Watkins v. State
| Decision Date | 02 May 1916 |
| Docket Number | 6889. |
| Citation | 88 S.E. 1000,18 Ga.App. 60 |
| Parties | WATKINS v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
On Motion for Rehearing, May 31, 1916.
Syllabus by the Court.
There is no substantial merit in the grounds of the motion for a new trial relating to the exclusion of certain evidence.
Where in a criminal trial, the judge has fully and fairly charged the jury concerning the law of reasonable doubt, he is not bound to comply with a request to instruct them, in effect that if they have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of some particular and specially enumerated fact, or as to what should be the proper inference therefrom, it would be their duty to give the accused the benefit of such doubt. McDuffie v. State, 90 Ga. 786(1), 17 S.E. 105.
The court did not err in refusing the grant of a new trial on account of the alleged newly discovered evidence, as it is clearly cumulative and impeaching in character, and is not such as would probably change the result on another trial. See Park v. State, 126 Ga. 575(6), 55 S.E. 489. "To render aleged newly discovered evidence available as cause for a new trial, it should appear that the evidence itself is newly discovered, not merely that certain named witnesses by whom the facts can be proved were unknown until after the trial." Burgess v. State, 93 Ga 304(1), 20 S.E. 331.
The court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial.
Error from Superior Court, Muscogee County; S. P. Gilbert, Judge.
W. J Watkins was convicted of homicide, and brings error. Affirmed.
Hatton Lovejoy, of La Grange, and T. T. Miller, of Columbus, for plaintiff in error.
Geo. C. Palmer, Sol. Gen., of Columbus, for the State.
The only ground of the motion which we consider necessary to discuss is that relating to the refusal of the trial judge to give to the jury certain instructions requested by the defendant. The defendant requested the court in writing to charge the jury as follows:
The court gave to the jury charge No. 1, but declined to give charges No. 2 and 3. The jury were instructed generally as follows:
Elsewhere in the charge the jury were plainly instructed on the doctrine of reasonable doubt, and in the excerpt last above quoted it will be observed that the trial judge specifically stated to the jury that the burden resting upon the state to satisfy them of the guilt of the accused by evidence sufficient to remove all reasonable doubt, applies to "every essential ingredient of the charge brought against him."
Under repeated rulings by the Supreme Court, it is not error for the court to omit instructions to the jury that they must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, in connection with each contention or with different features of the evidence or phases of the case, and it has been time and again held that one general instruction presenting fairly to the jury the law as to reasonable doubt is sufficient. Nor does the fact that a request to charge on the subject of reasonable doubt in connection with some particular feature of the case alter the rule; for if it were reversible error for a court to refuse such request, notwithstanding full and clear instructions had been given the jury to the effect that they could not convict unless convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, a judge might be required to interlard his instructions to the jury with such frequent references to the doctrine of reasonable doubt, as applying to each and every feature of the case or every fact suggested by the evidence, as would render his charge totally unintelligible, or, at best, greatly confused. In the present case the court, as stated above, specifically instructed the jury that the state must satisfy their minds of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt "as to every essential ingredient of the charge brought against him."
After having given the first requested charge, which instructed the jury that it was not incumbent upon the defendant to show that the killing was actually necessary, but it would be sufficient if the accused, at the time of the killing, believed, and had good reason to believe, that the killing was necessary to save his life or to prevent a felonious assault, to have charged the jury further, as requested by the defendant, that if they had a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant believed the killing was actually necessary, it would be their duty to find the defendant not guilty, would have been merely to specifically instruct them on the law of reasonable doubt as relating to a particular theory of the defense. Under the ruling in McDuffie v. State, cited in the headnote, it is apparent that the refusal of the judge to give this instruction to the jury was not error in view of his general instruction as to reasonable doubt, quoted above which was comprehensive enough to include this precise defense. In the light of what has been said in reference to the charge actually given, it certainly was not error to decline to give the third instruction requested:
"I further charge you that if you have a reasonable doubt as to the truth of...
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