Washington State Bar Ass'n v. State, 61830-5
| Decision Date | 09 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 61830-5,61830-5 |
| Citation | 125 Wn.2d 901,890 P.2d 1047 |
| Parties | , 149 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2099, 63 USLW 2578 The WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Washington; The Public Employment Relations Commission, an agency of the executive branch of the State of Washington; and Marvin L. Schurke, a state officer, in his capacity as Executive Director of PERC; Janet L. Gaunt, a state officer, in her capacity as Chairperson of PERC; Dustin C. McCreary, a state officer, in his capacity as a member of PERC; and Sam Kinville, a state officer, in his capacity as a member of PERC; and United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1001, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Davis, Wright & Tremaine, P. Cameron DeVore, Stephen Rummage, Gregory J. Kopta, Seattle, Davis, Wright & Tremaine, Linda White Atkins, Bellevue, for petitioner.
Christine O. Gregoire, Atty. Gen., Richard A. Heath, Sr. Asst., Spencer Daniels, Asst., Olympia, for respondent State.
Webster, Mrak & Blumberg, James H. Webster, Lynn D. Weir, Seattle, for respondent Union.
*
In this case we determine the constitutionality of a statute which was intended to nullify a general rule of court adopted by this court, and which directly and unavoidably conflicts with that rule of court. We hold that the statute in question, which declares the Washington State Bar Association a "public employer" subject to the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act, RCW 41.56, to be unconstitutional in that it violates the separation of powers doctrine.
This action grew out of a labor dispute between the Washington State Bar Association (Bar Association) and its employees. Our decision here is, however, not one which is in any way intended to affect labor law jurisprudence.
Initially, it is important to clarify what this case is not about. It is not about the value of collective bargaining, or about the importance of maintaining good labor relations between the Bar Association and its employees. It is also not about the authority of the Legislature to enact general employment statutes that are applicable to the Bar Association. Nor is it about the merits of the arguments advanced by the respective participants in this labor dispute.
This is a constitutional case. What it does involve is one of the cardinal and fundamental principles of the American constitutional system, the separation of powers doctrine.
The pertinent facts are simple. In early 1991 several Bar Association employees attempted to organize, seeking representation by the United Food and Commercial Workers Union (Union) for purposes of collective bargaining. The Bar Association refused to recognize the Union as the collective bargaining representative of its employees. Then in November of 1991, the Union asked this court to change our General Rule (GR) 12, which outlines the purposes and the powers of the Bar Association. The suggested rule change amendment would have required the Bar Association to collectively bargain with its employees.
On October 8, 1992, this court declined to adopt the Union's suggested rule change.
During the 1993 legislative session, the Legislature enacted Engrossed House Bill (EHB) 1152 as follows:
Sec. 1. The legislature is committed to providing collective bargaining for all employees. However, the legislature is also mindful of the separations of powers and responsibilities among the branches of government. Therefore, the legislature strongly encourages the state supreme court to adopt collective bargaining for the employees of the Washington state bar association.
Sec. 2. RCW 41.56.020 and 1992 c 36 § 1 are each amended to read as follows:
This chapter shall apply to any county or municipal corporation, or any political subdivision of the state of Washington.... The Washington state supreme court may provide by rule that the Washington state bar association shall be considered a public employer of its employees.
This court responded to that legislation by amending GR 12, the general rule governing the authority of the Bar Association. On December 2, 1993, after carefully considering the matter and mindful of the Legislature's recommendation, we added a new subsection (16) to our General Rule 12(b), giving the Bar Association's Board of Governors the discretion to determine whether to collectively bargain with its employees. 1 In an informational note to the amendment, this court recognized the Legislature's 1993 enactment, stating:
During the 1993 regular session EHB 1152 was passed. That legislation amends RCW 41.56.020 by providing that while recognizing the separation of powers and responsibilities in government, "the legislature strongly encourages the state supreme court to adopt collective bargaining for the employees of the Washington state bar association".
The amendment [to GR 12(b) ] confers upon the Washington State Bar Association's Board of Governors the authority, in its discretion, to adopt collective bargaining for employees of that association.
GR 12, which we adopted in 1987, is divided into three parts. The first part, section (a), declares the purposes of the Bar Association. The second, section (b), sets forth the various actions which the Bar Association is authorized to take. The third, section (c), sets forth the actions which the Bar Association is prohibited from taking. The parts of the rule, including the recent amendment, that are pertinent here are the following:
(a) Purposes; In General. The purposes of the Washington State Bar Association shall be to promote and aid in the effective administration of justice; to assist in the admission and discipline of members of the Bar Association; to foster and maintain high standards of competence, professionalism and ethics among its members; to promote the availability of legal services to all in need; to advise the public and its officials in matters relevant to these purposes and the professional interests of the Bar Association; to promote respect and understanding for our legal system; to promote the creation of voluntary associations of lawyers concerned with their members' professional interests; to carry on programs of legal research and education; to provide a forum for the discussion of subjects pertaining to jurisprudence and the practice of law; to foster camaraderie among members of the Bar Association and good will between the Bar Association and the public; to promote the independence of the Bar Association and the judiciary of which it is a part; and to promote the interests of the legal profession.
(b) Specific Activities Authorized. Among the specific Bar Association activities authorized by this rule and these stated purposes are:
. . . . .
(16) Authorizing, in its discretion, collective bargaining for its employees.
GR 12 (part).
In early 1994 the Legislature again addressed the issue. The Legislature noted that the court had amended GR 12(b) to give the Bar Association's Board of Governors discretionary authority to adopt collective bargaining for its employees. It further recognized that this court has held that "as a separate branch of government, it has inherent constitutional powers to control the bar association and its functions as part of its administration of the courts". 2 The Legislature nonetheless ignored this court's actions, repealed the declaration set forth in EHB 1152, Laws of 1993, ch. 76, § 1, and amended RCW 41.56.020 to read as follows:
This chapter shall apply to any county or municipal corporation, or any political subdivision of the state of Washington.... The Washington state bar association shall be considered a public employer of its employees.
Laws of 1994, ch. 297, p. 1881.
The effect of this new legislation was to remove the discretion which this court had granted the Board of Governors under GR 12(b)(16) by making collective bargaining mandatory.
Following the enactment of the statute, and pursuant to RCW 41.56, the Bar Association employees petitioned the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) for a determination as to whether the bar's employees desired to be represented by a labor organization for the purpose of collective bargaining. After PERC notified the Bar Association that it would investigate and administer the matter, the Bar Association filed a petition in this court seeking a writ of prohibition. This court has original jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Const. art. 4, § 4 and RAP 16.2. The petition for writ of prohibition asks the court to prohibit PERC from assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the bar and its employees and further asks us to declare the 1994 amendment to the statute unconstitutional.
One issue is determinative of this case.
Is legislation which directly and unavoidably conflicts with a court rule governing Bar Association powers and responsibilities constitutional?
CONCLUSION. Legislation which directly and unavoidably conflicts with a rule of court governing Bar Association powers and responsibilities is unconstitutional as it violates the separation of powers doctrine; such legislation is therefore void.
Washington's constitution, Const. art. 4, § 1 vests the judicial power of the State in a separate branch of government--the judiciary. 3 The importance of the separation of powers doctrine was stated in Washington State Motorcycle Dealers Ass'n v. State, 111 Wash.2d 667, 674-75, 763 P.2d 442 (1988) (quoting 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 296, at 808, § 309, at 829 (1979)) 4 as follows:
The importance of the case before us is that it deals directly with one of the cardinal and fundamental principles of the American constitutional system, both state and federal: the separation of powers doctrine. "It has been declared that the division of governmental powers into the executive, legislative, and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Rice
...manifest error affecting a constitutional right, see Ruff, 122 Wash.2d at 733 n. 1, 861 P.2d 1063;see also Wash. State Bar Ass'n v. State, 125 Wash.2d 901, 906, 890 P.2d 1047 (1995) (legislation in violation of separation of powers is unconstitutional and void). We thus consider whether the......
-
In re Dependency of A.K., 23018-0-III.
...executive, legislative, and judicial is essential to the maintenance of a republican form of government. Wash. State Bar Ass'n v. State, 125 Wash.2d 901, 906-07, 890 P.2d 1047 (1995). Although the separation of powers doctrine is designed to allow the three branches to maintain effective co......
-
State v. Yishmael
...of the basic functions of the judicial branch of government is the regulation of the practice of law." Wash. State Bar Ass’n v. State , 125 Wash.2d 901, 907, 890 P.2d 1047 (1995) (citing Graham v. State Bar Ass’n , 86 Wash.2d 624, 631, 548 P.2d 310 (1976) ). " ‘The practice of law is so int......
-
State v. Thorne
...Constitution vests the judicial power of this state in a separate branch of government--the judiciary. Washington State Bar Ass'n v. State, 125 Wash.2d 901, 906, 890 P.2d 1047 (1995). Legislation which violates the separation of powers doctrine is void. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 125 Wash.......
-
Megan A. Taylor, Gag Me With a Rule of Ethics: Bapcpa's Gag Rule and the Debtor Attorney's Right to Free Speech
...103 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Thomson West 2007). 104 E.g., Wash. State Bar Ass'n v. State, 890 P.2d 1047 (Wash. 1995) (holding that state statutes in conflict with court rules violated separation of powers); see also Squillace v. Kelley, 990 P.2d......
-
Understanding the Limits of Power: Judicial Restraint in General Jurisdiction Court Systems
...authority to regulate the practice of law steps across the constitutional line. Wash. State Bar Ass'n v. State, 125 Wash. 2d 901, 902, 890 P.2d 1047, 1048 (1995) (legislative designation of Bar Association as public employer for purposes of collective bargaining held unconstitutional); Grah......