Watts v. Watts
| Decision Date | 27 February 1894 |
| Citation | 160 Mass. 464,36 N.E. 479 |
| Parties | WATTS v. WATTS. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
On the trial it was proved or admitted that on June 4, 1892, libelee committed adultery with one Jeremiah Ford that she was discovered by libelant, who ejected her from his house; that on June 6, 1892, she brought suit in the probate court, under Pub.St. c. 147, § 33, for separate maintenance that libelant defended, but offered no evidence of her adultery; that on August 22, 1892, the probate court entered a decree for libelee, reciting that the libelee, "for justifiable cause, was actually living apart from her husband;" that no appeal was taken; and that, at the time of the filing of the libel, said decree was in full force. The court ruled that said decree was a bar to the maintenance of this libel.
Simmons & Pratt, for complainant.
Chester M. Perry, for defendant.
In regard to subjects of which the probate court has jurisdiction, and upon parties brought within its jurisdiction, a decree of that court, like a judgment of other courts, is conclusive. Miller v. Miller, 150 Mass. 111, 22 N.E. 765; McKim v. Doane, 137 Mass. 195; Pierce v. Prescott, 128 Mass. 140; Laughton v. Atkins, 1 Pick. 535.
The decree introduced at the trial, being between the same parties as those in the present action, is binding and conclusive upon them in this suit in regard to all matters shown to have been put in issue, or to have been necessarily involved, in the former suit, and actually tried and determined in it. In regard to matters not then in controversy, and not heard and determined, although it is conclusive so far as the final disposition of that cause of action is concerned, it is not conclusive to prevent a determination of them according to the truth, if they are subsequently controverted in a different case. Foye v Patch, 132 Mass. 111; Com. v. Evans, 101 Mass. 25; Burlen v. Shannon, 14 Gray, 433-437; Thurston v. Thurston, 99 Mass. 39; Lewis v. Lewis, 106 Mass. 309; Burlen v. Shannon, 99 Mass. 200; Hawks v. Truesdell, Id. 557; Lea v. Lea, Id. 496; Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351. It would be harsh and oppressive rule which should make it necessary for one sued on a trifling claim to resist it and engage in costly litigation in order to prevent the operation of a judgment which would be held conclusively to have established against him every material fact alleged and not denied in the declaration, so as to preclude him from showing the truth if another controversy should arise between the same parties. There might be various reasons why he would prefer to submit to a claim rather than to defend against it. For the purpose of defending that suit he would have his day in court but once, and if he chose to let the case go by default, or with a trial upon some of the defenses which might be made, and not upon others, he would be obliged forever after to hold his peace. But a plaintiff can claim no more than to be given what he asks in his writ. He cannot justly complain that the defendant has not seen fit to set up defenses and raise issues for the purpose of enabling him to settle facts for future possible controversies. In subsequent proceedings which are independent of the original suit, the judgment in that suit is conclusive as evidence, or may be pleaded as an estoppel, only as to those matters which were put in issue and determined; but it is not necessary that these should be particularly mentioned in the pleadings, if they are involved in the issue made up, and if the case is determined upon the trial of that issue. The bill of exceptions in this case shows nothing in regard to the pleadings, further than that there was a petition brought under Pub.St. c. 147, § 33, and that the respondent appeared and defended against it. It appears that no evidence was offered of the act of adultery on June 4, 1892, and we infer that it was not set up in answer to the petition. We must assume that the respondent's pleading was a general denial. Was the question whether the petitioner had committed adultery, as now appears, necessarily involved in the issue made up by an affirmation and denial that she was living apart from her husband for justifiable cause? The grounds of the decree do not appear. Could such a decree have been made upon any possible state of facts, if the petitioner had been known to have committed adultery on June 4, 1892? If so, the decree could not be held to be a bar to a divorce unless the only facts which would render the decree possible are such as would, of themselves, preclude the libelant from obtaining a divorce. The decision that a wife is living apart from her husband for a justifiable cause, made upon a hearing between them on the general issue, conclusively shows that she has not utterly deserted him. Miller v. Miller, 150 Mass. 111, 22 N.E. 765. Living apart from a husband under such circumstances as to constitute utter desertion, for which a divorce may be granted, is a marital wrong, and cannot be legally justifiable. But facts may be supposed upon which the decision of the probate court might have been made in the present case, even if it was known that the wife was guilty of adultery of which the husband had knowledge. If he had for a long time been guilty of extreme cruelty towards her, and had inflicted serious bodily injury upon her when he ejected her from his house, and then had asked her to return to his home, and had offered to forgive the adultery if she would come back, she would have been justified in refusing to return, on the ground that she had reason to fear great injury from his cruelty if she continued to live with him. If such facts appeared, the court might well decide that she was justifiably living apart from him on account of his cruelty, notwithstanding her adultery, which he was willing to forgive. It is obvious, therefore, that the decision in her favor on...
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