).

Deductions from salaries and wages of public officers and employees other than those enumerated in this section or by other law, may be authorized by the director of financial management for purposes clearly related to state employment or goals and objectives of the agency ...

(Italics ours.)

The thrust of appellants' argument is that these deductions are for "purposes clearly related to state employment", and, therefore, come within the general provision as political activity is an essential element of state employment. Appellants note that since state employees' working conditions are in part established by the legislature, the employees are at the mercy of the political process. Thus, voluntary political contributions are necessary to insure that employees have some voice in the establishment of working conditions. We do not find this argument persuasive. ³

First, it is unclear whether these contributions directly impact the employees' bargaining position. There is no guaranty that either PULSE or PACE will spend these funds exclusively on state elections. In fact, some of the Second, we can find nothing in the legislative history of the act indicating that the legislature intended to permit deductions for political purposes. In other legislation, the legislature has expressed its disapproval of using state property in connection with the solicitation or making of political contributions. See RCW 41.06.250(1) (prohibiting the solicitation on public property of political or partisan contributions); RCW 42.17.130 (prohibiting the use of any facilities of a public office or agency, directly or indirectly, for campaign purposes).

funds are contributed to candidates for federal offices who have little, if anything, to do with establishing wages, hours and conditions of employment for Washington state employees. Further, the interests of the members are diverse in that the associations are comprised of public employees and their families as well as state employees and "others".

Finally, the opinion of the Attorney General concludes that these political contributions are not authorized. Attorney General Opinion, October 26, 1978. Although not binding, opinions of the Attorney General in construing statutes are entitled to considerable weight. In re Chi-Dooh Li, 79 Wash.2d 561, 488 P.2d 259 (1971); Kasper v. Edmonds, 69 Wash.2d 799, 420 P.2d 346 (1966). This is especially true in the instant case given the legislature's acquiescence to the Attorney General's interpretation of RCW 41.04.230 as evidenced by its failure, in subsequent legislative sessions, to modify the statute. ⁴ See White v. State, 49 Wash.2d 716, 306 P.2d 230 (1957), appeal dismissed 355 U.S. 10, 78 S.Ct. 23, 2 L.Ed.2d 21; State ex rel. Pirak v. Schoettler, 45 Wash.2d 367, 274 P.2d 852 (1954).

There being no specific provision for such deductions within the statutes of the state, the problems of fiscal impact and the strict adherence of the legislature to refrain

from participation by the state in partisan politics, lead us to the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to include political contributions within the limited general classification of activity "clearly related" to state employment. If there is a fair or reasonable doubt as to whether or not a particular power has been granted, it must be denied. Pacific First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Pierce County, 27 Wash.2d 347, 178 P.2d 351 (1947); Griggs v. Port of Tacoma, 150 Wash. 402, 273 P. 521 (1928). Therefore, we hold the director does not have discretionary power in this case.

II

Appellants next assert that if RCW 41.04 does not permit voluntary payroll deductions for political contributions, it is violative of the First Amendment rights of political association and speech. They argue that not allowing the payroll deduction "becomes a limitation on political contributions and expenditures and therefore a regulation of speech" in direct conflict with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). Such a prohibition also "takes away from public employees their First Amendment right to political speech and association as a condition of their employment," in violation of Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). These arguments, however, ignore the fact that state workers are not prohibited entirely from contributing to the political action committees. Rather, only one method of facilitating contributions is prohibited. Thus, the federal...