Webb v. City of Demopolis

• Decision Date: 13 June 2008
• Docket Number: 2061087.
• Citation: 14 So.3d 887
• Parties: Henry Winder WEBB et al. v. CITY OF DEMOPOLIS.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

14 So.3d 887

Henry Winder WEBB et al. v. CITY OF DEMOPOLIS.

2061087.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

June 13, 2008.

Rehearing Denied August 15, 2008.

Isaac P. Espy and Mark A. Scogin of Espy, Nettles, Scogin & Brantley, P.C., Tuscaloosa, for appellants.

Richard S. Manley of Manley, Traeger, Perry & Stapp, Demopolis; and Rick A. Howard and April W. McKay of Nix Holtsford Gilliland Higgins & Hitson, P.C., Montgomery, for appellee.

THOMAS, Judge.

On September 14, 2006, Henry Winder Webb, Martha Virginia W. Jackson, Caro F.W. Osborne, and Mem Creagh Webb II (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Webb family") filed a complaint in the Marengo Circuit Court, seeking declaratory relief with respect to property located in the City of Demopolis ("the City") that they claim to own by virtue of adverse possession and upon which the City claims a right-of-way. On October 13, 2006, the City, arguing that the doctrine of res judicata bars the Webb family's claim, filed a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The City maintained that a dispute over the same property between the City and John C. Webb, the Webb family's predecessor in title, was conclusively decided in favor of the City in 1889. The City filed a brief in support of its motion and attached copies of two decisions by the Alabama Supreme Court—City of Demopolis v. Webb, 87 Ala. 659, 6 So. 408 (1889) ("Webb I"), and Webb v. City of Demopolis, 95 Ala. 116, 13 So. 289 (1892) ("Webb II")—as well as copies of maps, pleadings, and other exhibits referenced in the Webb I and Webb II opinions. The circuit court set the motion for a hearing; the hearing was continued several times. On July 17, 2007, the Webb family filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent the City from proceeding with any development or construction in the area known as the "Arch Street Scenic Walk and Riverfront Development Project."

On August 8, 2008, the circuit court granted the City's motion and dismissed the Webb family's complaint with prejudice. The Webb family appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court. The supreme court transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975.

Finality of the Judgment

Although neither party has raised an issue concerning this court's jurisdiction in this case, we must first consider whether this court has jurisdiction over this appeal, because "'jurisdictional matters are of such magnitude that we take notice of them at any time and do so even ex mero motu.'" Wallace v. Tee Jays Mfg. Co., 689 So.2d 210, 211 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997) (quoting Nunn v. Baker, 518 So.2d 711, 712 (Ala.1987)). Section 12-22-2, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part, that an appeal will lie to the appropriate appellate court "[f]rom any final judgment of the circuit court." "A `final judgment is a "terminal decision which demonstrates there has been a complete adjudication of all matters in controversy between the litigants."'" Horton v. Horton, 822 So.2d 431, 433 (Ala.Civ.App.2001) (quoting Dees v. State, 563 So.2d 1059, 1061 (Ala.Civ.App. 1990)).

In this case, the Webb family has appealed from the circuit court's order granting the relief sought in the City's motion to dismiss their complaint despite the circuit court's failure to rule on their motion for injunctive relief. For reasons that will be discussed infra, we conclude that, by dismissing the Webb family's complaint for declaratory relief on the basis that it failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the circuit court implicitly denied the Webb family's request for injunctive relief. Accordingly, we conclude that the judgment is final and appealable. Cf. Hingle v. Gann, 368 So.2d 22 (Ala.1979) (holding that when judgment established true boundary between the parties but made no mention of cross-claims alleging trespass, both parties' claims for money damages were deemed denied).

Standard of Review

Rule 12(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., states, in pertinent part:

"If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure ... to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment ...."

Although the City labeled its pleading as a motion to dismiss, it submitted in support of that motion copies of two Alabama Supreme Court decisions as well as copies of the maps and other documentary evidence referenced in those decisions. Because the circuit court was presented with, and did not exclude from its consideration, matters outside the pleadings, the City's motion to dismiss was converted into a motion for a summary judgment. See Rule 12(b).

The parties appear to believe that the motion to dismiss was not converted, pursuant to Rule 12(b), into a summary-judgment motion, evidently basing that belief upon certain language in Geer Brothers v. Crump, 349 So.2d 577 (Ala.1977). In that case, the trial court dismissed, based on the doctrine of res judicata, a complaint against an insurance agent for failure to provide coverage. The court stated:

"At the outset, the plaintiff argues on this appeal that the trial court had before it only the complaint, the motion to dismiss, the Geer affidavit, and briefs of the parties when the motion to dismiss was ruled upon. The defendant, on the other hand, states that the record in Civil Action No. 6290, which is contained in the record on this appeal, was before the trial court. The record on this appeal is silent on the question of whether either party introduced that record as part of the pleadings or as evidence for or against that motion. However, any such action would have been superfluous, because when a party refers to another proceeding or judgment of a court in his pleading before that court, as was done here, the court on motion to dismiss may take judicial notice of the entire proceeding, or so much of it as is relevant to the question of law presented. Moreover, the parties on appeal have argued the issue of res judicata, and of necessity have brought into consideration the effect of the former judgment. Therefore, we have before us the principal question: Whether the action of the trial court was proper, and in our response to that issue we shall treat the trial court's ruling as having been one upon a motion for summary judgment."

349 So.2d at 579 (final emphasis added; citation omitted). The above-quoted language from Geer Brothers indicates that a trial court may take judicial notice of the proceedings in a former case. It does not stand for the proposition that, when a trial court takes judicial notice of the proceedings in another case, there is no conversion of a motion to dismiss into a summary-judgment motion. See American Trust Corp. v. Champion, 793 So.2d 811, 813 (Ala.Civ.App.2001) (stating that "[b]ecause on the issue of res judicata, the trial court considered matters outside the pleadings, ... the motion to dismiss on that ground should be treated as one for a summary judgment, and ... we should review the res judicata issue by the summary-judgment standard").

Appellate review of a summary judgment is de novo. Ex parte Ballew, 771 So.2d 1040 (Ala.2000). A motion for a summary judgment is to be granted when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P. A party moving for a summary judgment must make a prima facie showing "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [it] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c)(3); see Lee v. City of Gadsden, 592 So.2d 1036, 1038 (Ala.1992). If the movant meets this burden, "the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to rebut the movant's prima facie showing by `substantial evidence.'" Lee, 592 So.2d at 1038 (footnote omitted). "[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989); see § 12-21-12(d), Ala.Code 1975.

Discussion

In 1888, the City filed a bill in the chancery court of Marengo County to abate a public nuisance. The City asserted that John C. Webb had erected a fence across Arch Street, a public thoroughfare that ran north and south along the banks of the Tombigbee River, from the low-water mark to the numbered lots on the east side of the street; several of those lots were owned by Webb. The City also alleged that Webb was collecting wharfage fees from the public at the "lower landing," a steamboat landing on the Tombigbee River at Arch Street, thereby obstructing the free use of the landing by the public. The City sought an injunction to compel Webb to remove the fence and to restrain him from collecting wharfage fees.

Webb filed a demurrer, asserting, among other things, that the City's bill failed to show that Arch Street had ever been laid off or opened as a street. The chancery court overruled the demurrer, and Webb appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court; the supreme court affirmed. In order to understand what was at issue in the Webb I and Webb II opinions, we set out a brief review of common-law pleading.

"Common law pleading allotted the defendant a limited number of apparently simple responses to the plaintiff's allegations. The principle behind the limited number of pleadings afforded a common law defendant reflected common law pleading's emphasis on producing a single issue for resolution. Essentially, three responses to a common law plaintiff's claim existed: (1) a demurrer, which attacked the plaintiff's allegation by asserting that the plaintiff stated `no legal claim'; (2) a dilatory plea, which took no position on the facts or law but asserted a `legal reason,...