Watson v. State
| Decision Date | 08 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20220103,20220104 |
| Citation | 2022 ND 215 |
| Parties | James Glenn Watson, Petitioner and Appellant v. State of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Appeals from the District Court of Stark and Hettinger Counties, Southwest Judicial District, the Honorable William A. Herauf, Judge.
Kiara C. Kraus-Parr, Grand Forks, N.D., for petitioner and appellant.
James A. Hope (argued), Assistant Stark County State's Attorney, Dickinson, N.D., and Pat J. Merriman (on brief) Assistant Hettinger County State's Attorney, for respondent and appellee.
OPINION
[¶1] James Watson appeals from a district court order denying his application for postconviction relief from two convictions entered upon a conditional plea of guilty. He argued to the district court that the court should allow him to withdraw his plea because he did not have effective assistance of counsel when he pleaded guilty. We conclude Watson failed to establish the prejudice necessary to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test. We affirm.
[¶2] A Golden Valley County jury found Watson guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child. Watson then entered a conditional Alford guilty plea to a charge of sexual assault in Hettinger County and a charge of continuous sexual abuse of a child in Stark County, reserving his right to appeal the district court's grant of the State's motions for continuance in all three cases. This Court reversed Watson's conviction from Golden Valley County because of a violation of his speedy trial right, but affirmed the other two convictions. State v. Watson, 2019 ND 164, ¶¶ 34, 41, 930 N.W.2d 145.
[¶3] After his Golden Valley conviction was reversed, Watson moved to withdraw his conditional Alford plea in the Hettinger and Stark County cases, arguing that it had been contingent upon his conviction in the Golden Valley case. State v. Watson, 2021 ND 18, ¶ 4, 954 N.W.2d 679. This was the first time he argued that his guilty plea was so conditioned. The district court denied his motions, and this Court affirmed. Id. at ¶ 18. We concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Watson's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in Stark and Hettinger Counties. Id. at ¶ 17.
[¶4] Watson then applied for postconviction relief in Stark and Hettinger Counties seeking to withdraw his guilty plea because he was denied effective assistance of counsel, claiming his lawyer, Kevin McCabe, incorrectly advised him that if this Court reversed his Golden Valley County conviction, he would be able to withdraw from his guilty plea in the other two counties. Watson alleges that he would not have pleaded guilty but for McCabe's error. He argues that the district court erred in denying his application, and he now appeals that order.
[¶5] There is no express indication in the plea agreement that Watson had the right to withdraw his guilty plea if this Court reversed the Golden Valley County conviction. However, McCabe testified that he erroneously told Watson in the hallway before entry of his guilty plea that if the Golden Valley judgment was reversed by this Court, he would be able to withdraw his guilty plea in Stark and Hettinger Counties. None of the state's attorneys present at the guilty plea recalled McCabe having made this statement. The district court noted in its denial of Watson's motion that Watson waited a year and a half after the change of plea hearing to raise this argument and did not do so in his initial appeal.
[¶6] Postconviction relief proceedings "are civil in nature and governed by the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure." Chase v. State, 2021 ND 206, ¶ 8, 966 N.W.2d 557. A criminal defendant may withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing only by demonstrating a manifest injustice. N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2); State v. Yost, 2018 ND 157, ¶ 6, 914 N.W.2d 508. We will not reverse a district court's finding of a manifest injustice unless the court has abused its discretion. Id.; Isxaaq v. State, 2021 ND 148, ¶ 7, 963 N.W.2d 260. "A court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or it misinterprets or misapplies the law." Id.
[¶7] "A guilty plea must be entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily to be valid." State v. Hoehn, 2019 ND 222, ¶ 18, 932 N.W.2d 553. The criminal defendant must at least have a "sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Hart v. Marion Correctional Inst., 927 F.2d 256, 257 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). "A defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea." Damron v. State, 2003 ND 102, ¶ 9, 663 N.W.2d 650 (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989). Whether or not a guilty plea was voluntary depends on "whether that advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Id.
[¶8] A manifest injustice may stem from ineffective assistance of counsel. Everett v. State, 2015 ND 149, ¶¶ 3-4, 864 N.W.2d 450. A criminal defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and N.D. Const. art. 1, § 12. DeCoteau v. State, 1998 ND 199, ¶ 6, 586 N.W.2d 156. The defendant bears the burden to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. Abdi v. State, 2000 ND 64, ¶ 29, 608 N.W.2d 292 (citing State v. Skaro, 474 N.W.2d 711, 714 (N.D. 1991)). The defendant must show "(1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Yoney v. State, 2021 ND 132, ¶ 7, 962 N.W.2d 617 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96, 694 (1984)). This is a "heavy burden." Yoney, at ¶ 7.
[¶9] Watson argues on appeal that this Court should reverse the district court's order dismissing his application for post-conviction relief and remand so he may withdraw his guilty pleas made in the Hettinger County and Stark County prosecutions against him. He argues that his guilty plea was invalid because McCabe incorrectly counseled him about the ramifications of pleading guilty and failed to reduce the terms of the plea agreement into writing in violation of N.D.R.Crim.P 11(a)(2), which, he argues, would have prevented this misunderstanding. Therefore, because his counsel was ineffective, he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily plead guilty.
[¶10] When applying Strickland, courts need not address both prongs if a court can resolve the case by addressing only one prong. Morales v. State, 2019 ND 137 ¶ 8, 927 N.W.2d 401. To satisfy Strickland prong two as applied to guilty pleas, the defendant must show that "'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" Booth v. State, 2017 ND 97, ¶ 9, 893 N.W.2d 186 (quoting Lindsey v. State, 2014 ND 174, ¶ 19, 852 N.W.2d 383); see also Bahtiraj v. State, 2013 ND 240, ¶ 15, 840 N.W.2d 605 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)); U.S. v. Nesgoda, 559 F.3d 867, 870 (8th Cir. 2009).
[¶11] An applicant for postconviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel "must specify how and where counsel was incompetent and the probable different result." Morales v. State, 2019 ND 137, ¶ 6. It is insufficient for a petitioner to merely declare with conclusory, self-serving after-the-fact assertions that but for his counsel's errors, the petitioner would not have pleaded guilty. Isxaaq, 2021 ND 148, ¶ 11. A defendant does not satisfy this second prong if the evidence shows that he was "eager to plead guilty." Nesgoda, 559 F.3d at 870. This Court must look beyond a petitioner's "subjective, self-serving statement" and look to "contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant's expressed preferences." Isxaaq, at ¶ 11. We may take into account the strength of the prosecution's case as well as how the "reasonable defendant" would take the State's case into account. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18. We may also factor in the reasonable defendant's concern for "the amount of prison time they will serve" and a defendant's desire to limit exposure to incarceration. Bahtiraj, 2013 ND 240, ¶ 17.
[¶12] This Court has looked to the following factors to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, a defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial:
(a) whether the defendant pleaded guilty in spite of knowing that the advice on which he claims to have relied might be incorrect, (b) whether pleading guilty gained him a benefit in the form of more lenient sentencing, (c) whether the defendant advanced any basis for doubting the strength of the government's case against him, and (d) whether the government would have been free to prosecute the defendant on counts in addition to those on which he pleaded guilty.
Bahtiraj, 2013 ND 240, ¶ 17 (quoting Chhabra v. United States, 720 F.3d 395, 408 (2nd Cir. 2013)).
[¶13] Watson asserts that but for McCabe's error, he would not have pleaded guilty. Other than this bare assertion, he brings no other evidence to support a finding that but for his counsel's advice he would have proceeded to trial. The district court found this to be a self-serving assertion in the face of other factors that suggest he otherwise would have pleaded guilty. Strickland's second prong inquires whether...
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