Washington Natural Gas Co. v. Tyee Const. Co.

• Citation: 26 Wn.App. 235,611 P.2d 1378
• Decision Date: 27 May 1980
• Docket Number: No. 7521-7-I,7521-7-I
• Parties: WASHINGTON NATURAL GAS COMPANY, a Washington Corporation, Appellant, v. TYEE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and Puget Sound Power and Light Company, Washington Corporations, Respondents.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington

Page 235

26 Wn.App. 235

611 P.2d 1378

WASHINGTON NATURAL GAS COMPANY, a Washington Corporation, Appellant, v. TYEE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and Puget Sound Power and Light Company, Washington Corporations, Respondents.

No. 7521-7-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

May 27, 1980.

Reconsideration denied June 24, 1980.

Thomas C. McKinnon, Cartano, Botzer & Chapman, Seattle, for appellant.

David N. Lombard, Ferguson & Burdell, Paul B. Goodrich, Perkins, Coie, Stone, Olsen & Williams, Seattle, for respondents.

SWANSON, Judge.

Plaintiff Washington Natural Gas Company (Gas Company) brought suit against Tyee Construction Company (Tyee) and Puget Sound Power and Light Company (Puget) to recover for damage to its underground gas lines ¹ at 10 locations in a residential subdivision. The Gas Company's contention was that Tyee, a contractor employed by Puget to underground its power lines, had "barked" a protective covering off existing gas lines during the process of laying the power lines. The trial court, sitting without a jury, dismissed the complaint, and the Gas Company appeals. We find no error and affirm.

In 1968 defendants Tyee and Puget entered into a contract for the conversion of Puget's overhead power lines to underground lines in a Bellevue subdivision. Tyee's job was to dig the necessary trenches, install transformers, and lay the power lines. By the contract, Tyee was required to allow the telephone company, fire department, and a television cable company to lay their respective lines before the trenches were backfilled.

Before starting work, Tyee had an employee of the Gas Company mark the locations of the underground gas lines. There was evidence that when one of the marked locations was approached, Tyee's employees used both a hand shovel and a backhoe to carefully dig the trench until the gas line was located. Once the line was located, the rest of the trench around it was dug with only a shovel. Tyee would then lay Puget's power line in the trench by hand. Dirt was tamped between the power line and the gas line to prevent contact.

According to the testimony of Tyee's foreman, extreme care was necessary because if the thin protective covering on the power line was crimped or damaged, the power line would explode. Testimony by witnesses for the Gas Company indicated if the protective wrapping on its gas line was removed, or "barked," and there was metal to metal contact between the gas line and other utility lines, corrosion would result. Such corrosion could lead to a gas leak and possible explosion.

In 1977, during the course of survey work by the Gas Company to determine whether its lines were intact, metal to metal contact was detected. Further tests pinpointed the contact to 10 locations, and the Gas Company dug up the lines, discovering Puget's power lines in contact with the gas lines in all locations. (At trial, the Gas Company agreed to strike an allegation concerning one of the 10 locations and the trial proceeding regarding the other nine locations.) The cost of repairing the damage was $2,167, and the Gas Company brought suit against Tyee and Puget when both refused to pay.

In answer to the complaint, both Puget and Tyee raised as a defense the special statute of limitation contained in RCW 4.16.300-.320. ² There is no contention that the Gas Company's cause of action accrued within 6 years after Tyee completed work on the project. Thus, the issue presented is whether installation of the power lines was an "improvement upon real property" within the meaning of RCW 4.16.300.

The Gas Company contends that the power lines are not an improvement upon real property because they are not structures and are not permanent in nature because they are subject to relocation or removal when necessary in the interest of public health, safety, or welfare. See Washington Natural Gas Co. v. Seattle, 60 Wash.2d 183, 373 P.2d 133 (1962).

This contention is disposed of by our decision in Pinneo v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 14 Wash.App. 848, 545 P.2d 1207 (1976). There we held that a ski lift is an improvement upon real property despite its being subject to removal upon expiration of the operator's special forest permit. We said:

The legislative purpose in enacting RCW 4.16.300 et seq. suggests that a similarly comprehensive definition should be given to the term "improvement" as used in the statute of limitation context. The legislature adopted the particular statute of limitations to protect architects, contractors, engineers, and others from extended potential tort and contract liability. (Citation omitted.) The statute has a broad scope barring all causes of action that do not accrue within 6 years after substantial completion or termination of any of the specified services. Given the comprehensive coverage of the statute and the legislative intent behind its enactment,

there seems no reason not to include within the favor of the statute all . . . whether they be planners and builders of structures, roads, playing fields or aught else that by broad definition can be deemed "an improvement to real property."

Rosenberg v. North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 198, 293 A.2d 662, 666 (1972).

We conclude that the ski lift is an "improvement" within the meaning of the statute. The ski lift adds to the value of the property, is an amelioration of its condition, and enhances its use.

Pinneo, 14 Wash.App. at 852, 545 P.2d at 1209.

Under the same analysis, the power lines are an improvement upon real property even though potentially subject to removal under some circumstances. The power lines add to the value of the property and enhance its use, and Tyee, being a contractor, is clearly within the class to be protected by the statute.

The Gas Company attempts to draw a distinction between the word "upon," as used in RCW 4.16.300, and the word "to," found in similar statutes of limitation in other jurisdictions. We are not persuaded that by using the phrase, any improvement upon real property, the legislature intended to limit the statute to actions arising out of construction, etc., on the surface of the land only. As noted, the statute is broad in scope and comprehensive in coverage and intended to protect contractors, engineers, and others from extended liability. To limit the statute as the Gas Company suggests would defeat its obvious purpose. ³

With regard to Puget, the Gas Company raises the proviso in RCW 4.16.310 which prevents an owner, tenant, or one in possession or control of the improvement from asserting the limitation as a defense. This issue, however, was not argued below and will not be considered on appeal. Fuqua v. Fuqua, 88 Wash.2d 100, 558 P.2d 801 (1977).

Although we hold that the Gas Company's claim is barred by RCW 4.16.300-.320, the trial court's decision may be affirmed on the basis that substantial evidence exists to support the finding that Tyee used reasonable care in laying the power lines.

The Gas Company asserts that the trial court arbitrarily disbelieved uncontradicted evidence. There is no dispute that the gas lines were damaged and were in metal to metal contact with the power lines. The trial judge stated in his oral opinion that had Tyee put on no evidence regarding the manner in which the power lines were laid, he would have to infer that Tyee was negligent. However, there was testimony at length...