In re Dependency of A.K., 23018-0-III.

• Decision Date: 20 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. 23211-5-III.,No. 23252-2-III.,No. 23018-0-III.,No. 23253-1-III.,23018-0-III.,23211-5-III.,23253-1-III.,23252-2-III.
• Citation: 130 Wn. App. 862,125 P.3d 220
• Parties: In re the DEPENDENCY OF A.K., A Minor Child. In re the Dependency of M.H.-O., A Minor Child. In re the Dependency of Y.H., A Minor Child.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 220

125 P.3d 220

130 Wn. App. 862

In re the DEPENDENCY OF A.K., A Minor Child.

In re the Dependency of M.H.-O., A Minor Child.

In re the Dependency of Y.H., A Minor Child.

No. 23018-0-III.

No. 23211-5-III.

No. 23253-1-III.

No. 23252-2-III.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3.

December 20, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Gregory Charles Link, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.

Timothy S. Hamill, Office of the Attorney General, Yakima, WA, for Respondent.

SCHULTHEIS, J.

¶ 1 With this opinion we address consolidated cases of dependent juveniles, A.K., M.H.-O., and Y.H., who were sentenced to detention under the court's inherent contempt power. Each juvenile was found in contempt of court several times for running away from court-ordered placement. The substantive issues on appeal are whether and how the court may exercise its inherent contempt authority to exceed the seven-day detention allowed under chapter 13.34 RCW.

¶ 2 We conclude that the juvenile court properly imposes a determinate period of detention under its inherent contempt authority only when it finds that the statutory remedy is inadequate to meet the juvenile's needs and that a different period of detention is necessary. This exercise of inherent contempt authority must satisfy due process. Because we find that one of the inherent contempt disposition orders here was not supported by specific findings, and that another order violated due process, those orders are vacated. We affirm the remaining two orders of inherent contempt because they are supported by sufficient findings and satisfy due process.

CONTEMPT OF COURT AND JUVENILE DISOBEDIENCE OF PLACEMENT ORDERS

¶ 3 Contempt of court is intentional disrespectful behavior toward the court, disobedience of a lawful court action, or refusal to participate in the court process. RCW 7.21.010(1). The contempt statutes adopted in 1989 distinguish between two general types of contempt sanctions: remedial and punitive. RCW 7.21.010. A remedial sanction is imposed to coerce performance of "an act that is yet in the person's power to perform." RCW 7.21.010(3). A punitive sanction punishes a past contempt "for the purpose of upholding the authority of the court." RCW 7.21.010(2). The remedial sanction is imposed for civil contempt and the punitive sanction is imposed for criminal contempt. In re Interest of Rebecca K., 101 Wash.App. 309, 314, 2 P.3d 501 (2000).

¶ 4 Even a contempt sanction that involves detention remains coercive and remedial if the contemnor can purge the contempt and obtain release. In re Interests of M.B., 101 Wash.App. 425, 439, 3 P.3d 780 (2000). The opportunity to purge effectively places the keys of the prison in the contemnor's pocket. Id. On the other hand, a determinate period of detention without an opportunity to purge is usually considered punitive and criminal. Id. To comport with due process, the court must afford the contemnor facing punitive contempt sanctions the same due process rights afforded other criminal defendants. Id. at 439-40, 3 P.3d 780.

¶ 5 The juveniles here were found in contempt of dependency placement orders. RCW 13.34.165(1) provides that a party who fails to comply with a dependency order may be found in civil contempt of court "as provided in RCW 7.21.030(2)(e)." This latter subsection authorizes a "remedial sanction" of "commitment to juvenile detention for a period of time not to exceed seven days." RCW 7.21.030(2)(e). On several occasions, the juvenile court found that these dependent juveniles violated placement orders, found them in contempt, and imposed remedial sanctions under RCW 13.34.165. Yet, soon after the juveniles purged contempt by writing essays or participating in other affirmative actions, they ran away again. The juvenile court eventually concluded that the statutory scheme did not provide an adequate remedy and decided to resort to its inherent contempt power.

¶ 6 All constitutional courts are vested with independent inherent power to punish violations of court orders. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994); State v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wash.2d 327, 335, 553 P.2d 442 (1976). This inherent power may not be nullified or restricted by statute. M.B., 101 Wash.App. at 452, 3 P.3d 780; State v. Norlund, 31 Wash.App. 725, 729, 644 P.2d 724 (1982). "But neither may courts deviate from the statutory scheme unless the statutory powers are in some specific way inadequate." M.B., 101 Wash.App. at 452, 3 P.3d 780. As noted in Norlund, the inherent contempt power must be exercised with caution and within narrow limits: "Only under the most egregious circumstances should the juvenile court exercise its contempt power to incarcerate a status offender in a secure facility. If such action is necessary, the record should demonstrate that all less restrictive alternatives have failed."¹ 31 Wash.App. at 729, 644 P.2d 724.

¶ 7 In M.B., Division One of this court recently addressed contempt detention periods that were longer than the seven-day statutory detention limit prescribed by chapter 13.32A RCW (affecting minors found to be at-risk-youth or children in need of services) and chapter 28A.225 RCW (affecting truant minors). Amicus argued in M.B. that the juvenile court had the right to rely on its inherent contempt authority rather than on statutorily-based contempt sanctions. 101 Wash.App. at 451, 3 P.3d 780. Division One noted, however, that the juvenile court in those cases did not specifically find that the statutory remedy was inadequate:

On the rare occasion when a juvenile court decides it must disregard the statutory seven-day limit and resort to its inherent contempt powers, the court must enter a finding as to why the statutory remedy is inadequate and articulate a reasonable basis for believing why some other specific period of detention will achieve what seven days will not.

Id. at 453, 3 P.3d 780; see also State v. Boatman, 104 Wash.2d 44, 48, 700 P.2d 1152 (1985) ("before the inherent power of the court can be used, the court must determine that reliance on the statutory basis would be inadequate").

¶ 8 The juvenile court, as a division of the constitutional superior court, is vested with the inherent power to punish for contempt. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 831, 114 S.Ct. 2552; In re Pers. Restraint of Dalluge, 152 Wash.2d 772, 790, 100 P.3d 279 (2004). As with all constitutional courts, the juvenile court in a dependency proceeding must exercise this power only when necessary under the circumstances of a particular case. To impose a period of detention under its inherent contempt power, the juvenile court judge must enter findings that (1) the period of detention under RCW 7.21.030(2)(e) and RCW 13.34.165(1) is inadequate for specified reasons, and (2) another determinate period of detention is required to achieve what the statutory period could not. M.B., 101 Wash.App. at 453, 3 P.3d 780.

¶ 9 We review an order of contempt for abuse of discretion.² In re Pers. Restraint of King v. Department of Social & Health Services, 110 Wash.2d 793, 798, 756 P.2d 1303 (1988). The court's authority to impose an inherent contempt sanction is a question of law, and is therefore reviewed de novo. State v. T.E.C., 122 Wash.App. 9, 25, 92 P.3d 263, review denied, 152 Wash.2d 1012, 106 P.3d 243 (2004). As discussed below, the juvenile court in the current cases found that the statutory civil remedial contempt remedies were not adequate and that another specific period of confinement was necessary to address the juveniles' needs.³ In one of these cases, however, the court did not make findings with the required specificity.⁴

¶ 10 I. M.H.-O. M.H.-O. is a dependent child who was found in contempt of court several times by April 2004. The Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) filed a motion in December 2003 asking that M.H.-O. be held in contempt for running away earlier that month. By running, she also missed a hearing scheduled to purge a prior contempt order. DSHS warned M.H.-O.'s counsel that it would ask the court to exercise its inherent contempt powers. She was eventually picked up and in February 2004, the Yakima County juvenile court held a hearing on the contempt motion. M.H.-O. stipulated that she had run away. The commissioner concluded that her promises not to run, repeatedly broken, could no longer be believed, and that a longer period of detention was necessary to break the cycle:

There is reason to believe that an inherent contempt consequence with no purge option could achieve what a purgeable 7 days of civil contempt consequence could not. It will afford [M.H.-O.] a longer period of time to stabilize under the influence of a "home" where she is not on the streets and on the run. It will give her an opportunity to reflect and become more accustomed to a lifestyle which includes school and continuity. . . .

A longer and fixed term of confinement is likely to be coercive in the long run for [M.H.-O.], since she will realize that she can avoid this more significant consequence in the future by ceasing her running behaviors.

Clerk's Papers (CP) (No. 23211-5-III) at 87. Accordingly, the juvenile court commissioner imposed a sentence of 30 days in detention with credit for time served. Her request to purge the contempt was denied. She moved to revise the order on March 4, 2004.

¶ 11 Within days after she was released from an unrelated offender detention in April 2004, M.H.-O. again ran away. As she had on previous runs, she participated in activities that put her at serious risk of harm. On April 9, DSHS filed a motion requesting the juvenile court to exercise its inherent contempt power. M.H.-O. turned herself in on April 12 and the hearing on the motion was held a couple of days later. Before accepting her stipulation that she had run, the commissioner advised her of her rights,...