Webb v. Iowa Dist. Court for Johnson County, 86-1489

• Citation: 416 N.W.2d 95
• Decision Date: 30 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-1489,86-1489
• Parties: Matthew WEBB, Plaintiff, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR JOHNSON COUNTY, Defendant.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

Page 95

416 N.W.2d 95

Matthew WEBB, Plaintiff, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR JOHNSON COUNTY, Defendant.

No. 86-1489.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Sept. 30, 1987.

Bruce J. Nuzum of Matthias, Tyler, Nuzum, Johnson & Matthias, Newton, for plaintiff.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Stephen C. Robinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Dorothy Klosterbuer, Asst. Co. Atty., for defendant.

Considered by DONIELSON, P.J., and SCHLEGEL and SACKETT, JJ.

DONIELSON, Presiding Judge.

The plaintiff husband brings this certiorari proceeding in which he seeks review and reversal of the district court decision finding him in contempt of court for failure to pay child support. The husband was sentenced to jail for thirty days, unless the contempt was purged by payment of $3,500 against the back child support. The husband claims: (1) the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the parties agreed to waive, release, or compromise the child support provisions of the divorce decree; (3) the wife was estopped from trying to enforce payment of child support by contempt proceedings; and (4) he was not in contempt of court for willful failure to pay child support. We annul the writ.

The plaintiff, Matthew Webb, and Lureta Kahler were divorced in 1968. The decree provided that Matthew was to pay $50 per month child support for their child, Deborah. In 1975, the parties agreed that rather than pay Lureta directly, Matthew would put money into a savings account for Deborah's education. In 1984, Lureta asked Matthew for $500 to pay for Deborah's medical bills, requesting him to send whatever was in the savings account and as much as possible otherwise. Matthew cleared out the savings account in order to send $500.

Deborah became eighteen years old on May 22, 1985. As of May 31, 1985, Matthew owed $9,850 in delinquent child support. The district court found Matthew to be in contempt of court and sentenced him to jail for thirty days unless the contempt was purged by payment of $3,500 against the back child support. Matthew then brought this certiorari proceeding seeking review or reversal of the district court decision. The supreme court granted Matthew's petition for writ of certiorari.

Certiorari is a procedure to test whether a lower court exceeded its proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally. Iowa R.Civ.P. 306. Generally, it is an action at law so findings of fact are not reviewable. Iowa R.App.P. 4; Lane v. Oxberger, 224 N.W.2d 245, 247 (Iowa 1974).

We note at the outset that only two defenses are available in a contempt proceeding: (1) indefiniteness of the order (not alleged in the present case); and (2) absence of willfulness in disobeying the order because of inability to pay. Bevers v. Kilburg, 326 N.W.2d 902, 904 (Iowa 1982). However, we will nonetheless address all four of plaintiff's arguments.

First, Matthew argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try him for contempt because Deborah was no longer a minor at the time the application was filed. He claims that a contempt proceeding must be commenced prior to a time a child reaches majority. We do not decide that issue in this matter before us. The defendant states that when the dissolution decree was issued, twenty-one was the age of majority, not eighteen, and the decree should be interpreted by the statute in effect at the time of the original award rather than the statute in effect at the time of the contempt hearing.

Subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Matter of Guardianship and Conservatorship of Cerven, 334 N.W.2d 337, 340 (Iowa App.1983). We find a close analogy in Wilcox v. Bradrick, 319 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1982), a modification proceeding, involving the jurisdictional issue at hand:

At the time of the original decree majority age was defined in section 599.1, The Code 1966, as twenty-one years. Subsequently, the legislature reduced the age of majority to nineteen years, 1972 Session, 64th G.A., ch. 1027, § 49, and again reduced it to eighteen years, 1973 Session, 64th G.A., ch. 140, § 49. While the defendant argues the oldest son "must now be viewed as any other eighteen-year-old," implying the majority age is defined under the present version of the statute, § 599.1, The Code 1981, the plaintiff insists majority age is defined under the statute in effect at the time of the original decree, § 599.1, The Code 1966. In re Marriage of Harless, 251 N.W.2d 212 (Iowa 1977), forecloses an extended discussion of the issue. In that case we held the legislature's lowering of majority age from twenty-one to eighteen years was to have prospective application only: "[T]he law in effect at the time of the decree should govern." Id. at 213. Under the circumstances of that case a father was obligated to support his child until she reached age twenty-one where the original decree, entered prior to the statutory amendment, provided for payments until the child attained majority. Id. Accordingly, under the rule announced in Harless, the parties' oldest son would reach majority at age twenty-one in the present case.

Id. at 217-18.

In accord with the discussion in Wilcox, we find the trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction. The law in effect at the time the decree was entered should govern. Further, assuming arguendo that Deborah did reach her majority as of the time Matthew contends, we note that the support payments put aside in the bank account were for the future education of Deborah and, hence, this matter is still properly within the trial court's jurisdiction. Iowa Code §§ 598.1(2) and 598.2 (1985).

Second, Matthew contends the parties agreed to waive, release, or compromise the child support provisions of the divorce decree. According to Matthew, he and Lureta agreed that he would pay money into the savings account whenever he could, instead of paying $50 per month in support. Third, Matthew claims Lureta is estopped from trying to enforce payment of the child support because she led him to believe he did not need to make payments if he paid what he could into the savings account. Lureta replies the facts do not support an agreement to waive nor do they support estoppel.

The exhibits in this case consist of numerous letters throughout the past nineteen years from Lureta to Matthew requesting financial help. Lureta's testimony clearly demonstrates she at no time intended to waive support of Deborah. Lureta agreed to allow a savings account to be established so that Matthew could more easily contribute to this account, rather than forcing upon him a set amount of $50 each month. Her reasons for this type of disposition can be summed up as follows: (1) she felt Matthew would feel greater at ease knowing his support payments were going directly to Deborah, rather than to her other child who was not fathered by him; (2) if Matthew could only pay $25 one month, he would have the flexibility to pay $75 the next month; and (3) Deborah would be assured of adequate financing to help her pursue a college education. We find no intent by Lureta to release Matthew of his support obligations, especially in light of the many pleas for help on Deborah's behalf and in light of her consent to the Child Support Recovery Unit to bring suit against Matthew for back support payments.

Assuming arguendo that it was Lureta's desire to waive child support payments, our supreme court has stated in Anthony v. Anthony, 204 N.W.2d 829, 833-34 (Iowa 1973):

Nor can we permit a custodial parent lightly to bargain away his child's right to support. The child's best interest is paramount here also. See Pals v. Pals, 186 N.W.2d 619, 620 (Iowa 1971). Public...