Watson-Santin v. St. John Med. Ctr., Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. 111,748., Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 1. ,111,748.
• Citation: 2015 OK CIV APP 83,361 P.3d 533
• Parties: Kimberly WATSON–SANTIN, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. ST. JOHN MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Defendant/Appellant.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma

361 P.3d 533

2015 OK CIV APP 83

Kimberly WATSON–SANTIN, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.ST. JOHN MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Defendant/Appellant.

No. 111,748.

Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 1.

Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 3.

April 17, 2015.

E. Terrill Corley, J. Derek Ingle, E. Terrill Corley & Associates, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee.

Charles H. Moody, Leslie C. Weeks, Jason C. Rush, Emily M. Jones, Rodolf & Todd, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellant.

Opinion

WM. C. HETHERINGTON, JR., Chief Judge.

¶ 1 St. John Medical Center (Hospital) appeals an order of the trial court granting a new trial motion by Kimberly Watson–Santin (Patient) entered after a jury returned a verdict in favor of Hospital. Following review of the entire record, Hospital has not demonstrated the trial court acted arbitrarily, abused its discretion, or materially and manifestly erred in granting the new trial. The trial judge's order granting Patient's Motion for New Trial is AFFIRMED.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 2 In Capshaw v. Gulf Insurance Company,2005 OK 5, ¶ 7, 107 P.3d 595, 600, the Court describes the appellate review for the grant of a motion for new trial:

A motion for new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. When a trial court grants a new trial and its decision is appealed, we will indulge every presumption in favor of that decision's correctness. In reviewing a trial court's grant of new trial, the standard of review an appellate court must apply is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Because a trial court's discretion is broad, its ruling will not be disturbed by the reviewing tribunal in the absence of a clear showing of a manifest error or abuse of discretion with respect to a pure, simple and unmixed material question of law.

(Footnotes omitted.)

¶ 3 “The threshold for upholding the grant of a new trial is much lower than where the motion is overruled.”Ledbetter v. Howard,2012 OK 39, ¶ 9, 276 P.3d 1031, 1034(footnote omitted). As the Court advises in its Supplemental Opinion on Rehearing in Conyers v. Conyers,1963 OK 75, ¶ 2, 386 P.2d 633, 638, “[t]he function of a motion for new trial is to open judicial inquiry into errors occurring during the conduct of the trial proceedings. Its office is to invoke the power of a trial court to correct and cure its own errors.” (Citations omitted.) “Furthermore, where the issues raised necessitate an examination of the entire lower court record, we will examine such record to determine if the trial court, in granting the new trial, abused his discretion, acted arbitrarily, or erred on some unmixed question of law.” Strubhart v. Perry Memorial Hosp. Trust Authority,1995 OK 10, ¶ 17, 903 P.2d 263, 270(citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no rational basis in evidence for the ruling.” Spencer v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company,2007 OK 76, ¶ 13, 171 P.3d 890, 895(emphasis omitted).

FACTS

¶ 4 In her lawsuit, Patient contended Hospital committed medical negligence due to a delay in providing treatment after a cervical epidural injectioncaused a hematoma.¹During voir dire, the jury panel was questioned about their experiences with epidural injections. One juror, Juror J, reported she had two such procedures without any negative results. The trial judge then commented “[a]nd so you're kind of an expert about epidural injections, but I'm going to tell you that it would be inappropriate for a juror to apply any extra special knowledge that they have in deciding the case” and asked if she could set aside her prior lack of problems. Juror J assented. A few other jurors who reported they had received epidural injectionsalso agreed to set aside their prior personal experience and to consider the evidence presented. Later in the voir dire, Juror J indicated she worked at a hospital as a certified nursing assistant. When the proceedings broke for lunch, Hospital moved for mistrial based upon the “expert” comments made by the trial judge to Juror J during the questioning about jurors' experiences with epidural procedures. Hospital's motion for mistrial was denied.

¶ 5 On the second day of trial, the trial judge questioned another juror (Juror B) after he was observed nodding off and then catching himself during the presentation of evidence. Juror B described his situation at home, told how his multiple jobs had caused him to lose sleep, and stated he would get more sleep so as to “not have anymore issues like this.” The trial judge offered to take more frequent breaks and to allow Juror B to consume a helpful beverage, if necessary. The trial judge advised Juror B “it's essential that you pay attention here,” cautioned him it was important to get sufficient sleep, and warned “if you can't stay awake, I will have to excuse you.” Neither parties' attorney raised any further concerns about Juror B at this earlier time.

¶ 6 On the third day of trial proceedings, February 13, 2013, in response to a question by one of Hospital's two trial counsel, Mr. Santin (Husbandn²) acknowledged he had told Patient's counsel he had been convicted of a felony for possession of methamphetamine and possession of paraphernalia,³at which point the following transpired:

Q. You've also been convicted for a felony involving truth and dishonesty shortly before that, haven't you, sir?

A. I don't recall what you're talking about.

Q. Okay. Were you—were you convicted of a felony—Let me make sure I get the wording correct, Judge, I'm sorry. Don't want to misstate. Have you been convicted of any other felonies besides that one, sir?

Counsel approached the bench, the jurors exited on a recess, and the scope of the motion in liminewas discussed. Patient's counsel contended the final question above was designed to open the door to an old warrant outstanding in California.⁴Hospital's counsel admitted the charge he was referencing was a misdemeanor for obtaining merchandise under false pretenses, not a felony, and he contended he was “allowed to bootstrap backwards from the last conviction.” The trial court asked Hospital's counsel what steps had been taken to identify the person whose record was used as the basis of the question and about the birth dates of the person charged and of Husband. It was revealed they were about twenty years apart. Husband identified the person with the same name as his son. In response to a question by the trial judge, Hospital's counsel admitted he was present when the order was entered on the motion in limine.

¶ 7 The trial judge noted “if we are going to mistry this case, I much rather would have done it on Monday,” and indicated he needed a few moments before he “determine[d] what we're going to do. And when we come back, I'll hear whether we're going to start over again or not.” When they returned from the break, the trial judge found Hospital's questioning attorney in direct contempt of court for violation of the motion in limine,but suspended a fine and jail time dependent on “good conduct during the balance of the trial, if we have a balance of this trial.” The trial judge went on to explain:

As I see my alternatives—And I haven't heard [Patient] move for a mistrial yet. I could grant one on my own and then consider—and then consider at the conclusion of this case whether I should give [Patient] a free ride if there's a Defendant's verdict in the case.

I can tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury that [Hospital's counsel] was mistaken, that there—after inquiry, there are no other convictions, and that could be with or without an admonition to the jury that they should disregard and not allow any unfair advantage to be given to [Hospital] by the—by the mistake, and I use that word charitably, of [Hospital's counsel].

What does [Patient] wish me to do?

Patient then moved for mistrial and Hospital suggested: “Your Honor, we believe that an admonition to the jury would be sufficient to cure the misinformation that was given to them.” Both of Hospital's counsel apologized to the trial court. The trial judge indicated he “no longer consider[s] the six months in the county jail” but needed “to make a point.” The trial judge took Patient's motion for mistrial under advisement and said “[w]e're half way through it. We're going to press on.”

¶ 8 The trial judge admonished the jury upon its return, telling them Hospital's counsel had “made a reference to some criminal conviction of somebody that was not the witness on the stand,” “the question that he asked about some other criminal conviction was a person that had a similar name but was not this witness,” and they should disregard the question which had “absolutely nothing to do with the issues in this case.”

¶ 9 Patient rested her case, joint exhibits were admitted into evidence, and Hospital rested without putting on any witnesses. Patient then informed the trial court the parties had agreed Hospital would call two witnesses, a doctor and a nurse, in its case if she did not require its counsel to travel to Florida and California for re-depositions. She contended she did not re-depose these witnesses or call them as witnesses based upon a specific promise to have the witnesses appear live in Hospital's case. Hospital denied entering into such an agreement and claimed an entitlement to make a strategy decision at trial not to call the witnesses. After a brief recess, Patient presented copies of e-mails she contended showed an agreement, the trial judge marked the materials as a Court's exhibit, and found there was not sufficient evidence of a promise by Hospital's counsel such as would entitle Patient to rely upon the witnesses being called in Hospital's case.

¶ 10 Hospital moved for a directed verdict and it demurred. Both requests were denied. After closing arguments, Patient moved to excuse Juror B and asked that an alternate be seated in his place because, despite the trial judge's...