Washington v. Albright

• Decision Date: 30 September 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2:10–cv–796–MEF.
• Citation: 814 F.Supp.2d 1317
• Parties: Monica WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. Frank ALBRIGHT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

814 F.Supp.2d 1317

Monica WASHINGTON, Plaintiff,

v.Frank ALBRIGHT, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:10–cv–796–MEF.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

Sept. 30, 2011.

Christopher Stephen Genereux, Frederic Allen Bolling, Thomas, Means, Gillis, & Seay, P.C., Birmingham, AL, Gerald Clark Brooks, Jr., Henry Lewis Gillis, Thomas, Means, Gillis & Seay, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

Scott Lee Rouse, Alabama Department of Corrections Legal Office, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARK E. FULLER, District Judge.

Monica Washington (“Washington”), a female inmate at The Tutwiler Prison for Women (“Tutwiler”) alleges violations of her rights under the United States Constitution and various claims pursuant to federal law arising out of the alleged sexual misconduct of a correctional officer. Although Washington originally brought suit against the correctional officer, the Court dismissed those claims after Washington failed to timely serve him. What remains pending before the Court are Washington's claims against Frank Albright (“Albright”), the Warden at Tutwiler, who is sued in his individual and in his official capacities, and Washington's claims against Richard Allen (“Allen”), the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) at the times material to this action, who is sued in his individual and official capacities. This cause is presently before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. # 20) filed on January 4, 2011 by counsel for Albright and Allen. By this motion, they contend that all claims against them in the First Amended Complaint are due to be dismissed. To the extent that the motion seeks dismissal of the claims pursuant to federal law, the Court agrees, however, it will dismiss the claims pursuant to state law without prejudice.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a), and 1367. Additionally, Defendants have not argued that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over them. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is appropriate in this district.

LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), a motion to dismiss could only be granted if a plaintiff could prove “no set of facts ... which would entitle him to relief.” See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 967 (11th Cir.1986). Now, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)); Sinaltrainal v. Coca–Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1268 (11th Cir.2009). A complaint states a facially plausible claim for relief “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. A complaint does not state a facially plausible claim for relief if it shows only “a sheer possibility that the defendant acted unlawfully.” Id. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations to survive a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). Absent the necessary factual allegations, “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” will not suffice. Id. In considering a defendant's motion to dismiss, a district court will accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th Cir.2007). Accord, Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 640, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (where a court is considering dismissal of a complaint at the pleading stage, it must assume the allegations of the complaint are true).

FACTUAL ¹ AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Due to the procedural posture of this case, the following is a summary of the factual basis for the lawsuit as set forth by the allegations of the First Amended Complaint (Doc. # 9). Unfortunately, the First Amended Complaint is long on legal conclusions and very short on facts. The facts alleged are as follows.

In September of 2099, Washington began serving a sentence at Tutwiler. On or about June of 2010, a correctional officer employed at Tutwiler forced Washington to engage in sexual intercourse with him. Washington became pregnant as a result. After the sexual assault, Washington notified a ADOC employee of the assault. This employee reported it to Albright. Albright ordered a lie detector test of Washington. Washington passed this test.

Alabama law makes it unlawful for any employee of the ADOC to engage in sexual conduct with a person who is in the custody of ADOC. ADOC's administrative regulations prohibit any behavior of a sexual nature to be directed toward an inmate and prohibit any social relationships between offenders and employees of ADOC. Nevertheless, Washington alleges that these policies caused a rampant environment of abuse, including sexual abuse against female inmates inside Tutwiler. See Doc. # 19 at ¶ 17.

With respect to Albright and Allen, Washington alleges that they “were aware or should have been aware for[sic] the potential for abuse because of the rampant nature of the abuse, and because of the recent cases of Laube v. Haley, 234 F.Supp.2d 1227 (M.D.Ala.2002) and Laube v. Campbell, 333 F.Supp.2d 1234 (M.D.Ala.2004).” Id. at ¶ 18. Because she was sexually assaulted by a correctional officer at Tutwiler after the filing of these cases, Washington alleges that Albright and Allen were on notice of the significant risk of substantial injury to female inmates, but were deliberately indifferent to those risks. Id. at ¶¶ 19–20. Washington's First Amended Complaint is replete with allegations concerning what Allen and Albright could and should have done to better supervise conditions at Tutwiler. Washington alleges in a very general fashion that custodial sexual attacks at Tutwiler were “known.” Id. at ¶¶ 40d & 43d.

On September 21, 2010, Washington filed suit against Allen, Albright, ADOC, and Rodney Arbuthnot (“Arbuthnot”), the correctional officer who sexually assaulted her. Washington failed to serve Arbuthnot within the time specified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court dismissed her claims against him without prejudice. Allen, Albright, and ADOC filed a motion to dismiss in November of 2010. Washington conceded that the claims against ADOC were due to be dismissed along with certain state law counts against Albright and Allen. In addition to opposing the motion to dismiss, Washington sought and received leave to file the First Amended Complaint. Allen and Albright filed the motion to dismiss now before the Court.

DISCUSSION

Albright and Allen, individual defendants eligible to assert the qualified immunity defense to Washington's claims in this lawsuit, contend that Washington's allegations fail to meet the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals “heightened pleading” requirement for cases such as this one. In response Washington contends that her pleadings satisfy that requirement. In Albright and Allen's supplemental response, they acknowledge that at least one panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that recent Supreme Court precedents have overruled the prior decisions from the Eleventh Circuit imposing a heightened pleading requirement in cases such as this one. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709–10 (11th Cir.2010). Nevertheless, Albright and Allen dispute whether Randall can properly abrogate Eleventh Circuit's heightened pleading requirement. Thus, the Court is compelled to assess the state of the law and determine whether heightened pleading is applicable to this action.

A. The Tangled History of the Eleventh Circuit's Heightened Pleading Requirement

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has long required plaintiffs bringing claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to satisfy a heightened pleading standard. See, e.g., Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 987, 113 S.Ct. 1586, 123 L.Ed.2d 153 (1993); Arnold v. Board of Educ. Of Escambia County, Ala., 880 F.2d 305, 310 (11th Cir.1989); Johnson v. Wells, 566 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir.1978) ²; Cook v. Whiteside, 505 F.2d 32, 34 (5th Cir.1974). To satisfy this standard in such cases, a plaintiff must plead her claims with some factual detail. Oladeinde. 963 F.2d at 1485. Moreover, it is clear that in this early cases it was merely the fact that the plaintiff sought relief pursuant to § 1983 which triggered the heightened pleading obligation.

In 1993, the Supreme Court of the United States held that courts may not impose a heightened pleading requirement for claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against municipal entities, but it specifically declined to reach the issue of whether a similar holding was warranted in such cases against individual government actors. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167–68, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). In 2002, the United States Supreme Court decided a case which once again has caused some courts to reconsider the appropriateness of requiring heightened pleading. In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152...