McKinley v. Iowa Dist. Court for Polk County

Decision Date17 January 1996
Docket NumberNo. 94-357,94-357
Citation542 N.W.2d 822
PartiesSuzanne McKINLEY, Plaintiff, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR POLK COUNTY, Defendant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Victoria Herring, West Des Moines, for plaintiff.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bruce Kempkes, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant.

William W. Heaivilin, Des Moines, for amicus curiae Iowa Protection & Advocacy Services, Inc.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and CARTER, NEUMAN, SNELL, and TERNUS, JJ.

NEUMAN, Justice.

Plaintiff Suzanne McKinley brought this action for certiorari to challenge both the district court's order punishing her for contempt and the court's refusal to punish her former husband for contempt. Because we believe the court's findings and conclusions are supported by the requisite proof beyond a reasonable doubt, we annul the writ.

Background Facts and Proceedings.

In January 1993, Suzanne and Tim McKinley's twenty-year marriage ended in divorce. The parties were granted joint custody of their two daughters, then ages twelve and seven. Suzanne was named the girls' primary custodian, while Tim was granted reasonable visitation and ordered to pay $980 per month child support. The court also awarded Suzanne $210 per month alimony, payable for thirty-six months. The marital residence was ordered immediately sold and the proceeds divided "equitably." Suzanne was directed to make the monthly mortgage payments of $1038 pending sale.

The decree as described above departed significantly from temporary allowances which had required Tim to pay child support of $1090 per month plus $1038 per month "spousal support" payable directly toward the parties' mortgage. Suzanne, who suffers a compensable mental disability that renders her unemployable, immediately defaulted on the mortgage payments. The house sold by July, but the accumulated principal and interest on four months' unpaid mortgage installments, combined with a joint debt of $13,000 payable to Suzanne's father, left no equity to be divided.

Tim blamed the shortfall at the time of closing on Suzanne's allegedly willful failure to make the mortgage payments as ordered. He petitioned to have her found in contempt. Suzanne denied that her inaction was either willful or contemptuous. She countered with a claim that Tim should be found in contempt on a number of grounds, most notably for willfully failing to exercise the visitation granted him in the decree.

The petitions were consolidated for trial. Suzanne tendered two defenses for her failure to abide by the court's order: first, that the decree's reference to an "equitable" division of the house sale proceeds was ambiguous, thereby leaving her obligation uncertain and not subject to punishment by contempt; second, that her financial circumstances--as complicated by her mental disability--excused her failure to make the payments as ordered. The district court rejected these arguments, concluding under the record made that Suzanne "has engaged in a calculated and deliberate scheme to frustrate the intent of the Court in the dissolution decree, and to prevent Timothy from receiving the property division ordered by the trial court." The court also rejected Suzanne's complaints about Tim's failure to abide by the decree, finding her allegations bordering on the frivolous.

As punishment for her contempt, the court sentenced Suzanne to "thirty days at hard labor" in the county jail. It then withheld mittimus for ninety days to enable her to purge her contempt by paying Tim the sum of $2651 plus interest, an amount calculated to reimburse him for the reduction in net proceeds at the closing caused by Suzanne's failure to make the mortgage payments.

We granted Suzanne's petition for certiorari. She raises seven points for review: (1) The evidence does not support a finding of contempt; (2) a noncustodial parent who willfully refuses or fails to comply with specific visitation orders should be compelled to do so; (3) the court erred in making "hard labor" a condition of her sentence; (4) the court intemperately and erroneously denied Suzanne's motion for recusal; (5) the court punished Suzanne for her attorney's adherence to the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure; (6) the court erred when it awarded damages and interest from July 1, 1993; and (7) Suzanne should have received an award of attorney fees.

Our review is at law, not de novo. Zimmermann v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 480 N.W.2d 70, 74 (Iowa 1992). The question is whether substantial evidence supports the court's judgment. Ervin v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 495 N.W.2d 742, 744 (Iowa 1993). Contempt must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Phillips v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 380 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1986).

We shall consider Suzanne's arguments in turn.

A. Proof of contempt. Contempt is customarily defined as willful disobedience. Ervin, 495 N.W.2d at 744. "Willful disobedience" requires

evidence of conduct that is intentional and deliberate with a bad or evil purpose, or wanton and in disregard of the rights of others, or contrary to a known duty, or unauthorized, coupled with an unconcern whether the contemner had the right or not.

Id. The alleged contemner carries the burden of producing evidence on any defense tendered. Skinner v. Ruigh, 351 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Iowa 1984). The burden of persuasion on the willfulness issue, however, remains on the contemnee. Ervin, 495 N.W.2d at 745.

Two defenses to contempt are recognized: (1) indefiniteness of the order and (2) absence of willful disobedience caused by inability to pay. Webb v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 416 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Iowa App.1987). Suzanne claims both defenses here.

1. Clarity of the order. The decree ordered the parties' home sold immediately with "the net proceeds therefrom equitably divided" after satisfaction in full of the parties' debt to Ralph Chadek, Suzanne's father. Suzanne asserts use of the term "equitable" casts doubt on her obligation to Tim under the decree. The record makes plain, however, that Suzanne understood the court's intent that the proceeds be divided equally between them. Suzanne's posttrial motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(b) raised this very issue. The court's ruling rejected Suzanne's request for an "equitable," rather than an "equal" division of the proceeds. Thus Suzanne cannot rely on lack of clarity or definiteness in the decree's terms to escape responsibility for dividing the net proceeds equally with Tim.

2. Ability to comply. The fighting issue centers, not on Suzanne's failure to distribute the proceeds, but on her failure to timely make the mortgage payments prior to the sale. She concedes her failure to abide by the decree's terms, but claims her inaction cannot be ascribed to willful disobedience.

Suzanne first contends she was financially unable to pay necessary expenses for herself and her daughters and still make the house payment. Financial records submitted in evidence bear out the claimed strain on her cash flow. Other evidence, however, supports the court's finding that Suzanne had sources of cash (a $5000 lump sum social security benefit payment and three retirement accounts) which she chose not to apply to her obligation under the decree. As noted by the district court, her dissatisfaction with the decree does not excuse her compliance with its terms. See Ervin, 495 N.W.2d at 745. The record reveals no attempt by Suzanne to make even a partial payment on the mortgage. She was not free to prioritize her monthly financial obligations so as to prefer her own creditors over her court-ordered obligation to Tim. See Skinner, 351 N.W.2d at 186; see also Callenius v. Blair, 309 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Iowa 1981) ("[t]he test is not merely whether appellee is presently working or has current funds or cash on hand, but whether he has any property out of which payment can be made").

Whether Suzanne's default on the mortgage was willful or an unintended consequence of her mental illness was a hotly contested point at trial. Suzanne claimed the shock of the decree's terms left her feeling victimized, triggering the symptoms of her posttraumatic stress disorder. Her therapist testified that Suzanne's obligations under the decree (to prepare the house for sale and make the mortgage payments), coupled with her custodial responsibilities for the parties' two children, thrust her into a "survival mode" just to cope with the "hierarchy of demands" placed upon her. As part of this coping strategy, making the mortgage payment took on diminished importance. Tim presented no contradictory expert testimony.

Given the severity of Suzanne's disability, and the extent of testimony concerning it, we find it surprising the court's ruling makes no mention of it. Suzanne and amicus, Iowa Protection and Advocacy Services, Inc., highlight this alleged oversight as proof the court's finding of willfulness is unsupportable as a matter of law. Yet the court was not without opinion on the viability of Suzanne's defenses. Summing up, the court said:

After viewing petitioner's demeanor on the witness stand, assessing the inconsistencies in her own testimony as well as the conflict between her testimony and the documentary evidence and hearing the other witnesses in the case, the court concludes that Suzanne's testimony as to the reasons for her failure to comply with the Court's order is entitled to virtually no weight.

We are obliged to give great deference to the trial court on issues of witness credibility. State v. Hatter, 342 N.W.2d 851, 854 (Iowa 1983). Substantial evidence in the record shows that Suzanne was capable of managing her affairs despite her illness. She paid other bills, prepared the house for sale, organized the family for the move, and secured other housing. The district court plainly believed that Suzanne's decision to ignore the mortgage payments stemmed from her disagreement with the decree, not her illness. From our vantage point we are unable to...

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