Waters v. McGuriman

• Decision Date: 12 March 1987
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 84-3316.
• Parties: Robert D.B. WATERS v. Joseph McGURIMAN and the Borough of Lansdale, By Its Supervisors.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

656 F. Supp. 923

Robert D.B. WATERS v. Joseph McGURIMAN and the Borough of Lansdale, By Its Supervisors.

Civ. A. No. 84-3316.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

March 12, 1987.

Geoffrey L. Beauchamp, Norristown, Pa., for plaintiff.

Sean O'Callaghan, Paoli, Pa., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

RAYMOND J. BRODERICK, District Judge.

This action is brought by Robert D.B. Waters against the Borough of Lansdale and Officer Joseph McGuriman of the Lansdale Police Department pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in connection with the plaintiff's arrest on April 21, 1982 by Officer McGuriman and prosecution by the Borough for loitering pursuant to Borough of Lansdale Ordinance No. 942 subsection (F), § 89-3(F). The plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment against the Borough on the ground that Ordinance 942 subsection (F) is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague and that enforcement of the Ordinance against the plaintiff deprived him of his constitutional rights. The Borough opposes the motion. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact relative to the Borough of Lansdale's liability, and that the plaintiff is entitled to a favorable adjudication as a matter of law. However, since there is a genuine factual issue as to the amount of damages recoverable, summary judgment will be granted in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of liability, and the issue of damages will remain for future determination.

The material facts concerning which there are no genuine issues may be summarized as follows: On April 12, 1982, at approximately 4:30 a.m., the plaintiff was walking on a street in Lansdale. He was seen by Officer McGuriman, who approached the plaintiff, stopped him and asked him his name and destination. The plaintiff initially refused to talk to McGuriman. After two requests for identification, the plaintiff presented an identification card with his picture and address, and told Officer McGuriman that he was going to a 24-hour convenience store. McGuriman noted that the plaintiff was walking in the opposite direction from the convenience store. McGuriman then arrested the plaintiff for loitering at 4:20 a.m. and for being uncooperative. Several days after his arrest, the plaintiff appeared before the District Justice and was convicted of the summary offense of loitering and was fined $41.00. The plaintiff appealed his conviction to the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County. On May 31, 1984, the charges were dismissed by the Borough and the conviction was set aside. This action was filed on July 20, 1984.

The Ordinance at issue provides in pertinent part:

§ 89-1. Disorderly conduct and disturbing the peace.

Disorderly conduct and/or acts disturbing the peace within the limits of the Borough of Lansdale are hereby prohibited, and no person shall engage in such conduct or commit such acts within the limits of the Borough of Lansdale.

§ 89-2. Definitions.

A. Disorderly conduct and/or acts disturbing the peace are hereby defined for the purposes of this chapter as any act, word or conduct causing or tending to cause a disturbance of the peace and good order of the borough or causing or tending to cause any danger, discomfort or annoyances to the inhabitants of the borough or users of the borough thoroughfares. Such act, words or conduct, shall include but not be limited to, loafing, fighting, drunkenness, vagrancy, begging, profanity or indecent language or acts; the making or causing to be made of any unnecessary noises or disturbances, clamor, din or other sounds disturbing, or tending to disturb, the peace and quiet of the community; the carrying on of any business, trade, transportation, recreation or amusement in a manner, at a time or in a place which causes any unnecessary noise or disturbance, discomfort, danger or annoyance; the reckless or careless driving or any other use of vehicles or animals by owners, occupants, users or operators of the same as shall endanger the safety of, or interfere with the comfort and convenience of, inhabitants of the borough or persons using the thoroughfares of the borough.

* * * * * *

§ 83.3. Illustrative acts of disorderly conduct.

Without in any manner intending to limit or restrict the generality of the above definition of and prohibition against disorderly conduct and/or acts disturbing the peace, the following are hereby declared to constitute disorderly conduct and/or acts disturbing the peace:

* * * * * *

F. Loafing, loitering or strolling in or upon any street, alley or other public way or public place, or at any public gathering or assembly, or in or around any store, shop, business or commercial establishment or on any private property or place without lawful business.

Borough of Lansdale Ordinance, No. 942, Chapter 89 §§ 1-3.

The plaintiff challenges the Ordinance on its face as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and as constituting a "policy" of the Borough. It is clear that a local government may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where "the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes ... an ordinance ... officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Monell v. New York City Department of Social Sciences, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

As the United States Supreme Court stated in Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982):

In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court's first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail. The court should then examine the facial vagueness challenge and, assuming the enactment implicates no constitutionally protected conduct, should uphold the challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. A court should therefore examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law.

455 U.S. at 494-95, 102 S.Ct. at 1191 (footnotes omitted). Furthermore, as the United States Supreme Court stated in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940), an overly broad statute is one "which does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or the press." Id. at 97, 60 S.Ct. at 742. Overbreadth attacks have been allowed where the statutes involved seek to regulate spoken words; rights of association; and the time, place and manner of expressive or communicative conduct. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-13, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). Although the challenged Ordinance does not appear to fit within the Supreme Court's categorization of an unconstitutionally overbroad enactment, the Court will not further consider "overbreadth" since the plaintiff has restricted his attack of the Ordinance as being "void for vagueness." The Court will, therefore, consider whether the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.

One who challenges a statute or ordinance as vague must prove that it is vague in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971). See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S.Ct. 710, 714, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975) ("vagueness challenges to statutes ... must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.") An ordinance will be void for vagueness if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his actions are prohibited by the ordinance or if it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). Due process requires that laws provide a fair warning of that which is prohibited so that one can act accordingly, and they must provide sufficiently explicit standards for persons applying those laws. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). While the void for vagueness doctrine focuses on both actual notice to citizens and arbitrary and erratic enforcement, the United States Supreme Court determined in Kolender v. Lawson that the requirement that the legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement is the "more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine." 461 U.S. at 357-58, 103 S.Ct. at 1858; Pringle v. Court of Common Pleas, 778 F.2d 998 (3d Cir.1985). As the Third Circuit stated in Pringle:

There is a constitutional mandate to legislatures to define criminal conduct carefully and specifically and thereby control the actions of those who apply the power of the state. The concept that "reasonable" persons should be aware of criminal prohibitions is therefore a standard used primarily to prevent legislatures from granting excessive decision-making authority to public officials.

Id. at 1001. In connection with the "minimal guidelines" element of the vagueness doctrine, it is clear that a law is impermissibly vague if it "delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis" because it thereby permits and encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498, 102 S.Ct. at 1193; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09, 92 S.Ct. at 2298-99.

A federal court must consider any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency has offered in connection with the facial...