Watkins v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 29 September 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-9165,98-9165
• Parties: (11th Cir. 1999) JAMES WATKINS, BELINDA WATKINS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1213

190 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 1999)

JAMES WATKINS, BELINDA WATKINS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 98-9165

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Sept. 29, 1999

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D. C. Docket No. 1-96-cv-3017-WBH

Before COX, Circuit Judge, FAY, Senior Circuit Judge, and NANGLE^*, Senior District Judge.

FAY, Senior Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellants James and Belinda Watkins, as administrators of the Estate of Brian Watkins, Stacy Purcell, Rachelle L. Oliver and Joseph Washo appeal the district court's order granting Ford Motor Company's motion for summary judgment. Raised on appeal are two issues: (1) whether the appellants' evidence was sufficient to meet the exception in Georgia's statute of repose on the design defect claim; and, (2) whether the failure to warn claim was subject to the same statue of repose. Because a question of fact exists regarding whether Ford's actions constituted a "willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for property or life," we conclude that it was error to dismiss the appellants' design defect claim. Similarly, we find that the appellants' failure to warn claim was not merely a restatement of their design defect claim and therefore was not subject to O.C.G.A. 51-1-11's statute of repose. Accordingly, we reverse.

I. FACTS

This is a products liability action stemming from an automobile accident that occurred on November 18, 1994. Plaintiff-appellant Joseph Washo ("Washo") was operating his pre-owned 1986 Ford Bronco II en route to a restaurant after a high school football game. Accompanying him were plaintiffs-appellants Stacy Purcell, Rachelle Oliver and plaintiffs'-appellants' decedent Brian Watkins.

While traveling in an eastward direction, the right side tires of Washo's Bronco II traveled a short distance off the road. Attempting to bring the vehicle back onto the road, Washo steered to the left and lost control. In an effort to regain control of the Bronco II, he steered the vehicle back to the right. At this time the Bronco II flipped, rolling over approximately two and one half times.

As a result of the accident, Brian Watkins sustained a severe head injury and died. Rachelle Oliver sustained severe head injuries with bleeding on the brain, and fractured her hip, ankle, and clavicle. Joseph Washo and Stacy Purcell were also injured in the accident.

On November 14, 1996, the plaintiffs filed suit against Ford Motor Company alleging, among other things, handling and stability defects caused the Bronco II to rollover and that Ford failed to warn of the known rollover hazards. The district judge granted Ford's motion for summary judgment, finding the plaintiffs' negligence claims were barred by the statute of repose in O.C.G.A. 51-1-11. The plaintiffs, arguing that their negligent design claim fell within the exception to the statute and that their failure to warn claim was not subject to the statute, filed this appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment, applying the same legal standard as the trial court. See Jones v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 977 F.2d 527, 535 (11th Cir. 1992). We are required to resolve all reasonable inferences and facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Augusta Iron & Steel Works v. Employers Ins. of Wasau, 835 F.2d 855, 856 (11th Cir. 1988).

III. DISCUSSION

Appellants brought this action against Ford Motor Company pursuant to Georgia's product liability statute, O.C.G.A. 51-1-11, contending that Ford's Bronco II was defectively designed and that Ford failed to warn of the vehicle's dangerous propensities¹. Subsection (c) of 51-1-11 incorporates a statute of repose, barring claims for negligence if the suit is not brought "within ten years from the date of the first sale." O.C.G.A. 51-1-11(c).

Not all negligence claims, however, are subject to the statute of repose. First, the statute does not bar claims filed more than ten years from the first date of sale if the plaintiff is able to adduce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the manufacturer acted with a "willful, reckless or wanton disregard for property or life." Id. Second, the statute of repose does not bar claims for failure to warn, regardless of the date of first purchase. See Id.

Here, there is no dispute that Washo's 1986 Bronco II was first purchased more than ten years prior to the filing of the instant action. Accordingly, the appellants based their negligent design claim on the exception to the statute of repose and claim sufficient evidence was present to support a finding of willful, reckless or wanton disregard. They also assign as error the district court's dismissal of their failure to warn claim, submitting that the district court erred by holding their failure to warn claim was simply a restatement of their negligent design claim and therefore subject to the statute of repose. For these reasons, they contend, this Court must reverse the order of the district court.

A. THE NEGLIGENT DESIGN CLAIM

As discussed above, negligent design claims filed more than ten years from the date of original purchase are barred unless the defendant acted with a willful, reckless or wanton disregard for property or life. See O.C.G.A. 51-1-11; Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 450 S.E.2d 208, 212(Ga. 1994). In the instant case, there is no question that Washo's 1986 Bronco II was first purchased more than ten years before the filing of suit and that, therefore, the appellants must meet an exception of the statute or be barred. The appellants contend that because a question of fact exists regarding the degree of Ford's culpability, summary judgement on their negligent design claim was error.

Georgia courts have defined the key words used in the statute. "Willful conduct is based on an actual intention to do harm or inflict injury; wanton conduct is that which is so reckless or so charged with indifference to the consequences ... [as to be the] equivalent in spirit to actual intent." Batten 450 S.E.2d at 212 (quoting Hendon v. Dekalb County, 417 S.E.2d 705 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)).

In this case, the appellants presented an array of evidence addressing Ford's knowledge of stability problems with the Bronco II and its decision to forgo recommended safety alterations in the design because it would either delay production or profits would be sacrificed. For example, the appellants presented evidence that Ford was aware of a "60 minutes" television program that revealed severe rollover and stability problems with the Jeep CJ - a vehicle the Bronco II was closely patterned after. Reacting to these stability problems, Ford engineers submitted five proposals intended to increase the stability of the Bronco II. Management selected the least expensive proposal, rendering the Bronco II less stable than the Jeep CJ. The appellants' design expert clearly stated that had Ford chosen proposal #5, at an additional cost of only $83.00 per vehicle, the Bronco II would have been a stable vehicle. See Affidavit of Melvin K. Richardson R-4-39 at 32. By selecting the least expensive measure, proposal #2, Ford made profit a priority over the safety of the consumers. Such evidence has supported findings of a reckless disregard for property or life. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 640 (Ga. 1993)(evidence that defendant's engineers "repeatedly informed ... other divisions ... that the frame rail was inadequate and should be replaced" was sufficient to support a finding of conscious indifference to consequences); General Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 447 S.E.2d 302, 311-312 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)(notwithstanding defendant's compliance with federal regulation, award of punitive damages was appropriate because defendant did not implement safety modifications for economic reasons)(reversed on other grounds); Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 319 S.E.2d 470 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)(the defendant's "conscious decision to defer implementation of safety devices in order to protect its profits" was sufficient to support punitive damages).²

Ford contends, notwithstanding this evidence, that Richards v. Michelin Tire Corp., 21 F.3d 1048 (11th Cir. 1994), bars a finding of willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for property or life when the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") conducts a safety investigation into a product and declines to adopt a standard recommended by the plaintiff. We disagree with Ford's interpretation of Richards.

In Richards, the plaintiff's-decedent was killed when attempting to mount a tire³. His death was caused by an explosion when he "mismatched" a 16-inch tire with a 16.5-inch rim. At trial, the plaintiff proceeded under theories of wanton design and wanton failure to warn. The jury found for the plaintiff, finding the failure to warn of mismatches constituted a wanton disregard for life.

The defendant appealed the verdict, claiming the evidence did not support a finding of wantonness. Although the manufacturer knew of mismatches, the evidence at trial showed that out of thirteen to fifteen million 16-inch tires, the manufacturer had knowledge of only four mismatches. This Court agreed with the manufacturer, and held that this evidence was simply too remote to constitute a wanton failure to warn. Contrary to Ford's argument, the court did not rule that the NHTSA's failure to adopt the warnings recommended by the plaintiff precluded a finding of wanton conduct. Indeed, the court specifically noted that "[h]ad the [manufacturer] been aware of a greater number of mismatch accidents, . . . [a different conclusion] may well have [been] reached." Richards, 21 F.3d at 1058. Thus, the holding in Richards did not bar a claim for wanton conduct because the Agency declined to adopt a minimum standard. Rather, the evidence was...