Wayne Cnty. v. Fuller

• Decision Date: 26 March 1930
• Docket Number: Jan. Term, 1930.,Motion No. 473
• Parties: WAYNE COUNTY et al. v. FULLER, Auditor General.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

250 Mich. 227

229 N.W. 911

WAYNE COUNTY et al.

v.FULLER, Auditor General. ^*

Motion No. 473, Jan. Term, 1930.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

March 26, 1930.

Application for writ of mandamus by Wayne County, by John C. Cowan and others, its Board of Auditors, against Oramel B. Fuller, Auditor General of Michigan.

Writ denied.

Argued before the Entire Bench, except McDONALD and POTTER, JJ.James E. Chenot, Pros. Atty., and Valois E. Crossley, Asst. Pros. Atty., both of Detroit, for petitioner.

Wilber M. Brucker, Atty. Gen., and Charles Rubiner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

NORTH, J.

Wayne county by its board of auditors, has brought mandamus to compel the state auditor general to draw and deliver to that county a warrant on the state treasurer for $679,062.81, claiming it has been deprived of that amount by reason of an alleged unlawful distribution of highway funds among the several counties of the state. The defendant asserts that the funds have been distributed in accordance with statutory provisions, and that nothing has been unlawfully withheld from plaintiff. Determination necessitates a construction of Act No. 302 of the Pub. Acts of 1915, as amended by Act No. 1 of the Pub. Acts of 1925, and also of Act No. 150 of the Pub. Acts of 1927.

It may be well to bear in mind that these have been companion statutes since the inception of the present method of raising highway funds. Prior to 1925, state highway funds were provided by a specific tax levied upon motor vehicles, and the tax was computed on the basis of weight and horse power. In 1925, with the obvious purpose of increasing the amount of highway funds, the Legislature adopted a new method of taxation. In furtherance of its plan, Act No. 1 and Act No. 2 of the Pub. Acts of 1925 were passed as immediate effect acts in January of that year. By Act No. 1 the specific tax on motor vehicles was changed to one computed on the basis of weight alone, and this has come to be known as ‘the weight tax.’ Section 34 (as amended by Act No. 1) provides that $6,000,000 of the amount thus collected annually shall be returned to the counties proportionately in the manner indicated by said section which is hereinafter quoted. Act No. 2 of 1925, for the first time in Michigan legislation, provided for the levy of a so-called ‘gas tax.’ This act contained no provision for returning to the counties for highway construction any portion of the tax collected. It provided, as does the weight tax law, that the revenue received should be made a part of the state highway funds in the hands of the state treasurer; and appropriation thereof was made in the body of the act. While Act No. 150, Pub. Acts 1927, expressly repealed Act No. 2 of 1925, in effect it practically re-enacted the legislation which it purports to repeal, amplified certain phases of it, increased the gas tax from two cents to three cents per gallon, and provided a method by which a further portion of the highway funds was to be turned over to the counties, cities, and villages of the state. Thus we have before us for construction an act which in its origin was a companion of Act No. 1 of the Pub. Acts of 1925; but amended in such a way as materially increases the amount of the tax raised and placed in the highway funds of the state; and, as amended, it provides the method of distributing a portion of such funds among the counties, cities, and villages of the state.

The particular sections of these two acts which are pertinent to the instant case are as follows:

Section 34, (as amended by) Act No. 1 of Pub. Acts of 1925:

‘Six million dollars of the amount collected annually as taxes upon the registered motor vehicles shall belong to the several counties of the state, and shall be returned to the county treasurers thereof in proportion to the amounts received from the owners of registered motor vehicles within the several counties, to be used for highway purposes under the jurisdiction of the county authorities * * *.’

Subdivision (c), § 19, Act No. 150, of the Pub. Acts of 1927:‘A sum equal to the difference between six million dollars and fifty per cent. of the total weight tax collected under the provisions of act number three hundred two of the public acts of nineteen hundred fifteen, as amended, [sec. 34, Act No. 1 of the Pub. Acts of 1925], shall belong to the several counties of the state; seven-eighths of a sum equal to one-half of the total weight tax shall be paid to the several county treasurers in proportion to the amount of said weight tax received from the owners of registered vehicles within the several counties under the provisions of said act number three hundred two of the public acts of nineteen hundred fifteen, as amended; the remaining one-eighth of said sum shall be paid to the several county treasurers thereof as follows: One-eighty-third to the county treasurer of each county. * * *’

After the gas tax law of 1927 became effective, the auditor general proceeded to apply the law to the highway funds and make distribution thereof to the counties as follows: By adding $6,000,000 out of the weight tax to a sum equal to the difference between $6,000,000 and 50 per cent. of the total weight tax, this difference being taken from the gas tax money, and apportioning the total thus reached in the following manner: Seven-eighths thereof to the several counties, in proportion to the amount of the weight tax received from the owners of registered motor vehicles within the respective counties under the weight tax law; the remaining one-eighth thereof be distributed equally among the eighty-three counties of the state. The plaintiff claims this method of distribution is erroneous; its position being that the $6,000,000 specified in the weight tax law (Act No. 1 of the Pub. Acts of 1925) should be first apportioned among the counties in proportion to the amount of weight tax received from the respective counties, and that the balance of the funds to be distributed (the sum equal to the difference between $6,000,000 and 50 per cent. of the total weight tax) should be divided among the counties as follows: Seven-eighths in proportion to the amount of the weight tax received from the respective counties, and one-eighth equally between the eighty-three counties. If this latter method is correct, the plaintiff is entitled to receive from the state the sum first above named; but, on the other hand, if the method adopted by the auditor general is correct, the plaintiff has already received its full share of the highway funds.

There is no controverted issue of fact. The parties agree that the total amount to be distributed is such a sum as equals one-half the weight tax. The one question of law presented is this: Which of the two methods above outlined is the correct and lawful way of distributing that part of the weight tax and of the gas tax which belongs to the respective counties of this state?

That the terms of the 1927 Act are couched in bunglesome language is all too evident. But as has been said by Chief Justice Christiancy: ‘Legislatures are not grammar schools; and, in this country at least, it is hardly reasonable to expect legislative acts to be drawn with strict grammatical or logical accuracy.’ People ex rel. Whipple v. Judge of Saginaw Circuit Court, 26 Mich. 342. It is likewise clear that the sections above quoted from the two acts are in pari materia.

‘Statutes in pari meteria are to be construed together, and repeals by implication are not favored. The courts will regard all statutes upon the same general subject matter as part of one system, and later statutes should be construed as supplementary of complementary to those preceding them.’ State v. Omaha Elevator Co., 75 Neb. 637, 106 N. W. 979,110 N. W. 874.

‘The object of the rule in pari materia is to carry into effect the purpose of the Legislature as found in harmonious statutes on a subject. * * *’ Ray Corporation v. Secretary of State, 241 Mich. 457, 217 N. W. 334, 335.

[1][2] It has already been noted herein that these two methods of raising highway funds first became a part of our statutory law at substantially the same time. The enactment of 1927 specifically refers to the earlier one, and must be read in connection with it. If possible, a construction should be placed on these two pieces of legislation which will give effect to each of the provisions contained in the respective acts. This accords with an elementary principle of statutory construction. Swartwout v. Railroad Co., 24 Mich. 389. But, if we adopt plaintiff's contention, we must wholly disregard that portion of subdivision C of section 19 which definitely provides that: ‘* * * Seven-eighths of a sum equal to one-half of the total weight tax shall be paid to the several county treasurers in proportion [etc.]; * * * the remaining one-eighth of said sum shall be paid to the several county treasurers' in equal proportion.

Instead of observing this provision in the statute, plaintiff...