Watson v. Wilkinson Trucking Co.

• Decision Date: 07 May 1964
• Docket Number: No. 18209,18209
• Citation: 244 S.C. 217,136 S.E.2d 286
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Charles Edward WATSON, Respondent, v. WILKINSON TRUCKING COMPANY, Appellant.

Page 286

136 S.E.2d 286

244 S.C. 217

Charles Edward WATSON, Respondent, v. WILKINSON TRUCKING COMPANY, Appellant.

No. 18209.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

May 7, 1964.

Ward, Hammett & Howell, Spartanburg, for appellant.

James R. Turner, Spartanburg, for respondent.

LEWIS, Justice.

The defendant has appealed from a verdict of $40,000.00, actual damages, awarded against it for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff when the automobile driven by him collided with a truck tractor and trailer of the defendant. In this appeal, the defendant apparently concedes that the evidence made a jury issue as to negligence on the part of the driver of its truck, but charges error on the part of the lower court (1) in denying defendant's timely motion for a directed verdict upon the ground that the evidence conclusively showed that the plaintiff was barred of recovery by his own contributory negligence, and (2) in refusing the defendant's motion for a new trial upon the ground that the verdict was so excessive as to show that the jury was influenced by caprice, passion, prejudice, or other considerations not founded upon the evidence.

In resolving the foregoing issues, it is well settled that the testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Our review of the testimony is so limited.

The collision, out of which this action arose, occurred between Spartanburg and Greenville, South Carolina, on U. S. Hghway No. 29, approximately four miles west of Spartanburg. Highway No. 29 is a four lane highway, consisting of two roadways separated by a median strip and providing two lanes for traffic in each direction. The median strip between the two roadways varies in width along the highway and was approximately five hundred feet wide at the point of the collision. The separate one-way roadways are connected at intervals by paved crossovers for the use of traffic desiring to exchange from one roadway to the other. The accident occurred on the roadway for traffic proceeding from Spartanburg to Greenville at or near one of the paved crossovers. At that point, there is an unimproved dirt road leading northward from the paved highway and the crossover leads south to the roadway for traffic proceeding to Spartanburg from Greenville. The posted speed limit was 55 miles per hour. Signs were in place at intervals along the highway advising traffic that left turns from the road must be made from the left lane only.

When the accident occurred, both vehicles were proceeding from Spartanburg towards Greenville and the plaintiff was in the act of passing the truck of the defendant. Before reaching the scene, the vehicles had passed over the crest of a rather long hill. The plaintiff testified that, as he was going up this hill at a speed of approximately 15 miles per hour, he turned into the left lane of the roadway and passed another automobile. As he passed over the crest of the hill, he saw the defendant's truck travelling ahead of him in the right hand lane at a speed of 25 to 30 miles per hour. The plaintiff continued in the left lane of the road intending to pass but, when he came within 100 to 150 feet of the defendant's truck, it suddenly turned from the right hand lane in which it was travelling, without signal or warning of any kind, directly across the left lane blocking the path of the plaintiff's automobile. The left turn by the defendant's truck was being made for the purpose of entering the paved crossover connecting the two roadways. The plaintiff applied his brakes in an effort to avoid the collision, but could not, and struck the rear of the defendant's trailer.

The defendant's version of the collision, as given by the driver of its truck, was that the plaintiff ran into the rear of the truck as it was in the process of making a left turn from the left hand lane of the roadway into the paved crossover, after proper signals were given of the intention to make such turn.

Error is first charged in the refusal of the lower court to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant on the sole ground that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in attempting to pass the defendant's truck at an intersection in violation of Section 46-388 of the 1962 Code of Laws. The portions of Section 46-388, relied upon by the defendant, are as follows:

'No vehicle shall at any time be driven to the left side of the roadway under the following conditions: * * *

(2) When approaching within one hundred feet of or traversing any intersection * * *.'

The collision occurred at or near the point where the paved crossover and a dirt road intersected the one-way roadway. The defendant contends that the foregoing constituted an intersection within the meaning of Section 46-388 and that the plaintiff, in driving to the left of the center line while attempting to pass defendant's truck, violated the statutory prohibition against driving to the left of the center of the roadway when approaching within 100 feet of or traversing an intersection, and constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law.

It is undisputed that the collision occurred while the parties were traveling upon a one-way roadway. The contention of the defendant that Section 46-388 governed the plaintiff in the operation of his vehicle at the time completely overlooks a further provision of that statute, which states that the limitations imposed therein 'shall not apply upon a one-way roadway.' Therefore, since the collision occurred upon a one-way roadway, the foregoing statutory prohibition against driving to the left of the center line was inapplicable.

The testimony further shows that there were no signs posted where the wreck took place, or markings of any kind, prohibiting a vehicle from being driven to the left of the center line of the roadway. Section 46-389 of the 1962 Code of Laws.

Since there was no statute or posted sign prohibiting the plaintiff from driving to the left of the center line to pass the truck of the defendant at the point in question, his actions in so doing, in so far as the issues in this appeal are concerned, were governed only by the common law rules requiring the exercise of due care.

While the testimony is conflicting, it is susceptible of the reasonable inference that at the time of the collision the plaintiff was proceeding to pass the truck of the defendant in a lawful manner. On the other hand, there is evidence that the driver of the defendant's vehicle turned from a direct course and moved left upon the roadway without taking any care or precaution to see that such movement could be made with reasonable safety, in violation of Section 46-405; that he attempted a left turn from the right hand lane, in violation of the posted highway signs; and that he failed to give a signal indicating his intention to make a left turn, in violation of Section 46-407. Under all of the facts, the issues of negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause were properly submitted by the lower court to the jury for determination. Jumper v. Goodwin, 239 S.C. 508, 123 S.E.2d 857.

The remaining question to be decided is whether the verdict for $40,000.00 actual damages is so grossly excessive as to indicate caprice, passion, or prejudice on the part of the jury. The trial judge did not consider the verdict excessive and refused to reduce the amount or set it aside.

The question of whether a verdict awarded for unliquidated damages is excessive presents a difficult problem; for the amount which a jury might properly award in such cases cannot be determined with any degree of certainty, but is...