Watkins v. U-Haul Intern., Inc., No. 1998-CA-01236-COA.

• Decision Date: 18 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 1998-CA-01236-COA.
• Citation: 770 So.2d 970
• Parties: Michael WATKINS, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Tamela Kay Watkins, Deceased; and as Father and Next Friend of Jessica Watkins and Michelle Watkins, Minors; Matthew D. Watkins, Jr., as the Administrator of the Estate of Matthew D. Watkins, Sr.; and Ronald S. Butcher, Appellants, v. U-HAUL INTERNATIONAL, INC. and James R. Dykes, Individually and d/b/a James R. Dykes, Appellees.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

770 So.2d 970

Michael WATKINS, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Tamela Kay Watkins, Deceased; and as Father and Next Friend of Jessica Watkins and Michelle Watkins, Minors; Matthew D. Watkins, Jr., as the Administrator of the Estate of Matthew D. Watkins, Sr.; and Ronald S. Butcher, Appellants, v. U-HAUL INTERNATIONAL, INC. and James R. Dykes, Individually and d/b/a James R. Dykes, Appellees.

No. 1998-CA-01236-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

April 18, 2000.

Rehearing Denied July 18, 2000.

Certiorari Denied November 2, 2000.

T. Jackson Lyons, William B. Gill III, Jackson, Attorneys for Appellant.

Fred Krutz III, Walter H. Boone, David Harrison Fulcher, Jackson, Attorneys for Appellees.

BEFORE SOUTHWICK, P.J., LEE, AND MOORE, JJ.

LEE, J., for the Court:

¶ 1. Michael Watkins, Matthew (Mac) Watkins, and Ron Butcher filed complaints against U-haul International, Inc. and James W. Dykes, individually, and d/b/a James R. Dykes. Eventually, these complaints were consolidated with the case styled Michael Watkins, Individually And As Administrator Of The Estate Of Tamela Kay Watkins, Deceased; And As Father And Next Friend Of Jessica Watkins And Michelle Watkins, Minors v. U-haul International, Inc. and James W. Dykes, Individually and d/b/a James R. Dykes. The cause of action originated from personal injuries and the wrongful death of Tamela Kay Watkins, Michael Watkins's wife, as a result of an automobile accident involving a Toyota truck and an attached U-haul tow dolly carrying a Ford Taurus.

¶ 2. The trial judge entered a directed verdict which dismissed U-Haul International, Inc. from the case at bar; however, a trial proceeded against Dykes. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury reached a verdict in favor of Dykes, fully denying any compensation to Michael Watkins, Mac Watkins, or Ron Butcher. Watkins asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial judge abused its discretion in not allowing the testimony of their expert witnesses. More specifically, Watkins argues the following issue as error whether the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that Richard Forbes, Ph.D., P.E., a professor of mechanical engineering, and Mr. Albert Medina, accident reconstructionist, could not testify. Finding this issue to be without merit, we affirm the decision of the lower court.

FACTS

¶ 3. In the case at bar, the death of Tamela Kay Watkins occurred as a result of an automobile accident involving a Toyota truck which was pulling a Ford Taurus being transported on a tow dolly. In addition to Tamela's death, other passengers in the vehicle suffered personal injuries.

¶ 4. On July 28, 1993, Michael Watkins and Ron Butcher were returning from Louisiana after having performed their work obligations on an oil drilling platform. Michael Watkins and Butcher were driving home in the aforementioned Ford Taurus. While driving home the Taurus suffered from mechanical problems and eventually ceased to be operational. Since Watkins could no longer drive the Taurus, he called his wife, Tamela, for assistance.

¶ 5. Tamela obtained Mac Watkins to travel with her to retrieve Michael Watkins, Butcher, and the Taurus. Tamela and Mac first went to U-haul and rented a U-haul tow dolly from Dykes, a U-haul dealer, so that she could bring her husband, Michael Watkins, as well as Butcher, and the Taurus home. At the time of the rental of the tow dolly, Dykes installed a hitch ball provided by Mac Watkins on the Toyota truck and attached the tow dolly with the knowledge that the dolly would carry the Taurus. Dykes performed this hook-up even though the U-haul manuals advised against it since there was a not a 750 pound weight differential. Mac Watkins and Tamela proceeded to Louisiana.

¶ 6. Once Mac Watkins and Tamela arrived at the location of the Taurus, Michael Watkins loaded the Taurus on the tow dolly and began an examination of the Taurus on the tow dolly and the tow dolly's connection to the truck, to make sure everything was properly loaded and attached. Michael Watkins testified that it was at this time that Mac Watkins told him to examine the hitch ball. Additionally, Watkins testified that there appeared to be only three or four threads of the nut holding onto the shank of the hitch ball, and you could stick your finger inside the nut because the shank did not come all the way through. Michael Watkins got a pipe wrench from Mac Watkins and used it to try and tighten the nut; however, the ball turned inside the coupler and would not tighten. After the examination performed by Michael Watkins, Tamela, Mac Watkins, Michael Watkins, and Butcher commenced their journey home; however, before they could reach their destination, while driving on I-55, Mac Watkins, the driver, lost control of the Toyota truck.

¶ 7. After the accident, both Watkins and Dykes had expert witnesses survey the accident scene and view such items as the Toyota, Taurus, the Toyota's bumper, the hitch ball, and the tow dolly which were involved in the accident. The main dispute among the experts was whether the accident was caused due to a weight differential problem and whether the nut disengaged and the hitch ball came out of the bumper on I-55 causing the accident, or whether the accident was caused due to driver error and the hitch ball became separated during a roll-over in the median. There was also some debate on whether Michael and Tamela Watkins were riding in the Taurus instead of the Toyota at the time of the accident. It is two of the expert witnesses's testimony that is the subject of this appeal.

¶ 8. Dykes filed a motion in limine to exclude Watkins's experts, Richard Forbes, a mechanical engineer, and Albert Medina, an accident reconstructionist, based on lack of qualification and insufficient knowledge of the facts of the case. The trial judge excluded the testimony of both Forbes and Medina. Additional facts will be discussed in the body of the opinion as needed.

DISCUSSION

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY RULING THAT RICHARD FORBES, PH. D., P.E., A PROFESSOR OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, AND MR. ALBERT MEDINA, ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTIONIST COULD NOT TESTIFY.

¶ 9. Watkins argues that the circuit court erred and abused its discretion when it ruled that Richard Forbes, Ph.D., P.E., a professor of mechanical engineering, could not testify because he was not an accident reconstructionist, metallurgist, or control and stability expert, and because he had not conducted tests to determine how much force would be required to separate the hitch ball from the mini-pickup's bumper. Additionally, Watkins contends that the trial court further abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of Mr. Albert Medina, the accident reconstructionist, because Medina did not have appropriate educational or professional qualifications, or experience in the specific area of control and stability of towing vehicles, or knowledge of the facts of the case. The trial judge is vested with the sound discretion to determine whether expert testimony is admissible. Roberts v. Grafe Auto Co., Inc., 701 So.2d 1093, 1098 (Miss. 1997). Only if this Court determines that the discretion was applied in an arbitrary or clearly erroneous manner, amounting to an abuse of discretion, will we reverse the decision. Id. The guidelines for the admission of expert testimony are enumerated in Mississippi Rule of Evidence Rule 702.

¶ 10. There are two prongs that must be met under Rule 702 before expert testimony is admissible at trial. One prong requires that the witness be qualified as an expert. In other words, he is an expert and may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise because of the knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education he holds. The second prong requires that the evidence be scientific, technical, or otherwise cover an area of specialized knowledge which will assist the trier of fact, in this case, the jury, to understand or decide a fact in issue. See also Taylor v. State, 672 So.2d 1246, 1257 (Miss.1996). In the comment to Mississippi Rule of Evidence Rule 702, it is noted that Rule 702 does not relax the standard that the expert must indeed be qualified to speak an opinion on a matter within his alleged field of knowledge. Additionally, the comment cites Frye v. U.S., 293 Fed. 1013, 1014 (App.D.C.1923), for the fact that the scientific principle from which the expert's opinion is developed "must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs."

¶ 11. In the case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that the Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702 superseded the former Frye "general acceptance" test. This law is not applicable to the Mississippi Rule of Evidence Rule 702. Gleeton v. State, 716 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Miss.1998). Indeed, Mississippi still adheres to the more rigid "general acceptance" test enumerated in Frye as noted in the comment to Rule 702. However, the Supreme Court in Daubert acknowledged that even though Frye was superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence, the trial judge still had the authority to review alleged scientific evidence and determine whether it is admissible. Id. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786. This obligation was referred to in a footnote in the case as the trial judge's "gatekeeping responsibility." Id. We believe that under the guidelines of the Mississippi Rule of Evidence Rule 702, the trial judge serves as a "gatekeeper" in ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony. The Supreme Court of Mississippi has advised that "[t]he facts upon which the expert bases his opinion or conclusion must permit reasonably accurate conclusions as distinguished from mere guess or conjecture." Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So.2d 626, 638 (Miss.1987) ( quoting Kruszewski v. Holz, 265 Md. 434, 290 A.2d 534, 540 (1972)).

¶ 12. With all...