Murray v. State
| Decision Date | 07 January 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 60608,60608 |
| Parties | MURRAY v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Robert B. Adams, Dalton, for appellant.
Stephen A. Williams, Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Appellant and two others were indicted jointly for selling "a quantity of phenylcyclohexyl ethylamine" in violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. Appellant was tried separately, found guilty and sentenced to twelve (12) years. From the denial of his motion for new trial, appellant enters this appeal.
1. The appellant assigns as error the admission over objection of certified copies of documents relating to his prior conviction for selling marijuana. Favors v. State, 145 Ga.App. 864(1), 244 S.E.2d 902 (1978). Accord: Posey v. State, 152 Ga.App. 216, 217, 262 S.E.2d 541 (1979); Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261, 262, 71 S.E.2d 615 (1952); Spear v. State, 51 Ga.App. 29, 179 S.E. 417 (1935).
On direct examination, appellant denied any involvement in the offense for which he was tried and further testified that he did not use drugs and that he did not sell "dope" of any kind. These additional statements were sufficient to place appellant's character in issue. Brown v. State, 237 Ga. 467(2), 228 S.E.2d 853 (1976); Hughes v. State, 141 Ga.App. 506(2), 233 S.E.2d 872 (1977). Compare, Smith v. State, 141 Ga.App. 64(2), 232 S.E.2d 401 (1977); Lindler v. State, 149 Ga.App. 155, 253 S.E.2d 833 (1979). Accordingly, the certified documents relating to appellant's prior conviction of selling marijuana were properly admitted to rebut appellant's testimony as to his good character. Brown v. State, supra; Scarver v. State, 130 Ga.App. 297(2), 202 S.E.2d 850 (1973).
2. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in instructing a prospective witness for the defense that she could not be forced to testify. The record reveals that the first witness called by counsel for appellant was Joanne Johnson who had been jointly indicted for the same criminal activity as that with which appellant was charged. When Ms. Johnson was called to the stand, her counsel informed the court that he was invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf of his client because the charges against her were still pending and she did not wish to testify. The trial court then advised Ms. Johnson of her Fifth Amendment rights and left the decision of whether or not to invoke the privilege entirely to her. Appellant urges that the trial court's instructions were erroneous and prejudicial because they had the effect of advising the prospective witness that she did not have to testify rather than advising her that she had the right not to answer any question which might incriminate her. We find appellant's argument meritless. Considering the instructions as a whole, we find them to be sufficient to convey correctly the meaning and application of the privilege against self-incrimination. See Tate v. State, 41 Ga.App. 300(4), 152 S.E. 609 (1930); Dodd v. State, 236 Ga. 572, 224 S.E.2d 408 (1976). Compare Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972). Furthermore, after the instructions were given to the prospective witness by the trial court, counsel for appellant did not state any objections thereto but, rather, proceeded to inform the court that, in view of the fact that Ms. Johnson intended to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege, he did not wish to call her as a witness. Compare Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, supra. Therefore, we find no merit in the assertion that the trial court improperly instructed the prospective witness as to her constitutional rights to appellant's prejudice. See Pulliam v. State, 236 Ga. 460, 465, 224 S.E.2d 8 (1976).
At the hearing on the motion for new trial appellant urged that both the District Attorney and the Sheriff of Murray County, in effect, "threatened" Ms. Johnson that if she took the stand and attempted to exonerate appellant, the state's previous consent to accept her plea to the lesser offense of possession of drugs would be withdrawn and she would have to face the charge of selling drugs as alleged in the indictment. Ms. Johnson's affidavit was submitted wherein she stated that prior to being called into the courtroom during appellant's trial she wanted to testify but refused to do so because of the alleged "threats" from the District Attorney and the Sheriff, coupled with the trial court's instructions that she could not be forced to testify. Ms. Johnson further stated in her affidavit that in any new trial of appellant she would testify that she was the person responsible for selling the drugs in question and that appellant neither sold them nor aided her in the sale.
The Assistant District Attorney stated in his place that Ms. Johnson's counsel had been told that if she admitted under oath her participation in selling the drugs in question, the state could not accept her plea to mere possession of the drugs. He further stated that there was no discussion about the "exoneration" of appellant.
After a careful review of evidence we cannot agree with Ms. Johnson's characterization of the statements attributed to the state officers as "threats." Rather, we believe the state was duty bound to inform Ms. Johnson of the possible consequences of admitting under oath she sold the drugs, including notifying her that the criminal law would be enforced to the full extent against those who violated it. Far from being "threats," the information imparted to Ms. Johnson was sound advice concerning the jeopardizing effect that testifying in contravention of her agreement to plead guilty to a lesser offense might have. The statements of the officials are not reasonably subject to the devious construction she and appellant seek to give them. Appellant's argument is no more than an assertion that Ms. Johnson should have been allowed to testify that she sold the drugs without being informed of the possible detrimental consequences to herself of so doing. She was informed, however, and instructed of her right to invoke the Fifth Amendment. Appellant cannot complain that Ms. Johnson chose to exercise that right any more than any defendant can complain that someone else chose not to take the stand freely in his trial and confess to the crime with which the defendant is charged. Ms. Johnson's statement that she would testify on behalf of appellant at any new trial is not, in itself, cause for a new trial. See Hudgins v. State, 61 Ga. 182(3) (1878).
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