Watson v. State

• Decision Date: 17 July 1975
• Docket Number: No. 3--574A84,3--574A84
• Citation: 165 Ind.App. 111,330 N.E.2d 781
• Parties: Roosevelt WATSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 781

330 N.E.2d 781

165 Ind.App. 111

Roosevelt WATSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 3--574A84.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District.

July 17, 1975.

William Edward McKenna, Gary, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Harry John Watson, III, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before STATON, P.J., and GARRARD and HOFFMAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM:

Watson was tried by jury, convicted of robbery ¹ and given an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) to twenty-five (25) years. He preserves two issues for appeal: ²

I. Whether the trial court correctly admitted his oral and written confessions in evidence.

II. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction.

We affirm.

The evidence most favorable to the State reveals that on September 14, 1972, Phillip Morgan was employed as the manager of a service station located in Gary, Indiana. At approximately 6:00 a.m. a car occupied by four males entered the service area. On the pretext of obtaining water for their auto, Watson and another man accompanied Morgan into the station. Once inside, either Watson or his accomplice placed a gun to the back of Morgan's head and forced him into the men's restroom. There, Watson and his accomplice robbed Morgan of five dollars, his money changer and the keys to the station safe. Morgan was then bound with his belt. Two Hundred and Eleven Dollars ($211.00) were subsequently taken from the safe. During the course of the robbery, another customer entered the station. He was also taken to the restroom, robbed of approximatly Seventy Dollars ($70.00) and bound with his belt.

Shortly thereafter, Morgan freed himself and notified the Gary police, who stopped the car containing Watson and three other males. A search of the car disclosed a .32 caliber pistol. The occupants were placed under arrest, searched and advised of their constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Watson was found to be in possession of a large sum of money.

While en route to the police station, one of the arresting officers asked Watson why he robbed the service station. Watson replied that he needed the money. Approximately six hours after his arrest, Watson signed a valid waiver of rights form and gave police a signed statement confessing his participation in the robbery.

I. THE CONFESSIONS WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE.

At trial, Watson objected to the admission of testimony concerning his oral confession made while en route to the police station. ³ In conformity with IC 1971, 35--5--5--1, Ind.Ann.Stat § 9--1634 (Burns Supp.1974), ⁴ the trial court immediately conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the voluntariness of both the oral and written confessions. The trial judge found that both confessions were given voluntarily.

During the voluntariness hearing, Watson testified that he had ingested quantities of heroin and LSD six to eight hours before the robbery. He stated that taking LSD was the last thing he remembered until some time in December, 1972, when he regained his senses and discovered that he was in Lake County Jail. Watson insisted that he had no recollection of participating in the robbery or giving any statements to the police. The fact of Watson's drug ingestion was corroborated by the testimony of another robbery participant, Darryl Daniels.

In rebuttal, the State produced three police officers who testified that, based on their experience in arresting drug users, Watson did not appear to be under the influence of drugs either at the time of his arrest or at the time he gave his full confession at police headquarters. His speech, coordination and physical appearance were normal. The officers further testified that Watson acted rationally and coherently at all times, and appeared to understand his rights and the consequences of signing the waiver form.

Watson argues that the trial judge erred in his factual determination that the confessions were voluntary. In support of his contention, he merely directs us to his own testimony that he was under the influence of drugs at the time he gave the confessions. ⁵

The State had the burden to establish the voluntariness of the disputed confessions by a preponderance of the evidence. Ramirez v. State (1972), Ind.App. 286 N.E.2d 219; Lego v. Twomey (1972), 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618. On appeal, this Court will review the trial court's determination on the issue of voluntariness in the same manner that it scrutinizes any facts or findings reached on a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Cooley (1974), Ind.App., 319 N.E.2d 868. In reviewing the sufficiency of the trial court's voluntariness finding, this Court will neither weigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility. We look only to that evidence which supports the trial court's determination that Watson's confessions were voluntarily given. State v. Cooley, supra.

On appeal, Watson is asking this Court to weigh the evidence. This we may not do. Three police officers testified that Watson was not under the influence of narcotics and acted quite normally in all respects, both at the time of his arrest and at the time his written statement was given. Sufficient evidence was presented at the hearing from which the trial court could determine that Watson's confessions were voluntary. See Layton v. State (1973), Ind., 301 N.E.2d 633.

II. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION.

Watson contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence solely on the theory that at the time he committed the robbery he was incapable, by reason of voluntary drug ingestion, of forming the requisite intent.

While voluntary intoxication is not a defense in a criminal proceeding, it is, nevertheless, well recognized that the absence of a specific intent, regardless of the cause of such mental state, is a defense to any crime requiring such an intent. To this extent, mental incapacity, although occasioned by the voluntary ingestion of alcohol or drugs, is a defense. The existence of this mental condition or incapacity, rendering the accused incapable of forming a specific intent, is a question of fact to be determined by the trier thereof--in this case, the...