Waterfield v. Meredith Corp..

• Decision Date: 14 April 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2009–828.,2009–828.
• Citation: 20 A.3d 865,161 N.H. 707
• Parties: Dean J. WATERFIELDv.MEREDITH CORPORATION and another.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

161 N.H. 707
20 A.3d 865

Dean J. WATERFIELD
v.
MEREDITH CORPORATION and another.

No. 2009–828.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Submitted: Jan. 6, 2011.Opinion Issued: April 14, 2011.

[20 A.3d 867]

Randy A. Britton, non-lawyer representative appearing by approval of the Supreme Court under Rule 33(2), on the brief, for the plaintiff.Sheehan Phinney Bass + Green, P.A., of Manchester (James P. Harris and Daniel K. Fink on the brief), for the defendants.CONBOY, J.

[161 N.H. 708] The plaintiff, Dean J. Waterfield, appeals an order of the Superior Court ( Barry, J.) granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Meredith Corporation, John Doe Anchorperson(s), and John Doe On–Site Reporter. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The trial court found or the record supports the following facts. In March 2001, the plaintiff married Stephanie Waterfield. The couple lived in Sterling, Connecticut. In September of that year, Ms. Waterfield died. At that time, the plaintiff was incarcerated in Connecticut. After his release, he was appointed administrator of his wife's estate by a Connecticut probate court. As a consequence of his management of the estate, however, he was subsequently removed as administrator and charged with various crimes.

On August 8, 2003, the plaintiff was arrested in Nashua and soon after extradited to Connecticut. On August 24, 2003, WSFB–TV, a Connecticut television station owned by the Meredith Corporation, an Iowa corporation, ran a news story about the plaintiff's handling of his wife's estate. At that time, the plaintiff was again incarcerated in Connecticut. Nearly three years later, on August 21, 2006, the plaintiff filed suit in superior court alleging, among other things, that the story defamed him.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on two grounds: (1) that the plaintiff's defamation claim is foreclosed because a Connecticut probate court found the contents of the news story to be substantially true; and (2) [161 N.H. 709] that the plaintiff's action is barred by Connecticut's two-year statute of limitations. The plaintiff, in response, argued that the Connecticut probate court's ruling is not a final, valid judgment for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel, and that the action is timely because New Hampshire's three-year statute of limitations is controlling.

The trial court concluded that the plaintiff was not a resident of New Hampshire at the time he filed suit and had in fact “maintained the New Hampshire address for the sole purpose of filing this suit because the statute of limitations had expired

[20 A.3d 868]

in the other potential jurisdictions.” Further, it found that the plaintiff's cause of action did not arise in this state because the broadcast's television signal did not reach New Hampshire. Applying the choice-of-law factors set forth in Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 353–55, 222 A.2d 205 (1966), and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 131 N.H. 6, 13, 549 A.2d 1187 (1988), the trial court determined that Connecticut's limitations period, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52–597 (2011), should apply. Accordingly, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff's claim was untimely and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. It did not reach the issue of whether the defamation action was barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel.

The plaintiff raises sixteen issues in his notice of appeal. Many are essentially rephrasings of the central question of whether the trial court properly applied Keeton in concluding that the Connecticut statute of limitations barred his claim. On this issue, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in finding that he was not domiciled in New Hampshire at the time he filed suit and that the television signal did not reach New Hampshire.

A moving party is entitled to summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits filed, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” RSA 491:8–a, III (2010). In reviewing the trial court's grant of summary judgment, we consider the affidavits and other evidence, and all inferences properly drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Big League Entm't v. Brox Indus., 149 N.H. 480, 482, 821 A.2d 1054 (2003). If our review of that evidence discloses no genuine issue of material fact, and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment. Id. “[T]he adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or by reference to depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” RSA 491:8–a, IV (2010). We review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo. Big League Entm't, 149 N.H. at 482, 821 A.2d 1054.

[161 N.H. 710] In New Hampshire, “[p]ersonal actions for slander or libel, unless otherwise provided by law, may be brought only within 3 years of the time the cause of action accrued.” RSA 508:4, II (2010). As the writ in this case was filed almost three years after the airing of the allegedly defamatory television broadcast, if Connecticut's two-year statute of limitations applies, the suit is barred as untimely.

When New Hampshire is the forum for a suit in which one or more other states also have an interest, we treat potential conflicts of law as follows: we first decide whether a relevant law is substantive or procedural; if it is substantive, we determine whether it actually conflicts with the laws of another interested state and, if so, we then conduct an analysis based upon five choice-of-law influencing considerations; if it is procedural, we generally apply our own law. Keeton, 131 N.H. at 13–14, 549 A.2d 1187.

In Keeton, we noted that we generally treat statutes of limitations as procedural statutes and accordingly apply our own law. Id. at 14, 549 A.2d 1187. We explained that “in any case in which either party is a New Hampshire resident or the cause of action arose in this State,” our limitations period applies “without appeal to our choice-influencing considerations.”...