Waters v. Rumsfeld, 01-5374.
| Decision Date | 28 February 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-5374.,No. 01-5375.,01-5374.,01-5375. |
| Citation | 320 F.3d 265 |
| Parties | Mary R. WATERS, et al., Appellants, v. Donald H. RUMSFELD, Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense and Robert J. Corter, Jr., Major General, Director, U.S. Defense Commissary Agency, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 00cv00332 & No. 01cv00472).
Claude D. Convisser argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellants.
Stratton C. Strand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.
Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and EDWARDS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.
The plaintiffs in this case filed actions against the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Defense Commissary Agency on behalf of themselves and a class of more than 9,000 people who bag and carry groceries for customers at United States military commissaries around the world. We affirm the district court's denial of the plaintiffs' request to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional. We vacate, however, the district court's denial of the plaintiffs' claims for money damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, because exclusive jurisdiction over those claims lies in the United States Court of Federal Claims.
Military commissaries are grocery stores that serve active and retired military personnel and their dependents. The commissaries are operated by the Defense Commissary Agency, a component of the Department of Defense. The commissaries do not regard the plaintiffs as their employees and do not pay them a salary or other compensation; the grocery baggers work solely for tips from the customers for whom they bag and carry groceries. The plaintiffs also allege that, in order to receive a commissary's permission to work for tips, baggers are required to perform additional work for which they receive neither salary nor tips. Among other duties, this work includes gathering shopping carts and collecting litter.
The plaintiffs contend that, under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., they are employees of the commissaries and must be paid the minimum wage, compensated for overtime hours, and provided with other benefits prescribed by the Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207. In 1978, Congress expressly addressed the FLSA status of commissary baggers. In relevant part, Public Law 95-485 reads as follows:
[A]n individual who performs bagger or carryout service for patrons of a commissary of a military department may not be considered to be an employee for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 by virtue of such service if the sole compensation of such individual for such service is derived from tips.
Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-485, § 819, 92 Stat. 1611, 1626 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203 note).
Two groups of commissary baggers filed class action complaints in the United States District Court. The first count of lead plaintiff Mary Waters' complaint sought a declaratory judgment that Public Law 95-485 is unconstitutional because it denies persons performing bagger and carryout services the equal protection of the laws. The remaining counts of Waters' complaint, and all of the counts of the complaint filed by lead plaintiff Calvin Davis, charged that the defendants are liable to the plaintiffs under the FLSA for unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime, and liquidated damages.1 The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss both the constitutional and FLSA claims, and the plaintiffs filed the instant appeal.
The plaintiffs contend that Public Law 95-485 violates the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it unfairly carves out commissary baggers from the protections accorded other workers under the FLSA.2 We review this contention de novo. LaRouche v. Fowler, 152 F.3d 974, 987 (D.C.Cir.1998). Because the plaintiffs do not assert that commissary baggers constitute a suspect class, or that Public Law 95-485 infringes upon fundamental constitutional rights, we must uphold the statute if it has any rational basis. As the Supreme Court said in FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.:
[E]qual protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.
508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); see Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488-89, 75 S.Ct. 461, 464-65, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955).
The government proffers such a rational basis here. It notes that Congress enacted Public Law 95-485 following a decision by the Civil Service Commission that commissary baggers were Defense Department employees for purposes of the FLSA. See 1 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 102 (1977) (discussing unpublished Civil Service Commission decision). According to the government, Congress decided to override the Commission's ruling because it feared the decision would make commissary bagger positions more difficult for military dependents to obtain. As the government explains, tips from commissary bagging provide an important source of supplemental income for these individuals, who often find it difficult to obtain other employment because they are relatively short-term residents of the area in which they are stationed. Appellees' Br. at 8, 15-17. If commissary baggers were covered by the FLSA, the government contends, the dependents of service personnel would be displaced by local civilians who would take the work as a route to more permanent positions. Id. at 16-17.
The plaintiffs dispute whether this concern truly was Congress' motivation, and, even if it was, whether excluding baggers from FLSA coverage is really necessary to accomplish that purpose. Although our examination of the legislative record makes clear that preserving opportunities for dependents of military personnel was indeed a purpose of Public Law 95-485, see infra notes 3-5, we need not dwell on the point because "it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature." Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315, 113 S.Ct. at 2102. All that is required is that there be "plausible reasons for Congress' action." Id. at 313-14, 113 S.Ct. at 2101 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor need we determine whether the vehicle chosen by Congress is necessary to accomplish its purpose. To uphold the statute, all we must decide is that there is "any conceivable rational basis" for the legislative classification. Id. at 309, 113 S.Ct. at 2099.
There is no doubt that Congress could rationally conclude that excluding baggers from FLSA coverage would enhance the employability of spouses and other dependents of service personnel. The transient nature of service life necessarily limits the employment opportunities of military dependents,3 and many do earn supplemental income working as grocery baggers.4 It would be rational for Congress to conclude that if baggers were covered by the FLSA, local civilians would successfully compete to fill the positions on a more permanent basis, leaving fewer opportunities for military dependents newly arriving from other posts.5 Nothing more is required to uphold the statute. As the Supreme Court has instructed, our "standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint":
The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.
Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 314, 113 S.Ct. at 2101 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 942-43, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979)).
Finally, the plaintiffs suggest that excluding them from the protection of the FLSA is simply unfair. But "classifying governmental beneficiaries [] `inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of the line, and the fact [that] the line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial, consideration.'" Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315-16, 113 S.Ct. at 2102 (quoting United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179, 101 S.Ct. 453, 461-62, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1987)). Where the line is not drawn to disadvantage a suspect class, Congress' decision to prefer one group of potential beneficiaries over another survives judicial scrutiny as long as it is minimally rational. Id. at 313, 113 S.Ct. at 2100-01. We conclude that the classification at issue in this case satisfies that test.
In addition to a declaration that Public Law 95-485 is unconstitutional, the plaintiffs seek unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime, and liquidated damages under the FLSA. They contend that even if the law is constitutional, it excludes from FLSA coverage only those individuals who perform "bagger or carryout service," and that because they perform additional duties that are not excluded, they are entitled to full protection under the FLSA. The district court rejected the plaintiffs' statutory interpretation, holding that Congress did not intend "to provide any FLSA coverage to grocery baggers, even if they performed duties in addition to bagging and carrying." Waters v. Rumsfeld, No....
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