Weathers v. City of Oxford
Decision Date | 02 July 2004 |
Parties | Lisa C. WEATHERS v. CITY OF OXFORD. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Randy J. Moeller, Anniston, for appellant.
C. David Stubbs of Stubbs, Sills & Frye, P.C., Anniston, for appellee. PITTMAN, Judge.
Lisa C. Weathers appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Calhoun Circuit Court in favor of the City of Oxford ("the City") in her action against the City seeking a declaratory judgment that the City had violated her constitutional right to due process when it suspended her from her employment without pay for five days.
In September 2002, Weathers, a police officer employed by the City, exited a police vehicle that she had been operating in an attempt to apprehend a burglary suspect; however, Weathers failed to place the vehicle in park or to apply the parking brake. As a result, the vehicle rolled into a nearby ditch and was damaged. Just over one month later, on October 9, 2002, the City's Accident Review Board held a hearing concerning that incident, which Weathers attended.1 On October 20, 2002, the Accident Review Board issued an order finding that "the damage to the police vehicle could have been avoided by applying the emergency brake and making sure the vehicle was in park." The Accident Review Board recommended that Weathers be suspended without pay from her job for five working days. On the morning of November 14, 2002, Weathers was served with the recommendation of the Accident Review Board, and she was orally informed that she was on suspension. Weathers did not appeal that decision to the Oxford Civil Service Board.
On February 5, 2003, Weathers filed a complaint in the Calhoun Circuit Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the City had violated her constitutional right to due process; the City filed an answer 15 days later. On August 13, 2003, the City filed a motion for a summary judgment and submitted a brief and evidentiary materials in support of that motion. Weathers filed a brief 13 days later opposing the City's summary-judgment motion, but she filed nothing else in response to that motion. Following a hearing, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the City on September 22, 2003. The trial court's judgment stated, in pertinent part:
Weathers argues on appeal that the trial court improperly entered a summary judgment because, she says, (1) genuine issues of material fact precluded the entry of a summary judgment; (2) the City violated § 11-43-230, Ala.Code 1975, which requires a predisciplinary hearing; and (3) the City violated Weathers's federal constitutional right to a predisciplinary hearing.
Our standard of review is well-settled:
Sizemore v. Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n, 671 So.2d 674, 675 (Ala.Civ.App.1995) (citations omitted).
The record clearly shows that Weathers did not respond to the City's summary-judgment motion with any documentary or testimonial evidence. Weathers's brief filed in opposition to the City's summary-judgment motion relies entirely on her contention that she received notice of the Accident Review Board hearing only three hours before it was held and that § 11-43-230, Ala.Code 1975, requires 10 days' advance notice before any predisciplinary hearing may be held as to municipal law-enforcement officers. The Code section cited by Weathers reads, in pertinent part:
Ala.Code 1975, § 11-43-230(b). That Code section, together with §§ 11-43-231 and -232, were enacted as a general act and took effect on July 14, 2001. See Act No. 2001-463, Ala. Acts 2001, p. 617.
The City, on the other hand, offered copies of the Oxford Civil Service Act, pertinent City personnel rules and regulations, and copies of documents relating to the Accident Review Board hearing; the City contended that § 11-43-232, Ala.Code 1975, exempted the City from the application of § 11-43-230. The City offered evidence to show that the Alabama Legislature established the Oxford Civil Service Board ("the Civil Service Board") when it enacted a local act on September 30, 1975. See Act No. 963, Ala. Acts 1975, p.1996. In that local legislation an "employee" is defined as "any person including firemen and policemen" who works for the City. See § 2, Act No. 963. The Civil Service Board is authorized "to make rules and regulations governing ... matters as may be necessary to accomplish the purposes of this act." See § 9, Act No. 963. The Civil Service Board is further required by the act to "establish rules and regulations governing dismissals, suspensions, layoffs, terminations, and leaves of absence." Id. The legislation includes the following provision:
The local legislation, although amended several times, has remained in full force and effect, in pertinent part, since it was first enacted.2 The City concluded its argument by noting that § 11-43-232, Ala.Code 1975, reads:
"This article shall not apply to any municipality with an established due process procedure for law enforcement officers on July 14, 2001, so long as the municipality continues to have a due process procedure in full force and effect."
Therefore, the City argued, the Legislature has exempted the City from the application of § 11-43-230, and, thus, it was entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law.
Based on the arguments of the parties in this action, we are required to determine which of the two cited statutes, the 1975 local act or the 2001 general act, properly governed the procedures pertaining to the City's suspension of Weathers. The applicable rules of statutory construction are quite clear:
""
Ex parte Master Boat Builders, Inc., 779 So.2d 192, 196 (Ala.2000) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala.1992)). It is a well-established principle...
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