Washington v. State, 59748

• Decision Date: 19 May 1983
• Docket Number: No. 59748,59748
• Citation: 432 So.2d 44
• Parties: Ricky WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 44

432 So.2d 44

Ricky WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 59748.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 19, 1983.

Robert M. Leen of Leen & Schneider, Hollywood, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Joy B. Shearer, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

BOYD, Justice.

This is an appeal from a conviction for first-degree murder and sentence of death. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const. We affirm the conviction but order the sentence reduced to life imprisonment.

On March 15, 1980, Ricky Washington, his brother, and two friends went by car to the T.C. Tire Company in Fort Lauderdale to try to find a buyer for some stolen guns. The driver of the car, Jack Hunter, went in the back door of the tire company's office and asked if anyone wanted to buy a shotgun. When everyone he asked declined, he returned to the car. One of the men present in the office was Sheriff's Deputy Worth Edwards, who was a civil process server with full arrest powers. Deputy Edwards thought it was suspicious that someone would offer to sell guns to strangers and went outside to investigate. He walked up to the car, identified himself as a deputy sheriff, and asked Hunter for his driver's license. When Hunter failed to produce one, Edwards asked him to get out of the car. Meanwhile Washington had been sitting in the right rear seat showing two rifles and a shotgun to a security guard of a nearby theater. Washington then got out of the car, brushed past the security guard, walked around the rear of the car, drew a .32 caliber chrome-plated pistol, and ordered Edwards to freeze. As he reached for Edwards' gun, Edwards spun around facing him. Simultaneously the security guard, who had followed Washington around the car, reached for Washington's shoulder. Washington shrugged the guard off and fired four bullets into Edwards. Washington and his companions then fled, leaving the car and stolen guns behind. Washington was apprehended a week later in North Carolina while driving a car he stole in Daytona Beach.

Washington was tried and convicted of first-degree murder. After the sentencing hearing the jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment. The trial judge chose not to follow this recommendation and instead imposed a sentence of death.

Appellant's first point on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction of first-degree murder. He argues that the element of premeditation was not established beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. There were six eyewitnesses at the shooting who testified at the trial. Although there were some minor discrepancies in their testimony about the degree of struggle that occurred before the shots were fired, they all agreed that appellant's arm and the hand in which he held the pistol were free when he fired the shots. This testimony showing that the shooting was intentional, along with the fact that appellant shot the deputy four times, is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that the murder was committed with premeditation. See Songer v. State, 322 So.2d 481 (Fla.1975), vacated on other grounds, 430 U.S. 952, 97 S.Ct. 1594, 51 L.Ed.2d 801 (1977).

Appellant next claims the court erred in admitting evidence of three other crimes not charged in the indictment. The evidence which he claims should not have been admitted was that the rifles and shotgun he was showing to the security guard were stolen, that after the shooting appellant stole a car in Daytona Beach, and that after his arrest appellant at one time had escaped temporarily. All of this evidence was relevant to the issues at trial. Evidence that the guns were stolen was relevant in showing appellant's motivation and intent in shooting the deputy. Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). Evidence of the stolen automobile was relevant to show identity and flight. Flight from the vicinity of the crime is a fact from which guilt can be inferred. Spinkellink v. State, 313 So.2d 666 (Fla.1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 3227, 49 L.Ed.2d 1221 (1976). Evidence of the escape was relevant to show a guilty conscience. Mackiewicz v. State, 114 So.2d 684 (Fla.1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 965, 80 S.Ct. 883, 4 L.Ed.2d 879 (1960). None of this collateral crime evidence was given undue emphasis. Since its probative value was not outweighed by any improper prejudicial effect, the court did not err in admitting it.

Appellant's third point on appeal is that the court erred in allowing his confession to be admitted into evidence since it was obtained by methods which violated his constitutional rights. The confession was presented by the state in rebuttal after appellant had testified in his own defense. Therefore it was not necessary for the state to establish that the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), had been followed in obtaining the confession. A defendant's prior inconsistent statements, which might otherwise be inadmissible under Miranda, may be used for impeachment purposes. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971).

As his fourth point appellant argues that the court erred by limiting his cross-examination of two of the state's eyewitnesses. The defense was trying to establish that one of the eyewitnesses, Tommy Troutman, was a former deputy who had been dismissed from the sheriff's department because of writing bad checks and who had previously dealt in stolen guns. The court ruled that the matter of the witness's writing bad checks was collateral and irrelevant to his credibility. The defense then tried to cross-examine another witness to show that Troutman had previously dealt in stolen guns. During a proffer of the cross-examination, the witness testified that on one occasion Troutman had privately handed a small gun to another person. The court ruled that this testimony was pure speculation upon a...