Washington v. State
Citation | 194 Ga.App. 756,391 S.E.2d 718 |
Decision Date | 07 March 1990 |
Docket Number | No. A89A1929,A89A1929 |
Parties | WASHINGTON v. The STATE. |
Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
John A. Pickens, Atlanta, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Joseph J. Drolet, Nancy Grace, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.
Defendant was indicted for murder. The case was tried before a jury and the evidence showed that defendant cut the victim's throat with a broken wine bottle, killing him, after a territorial dispute over sleeping rights in an abandoned van. Defendant was found guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. This appeal followed. Held:
1. First, defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing State's witness Mark Pevey to testify as an expert "on the behavioral effects of alcohol at differing blood alcohol levels[, arguing that] Mr. Peevy [sic] simply was not qualified as an expert on that subject."
" Brown v. State, 245 Ga. 588(1), 590, 266 S.E.2d 198. ." Morrison v. State, 147 Ga.App. 410(1), 411, 249 S.E.2d 131.
In the case sub judice, Mark Pevey testified that he holds a degree in chemistry from Berry College; that he served as a quality control chemist for a private pharmaceutical company; that he has been trained to measure the amount of alcohol in a person's blood and that he has had the opportunity to observe the physical and behavioral characteristics of persons under varying degrees of intoxication. Mark Pevey also testified that he participated in a study of the behavioral and physiological effects of persons under the influence of alcohol at Mercer University's "Southern School of Pharmacy ... in Atlanta...." This evidence was more than sufficient to authorize the trial court's ruling as to the expert qualifications of Mark Pevey in the field of the physical and behavioral effects of alcohol on persons of varying degrees of intoxication.
2. In his second enumeration, defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing evidence of his participation in a "fight" which occurred about four to five hours before the victim's death.
Georgia Tabb testified at trial that defendant was the father of her "baby" and that "[a]bout 9:00, almost 10:00 o'clock" on the night of the victim's death defendant came to her house to see her and the baby and "to get his I.D." Georgia Tabb then testified that her brother-in-law and her "friend" informed her that she "didn't need to go ..." to defendant; that the "friend" told defendant to leave and that she later "heard rumbling and stuff" and observed "Jason" and defendant fighting.
Georgia Tabb's sister's description of the altercation was more revealing. Jennifer Tabb testified that defendant came to her mother's house at "[a]bout 10:00 or 10:30" on the night of the victim's death and "knocked on the door...." She then testified that Georgia Tabb's boyfriend, Jason, told defendant that "she [Georgia Tabb] wouldn't come to the door" and that, when Jason tried to close the door, defendant forced his way in and started fighting and threatening Jason.
Chambers v. State, 250 Ga. 856, 859(2), 302 S.E.2d 86. The "fight" which took place at Georgia Tabb's and Jennifer Tabb's mother's house was relevant evidence of defendant's violent state of mind on the night of the victim's death. This enumeration is without merit.
3. Next, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after a law enforcement officer testified that he obtained a photograph of defendant from the Atlanta Police Department's Identification section. Defendant argues that this testimony impermissibly placed his character in evidence.
Harris v. State, 191 Ga.App. 399, 381 S.E.2d 602. This enumeration is without merit.
4. In his fourth enumeration, defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the State to place his character in issue.
An examination of the trial transcript shows that the State's attorney asked defendant on cross-examination, "When you are drinking, don't you become very violent?" The State later used defendant's negative response as a reason to present rebuttal testimony of defendant's violent character when drinking.
" Murray v. State, 157 Ga.App. 596(1), 278 S.E.2d 2.
In the case sub judice, defendant did not voluntarily place his character in issue. The State first brought defendant's character into question when it asked, "When you are drinking, don't you become very violent?" However, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case sub judice we find it highly probable that the testimony regarding defendant's violent character when drinking did not contribute to the verdict. The erroneously admitted evidence was cumulative of a fact which had already been established, beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59, 230 S.E.2d 869; Osborne v. State, 193 Ga.App. 276, 277(3), 387 S.E.2d 383.
The evidence in the case sub judice not only showed that defendant had been drinking and that he had a violent disposition on the night of the victim's death, but it showed without question that the victim died at the hands of defendant.
5. Defendant maintains in his fifth enumeration that "[t]he trial court erred in its charge on self-defense and erred in charging on mutual combat as these said charges contained elements that had not been covered in the charge conference and were a surprise to [defense] counsel and the charges related to matters not in evidence at the trial."
In the case sub judice, at the conclusion of the introduction of evidence court was recessed at lunch until "noon tomorrow." Upon the jury's leaving the courtroom, the trial court, in...
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... ... " 'It is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge as to whether a witness has such learning and experience in a particular area to be deemed expert. [Cit.]' [Cit.]" Washington v. State, 194 Ga.App. 756(1), 391 S.E.2d 718 (1990). A review of the sheriff's testimony reveals no abuse of discretion, and appellant did not submit a charge on expert testimony. " '[T]his court has held that where there has been no written request to charge, failure to give the charge is not ... ...
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... ... State, 194 Ga.App. 765, 768(2), 391 S.E.2d 801 (1990). Moreover, even if there had been no waiver, " '[a] mere reference to the fact that defendant's photograph was already in police records, without more, does not inject the defendant's character into evidence. [Cits.]' [Cit.]" Washington v. State, 194 Ga.App. 756, 758(3), 391 S.E.2d 718 (1990) ... 3. The trial court's instruction on the presumption of innocence was not, as appellant contends, erroneously incomplete ... See Rigsby v. State, 184 Ga.App. 330, 331(2), 361 S.E.2d 694 (1987); Ford v. State, 164 ... ...
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