Washington Educ. Ass'n v. Shelton School Dist. No. 309

• Decision Date: 26 June 1980
• Docket Number: I,No. 401,C,No. 81,H,No. 313,No. 46348,No. 128,P,No. 400,No. 501,S,No. 402-37 and S,No. 204 and C,No. 10,No. 322,L,No. 300,G,No. JT3,No. 120,501,400,401,81,10,JT3,120,128,204 and C,300,313,402-37 and S,322,46348
• Citation: 93 Wn.2d 783,613 P.2d 769
• Parties: WASHINGTON EDUCATION ASSOCIATION: Bellingham Education Association, Clover Park Education Association, Highline Education Association and Shelton Education Association, Individually and on behalf of a class of all local education associations in the State of Washington similarly situated; Kathleen Peters, Connie Rasmussen, Diane Campbell, Karel Murphy, Darlene Cartwright, Donna Lormor, Darleen Peterson, Abigail Eation, Linda Flathers and Michaelynn Withers, Individually and on behalf of a class of all female coaches of girls extracurricular athletic programs within the public school systems in the State of Washington; Linda Tomac, Jeanne Ratliff and Mike George, on behalf of their school age daughters, Individually and as representatives of a class of all female students attending public schools in the State of Washington, Petitioners, v. SHELTON SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 309, Bellingham School Districtlover Park School Districtighline School Districtpokane School District, and Tacoma School Districtndividually and as representative of a class of all statutory first class school districts; Naches Valley School Districtndividually and as a representative of a class of all statutory second class school districts with 1,000 or more pupils; Mabton School Districteavenworth School Districtranger School Districtolfax School Districtndividually and as representative of a class of all statutory second class school districts with 500-999 pupils; Crescent School Districtrescott School Districtt. John School Districtndividually and as representative of a class of all statutory second class school districts with fewer than 500 pupils; and Washington Interscholastic Activities Association, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 783

93 Wn.2d 783

613 P.2d 769

WASHINGTON EDUCATION ASSOCIATION: Bellingham Education Association, Clover Park Education Association, Highline Education Association and Shelton Education Association Individually and on behalf of a class of all local education associations in the State of Washington similarly situated Kathleen Peters, Connie Rasmussen, Diane Campbell, Karel Murphy, Darlene Cartwright, Donna Lormor, Darleen Peterson Abigail Eation, Linda Flathers and Michaelynn Withers Individually and on behalf of a class of all female coaches of girls extracurricular athletic programs within the public school systems in the State of Washington; Linda Tomac, Jeanne Ratliff and Mike George, on behalf of their school age daughters, Individually and as representatives of a class of all female students attending public schools in the State of Washington, Petitioners, v. SHELTON SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 309, Bellingham School District No. 501, Clover Park School District No. 400, Highline School District No. 401, Spokane School District No. 81, and Tacoma School District No. 10, Individually and as representative of a class of all statutory first class school districts; Naches Valley School District No. JT3, Individually and as a representative of a class of all statutory second class school districts with 1,000 or more pupils; Mabton School District No. 120, Leavenworth School District No. 128, Granger School District No. 204 and Colfax School District No. 300, Individually and as representative of a class of all statutory second class school districts with 500-999 pupils; Crescent School District No. 313, Prescott School District No. 402-37 and St. John School District No. 322, Individually and as representative of a class of all statutory second class school districts with fewer than 500 pupils; and Washington Interscholastic Activities Association, Respondents.

No. 46348.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

June 26, 1980.

Washington Education Association, Judith Lonnquist, Symone B. Scales, Federal Way, for petitioners.

Ronald Carpenter, Pros. Atty., Gerald R. Fuller, Deputy Pros. Atty., Whitman County, Colfax, Perkins, Coie, Stone, Olsen & Williams, John F. Aslin, Lawrence B. Ransom, Seattle, for respondents.

HOROWITZ, Justice.

Plaintiffs appeal from orders entered in King County Superior Court denying standing, transferring venue, and rejecting class certification in their sex discrimination suit. We reverse the trial court's rulings and remand for a proper consideration of the class certification issues presented in this case for the reasons stated below.

I.

This suit was begun in King County Superior Court in September 1977 as an attempted plaintiff and defendant class action. It was brought by the Washington Education Association (WEA), which is a statewide organization representing teachers in the K-12 public school system, by several local education associations, by a group of public school women coaches, and by several parents of school-age daughters. The local education associations, the coaches, and the parents, purported to act individually and on behalf of other associations, coaches, and school-age children similarly situated. The WEA purported to act in the interests of its members. Defendants were the Washington Interscholastic Athletic Association (WIAA), which is a statewide organization of junior and senior high schools for interscholastic athletic competition, and 14 local school districts located throughout the state. The defendant school districts were purportedly sued individually and as representatives of the four statutory classes of school districts within the state.

The plaintiffs in their complaint alleged unequal salaries and working conditions for female coaches and inferior athletic programs, including unequal awards, facilities, equipment, supplies, transportation, and recruitment opportunities, for school-age girls throughout the state public school system. The complaint alleged this inequality is the result of WIAA rules that are sexually discriminatory and of the failure of WIAA and local school districts to rectify past discrimination. Allegations of "pervasive and systemic" sex discrimination within the entire state public school extracurricular athletics program form the basis of the suit. Sex discrimination of the sort alleged in the plaintiff's complaint is prohibited by RCW 28A.85.

The suit was originally filed in King County Superior Court. With the complaint, the plaintiffs served on each defendant interrogatories and document production requests aimed at establishing the viability of class certification for both plaintiffs and defendants.

In their answers, non-King County defendants objected to venue under RCW 4.12.025. Some defendants asserted standing and joinder defenses to their participation in the suit. Motions to dismiss on the bases of standing and joinder were filed by some defendants. All of the defendants' motions were made pursuant to the provisions of CR 12.

Discovery against all defendants except the WIAA was indefinitely delayed by order of Presiding Judge Barbara Durham until a date to be determined by the judge to be preassigned to the case. When the suit was preassigned to Superior Court Judge Erle Horswill, he determined that the court should first examine the venue, joinder, and standing issues and set up a time table of defendants' interrogatories and plaintiffs' answers regarding these questions. The plaintiffs filed, but never noted up for argument, a motion requesting an order to compel answers to their original interrogatories concerning class certification, and only defendants' discovery proceeded. Thus, all of the court's rulings, noted below, were made without benefit of discovery requested by plaintiffs.

After discovery, briefing, and argument, Judge Horswill on June 22, 1978, granted the motions of all non-King County defendants for a change of venue. He transferred portions of the suit to ten other counties in the state. Judge Horswill dismissed outright the claims against the St. John, Naches, Mabton, and Granger school districts because none of the named plaintiffs directly bargained with, were employed by, or had daughters attending school in these districts, i. e., for lack of standing. Judge Horswill further determined the issue regarding joinder of indispensable parties should be considered by the courts with proper venue.

In his oral decision, Judge Horswill stated:

(I)f we finally got down to the class action business, I would deny it because I do not think that's a matter where the class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.

However, Judge Horswill did not explicitly rule on the class certification issue.

On July 29, 1978, before he had signed a formal order concerning these holdings, Judge Horswill died. After reviewing the file and Judge Horswill's oral opinion and conducting two hearings on the matter, Presiding Judge Lloyd Bever signed orders embodying Judge Horswill's standing and venue determinations. Judge Bever also formally denied class certification of both the proposed plaintiff and defendant classes, pursuant to Judge Horswill's oral opinion. In a separate order not appealed from, Judge Bever stayed the proceedings, as transferred into the other courts in the state with appropriate venue under his analysis, until the plaintiffs decided in which forum they would proceed.

Plaintiffs took an appeal as a matter of right and also moved for discretionary review to the Court of Appeals, Division I. The appellate court denied the motion and dismissed the appeal. On petition of the plaintiffs for review of the Court of Appeals' denial of the motion and appeal, the Supreme Court Commissioner granted review.

The case at this stage in the proceedings presents no substantive issues as to the merits of plaintiffs' action. We must determine merely whether the court's procedural rulings were premature. Before us at this time is the question of the appropriateness of the trial court's disposition of class certification in connection with the defendants' pretrial motions for dismissal for lack of standing and improper joinder and for transfer of venue. In light of the trial court's failure to permit plaintiffs' proposed discovery, the question presented is:

Did the trial court err under the facts of this case in considering questions of standing and venue before determining whether plaintiff or defendant classes should be certified?

II.

The plaintiffs first assert that the court must consider certifying requested classes before considering motions regarding venue and standing. This contention is based initially on the language of CR 23(c)(1):

As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained.

Plaintiffs believe that by interposing the determination of appropriate venue and the question of standing with regard to certain named defendants, the trial court cannot have been considered to have dealt with certification "as soon as practicable." They allege that the class certification process must always precede the resolution of CR 12 motions, since class certification "will most frequently dictate the appropriate venue and resolve questions regarding the standing of any specific plaintiff."

However, it is clear from a review of cases considering the federal class action rule that class certification need not always be undertaken before other pretrial motions are considered. Other matters are often disposed of before class certification. See, e. g., Goldberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 390 F.Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y.1975) (ruling on motion to dismiss for improper venue); Umbriac v. American Snacks, Inc., 388 F.Supp. 265 (E.D.Pa.1975) (ruling on motion for transfer of venue). See also Johnston v. Beneficial Management Corp., 85 Wash.2d 637, 538...