Wayne v. Benson, 95-2250

Decision Date14 August 1996
Docket NumberNo. 95-2250,95-2250
Citation89 F.3d 530
PartiesMichael WAYNE, also known as Michael Wayne Fenney, Plaintiff--Appellant, v. Dennis BENSON, Warden, Defendant--Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Andrea K. George, Minneapolis, MN, argued (Caryn A. Kauffman, on the brief), for appellant.

Paul Kempainen, St. Paul, MN, argued (Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., and Larry Collins, Weseca, MN, on the brief), for appellee.

Before McMILLIAN, LAY, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Michael Wayne, also known as Michael Wayne Fenney, appeals from the district court's 1 denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994). Wayne is serving a term of life imprisonment following his convictions for murder in Minnesota state court. Wayne argues that he did not receive a fair trial because the State failed to disclose two pieces of evidence favorable to him. In addition, Wayne makes seven other arguments in a pro se brief. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

Mona Armendariz was murdered during the early morning of July 29, 1986 in her trailer home in the Janesville Trailer Court of Janesville, Minnesota. She was stabbed thirteen times and her throat was cut. The State charged Wayne with the murder and his defense at trial was that someone else, possibly Steven Sack, committed the murder. Wayne was found guilty and was sentenced to life in prison.

Some three and a half years after Wayne's trial, Carolann Eggert gave a statement to an investigator that Steven Sack came to her home in Janesville with Wade Abraham at two o'clock in the morning on July 29, 1986. Eggert said Abraham "pound[ed] through [her] front door and went directly to [her] son William's bedroom door and pounded on it." When Eggert confronted Abraham about coming into her home at two o'clock in the morning, Abraham stated that "something terrible has happened." Eggert's son William got up and spoke to Abraham outside of Eggert's hearing. At this time Eggert saw Sack standing in her home, with blood on his shirt, pants, and hands, holding a bloody butcher knife. She stated that the knife was eight to ten inches long and about one and a half inches wide. Abraham and Sack wanted to use Eggert's washing machine to wash Sack's bloody clothes. Sack went into Eggert's kitchen and washed the blood off of the knife in her kitchen sink. Finally, Abraham and Sack left after Eggert angrily confronted them and told them to go to Abraham's aunt's house. Eggert stated that this visit upset all of her children and that she talked to her sons Scott, William, and Mark to settle them down.

There is considerable dispute over when Eggert first told someone else about Abraham and Sack's visit to her house. Eggert claims that she told Sheriff Edward Kubat her story when he came to serve a subpoena on her son before Wayne's trial. Kubat denies that Eggert ever told him anything about Sack being at her home with a knife and blood on his clothes. Eggert also claims that before Wayne's trial she told a Janesville city police officer about Sack's visit, but she cannot remember the police officer's name. Wayne has produced no evidence as to the identity of the police officer. Other than Sheriff Kubat and the city police officer, Eggert does not claim to have told her story to anyone else before or during Wayne's trial.

After his trial, Wayne also discovered that the Janesville police had found a knife on the roof of Ann Armendariz's trailer home. Ann Armendariz is the sister-in-law of the murder victim and a resident of the Janesville Trailer Court. On September 3, 1986, approximately five weeks after Mona Armendariz's murder, one of Ann's children found a knife on top of Ann's trailer home. Without disturbing the knife, Ann called the Janesville police who sent an officer out to get the knife. The officer took pictures of the knife and measured it before taking it back to the police department.

The police officer described the knife as a common paring knife which could be found in any kitchen. He also stated that there was nothing about the knife that would indicate its owner, where it came from, or how long it had been on Ann Armendariz's roof. The officer observed no blood on the knife, nor any rust or dirt, even though it was exposed to the weather on the roof. The knife's blade was two and thirteen-sixteenths inches long.

Wayne filed a petition for post-conviction relief in Minnesota state court based on newly discovered evidence including Eggert's statement. The trial court denied Wayne's petition and he appealed. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Wayne's petition. Wayne v. State, 498 N.W.2d 446 (Minn.1993).

In affirming the denial of Wayne's petition for post-conviction relief, the Minnesota Supreme Court referred to the questionable nature of the Eggert testimony, analyzing its credibility in detail, and stated that Eggert's statement was doubtful. Id. at 448. First, the court stated that Eggert's story conflicted with those of her sons. Eggert's sons William and Mark both testified that while Abraham and Sack visited their home the night of the murder, their mother was asleep during the visit. Id. The sons never mentioned any blood on Sack in their testimony. Id. Second, the court stated that Eggert's story was less credible because she failed to come forward with it earlier. Id. The court pointed out that Eggert did not reveal her story about Sack, even though she kept up with Wayne's trial. Id. Finally, even assuming Eggert's story to be true, the court stated that it was highly unlikely that the eight-inch-long butcher knife, which Eggert saw in Sack's possession, was the murder weapon. Id. At Wayne's trial, a forensic pathologist testified that the murder weapon probably had a blade about one and a half inches long and one-half inch wide. Id. In light of these contradictions, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that "Eggert's testimony would almost certainly not change the verdict" of Wayne's trial, and that "the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that [her testimony] would not produce a different and more favorable result at a new trial." Id.

After his unsuccessful appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Wayne filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court. His petition was referred to a magistrate judge 2 who prepared a report and recommendation. The magistrate judge found that Eggert never told her story to Sheriff Kubat, a Janesville police officer, or anyone else connected with the State before the end of Wayne's trial. The judge concluded that even if Eggert's statement had been presented at Wayne's trial, there was no reasonable probability that there would have been a different result. The judge stated that the credibility of Eggert's statement was diminished by the passage of time, her history of mental illness, and the obvious inconsistencies between her story and the other evidence in the case. Finally, the judge concluded that there was nothing about the paring knife which would have helped prove Wayne's guilt or innocence and, therefore, its disclosure would not have changed the result of Wayne's trial. The magistrate judge recommended that the district court deny Wayne's petition. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, and Wayne appeals.

I.

Wayne argues that the State violated his right to due process by failing to disclose Eggert's statement to him before his trial. He asserts that the State knew about Eggert's statement before his trial and that the statement would have helped him prove his innocence at trial.

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the State has a duty to disclose evidence which is favorable to Wayne and material to the issue of his guilt. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). To prove a violation of this duty, Wayne must show that: (1) the State suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to him; and (3) the evidence was material to the issue of his guilt. United States v. Thomas, 940 F.2d 391, 392 (8th Cir.1991). Favorable evidence is material to the issue of Wayne's guilt if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to him, the result of his trial would have been different. Kyles v. Whitley, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1565, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). There is a reasonable probability of a different result if the State's suppression of the favorable evidence undermines our confidence in the outcome of Wayne's trial. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1566.

A.

The State argues that it did not violate its duty to disclose Eggert's statement because it did not know about her statement until after Wayne's trial. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's factual finding that the State did not know about Eggert's statement until after Wayne's trial. We must accept this factual finding unless it is clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511-12, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985).

Eggert claims that she told her story about Sack to Sheriff Kubat and an unnamed Janesville police officer before Wayne's trial. Sheriff Kubat denies that Eggert told him anything relating to Mona Armendariz's murder. Eggert has also failed to identify the Janesville police officer she told her story to, and Wayne has produced no evidence as to the identity of the police officer. Eggert has never claimed to have told her story to anyone else connected with the State before Wayne's trial. On this evidence, the district court's factual finding that the State was not aware of Eggert's...

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