Webb v. State
Decision Date | 04 December 1942 |
Docket Number | 29601. |
Parties | WEBB v. STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
The defendant was indicted on three counts of murder and two counts of assault with intent to murder, arising from an automobile accident in which three persons were killed and two persons were injured. He was found guilty of Involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act under the first three counts, which involved the deaths of the victims, and was sentenced to one year under each, the sentences to be cumulative. He was found guilty of assault and battery under counts 4 and 5, and was given a sentence of twelve months under each, the sentences to run concurrently and to be served at the expiration of the sentence under count 3. The defendant's motion for new trial was overruled and he excepted.
R E. Brown and J. W. Bloodworth, both of Perry, and A. Russell Ross, of Eastman, for plaintiff in error.
Chas H. Garrett, Sol. Gen., of Macon, for defendant in error.
1. The evidence authorized the verdict.
2. The judge charged the jury in part as follows: On this excerpt the defendant assigns error because:
There was no demurrer to the indictment, and under Webb v. State, 177 Ga. 414, 170 S.E. 252, and Webb v. State, 47 Ga.App. 505, 170 S.E. 827, 828, it seems that it would have availed the defendant nothing to have demurred to the same. ' Webb v. State, 47 Ga.App. 505, 170 S.E. 827, supra. The defendant did not demand that the State elect on which count or counts it would proceed, and there is nothing in the record to show that the State's failure to elect in any way confounded the defendant in his defense, or in any way impeded him in his challenge to the jury. See also Martin v. State, 55 Ga.App. 166, 189 S.E. 624. The defendant bases his contention on Dean v. State, 9 Ga.App. 571, 71 S.E. 932, 933, in which several articles which were owned by different owners were stolen at the same time and place, and in which it was held that there was but one larceny, the court quoting as follows: This principle is well founded and is sustained by many competent authorities as to cases where there is a larceny committed at one time of articles owned by different people. The underlying theory for this seems to be that the thief intended to commit but one larceny. Being unable to find any Georgia cases in point with the instant case, we think the reasoning in State v. Laughlin, 180 Mo. 342, 79 S.W. 401, is well founded. In that case the defendant, a public official, was indicted separately for embezzlement of two trust funds, though the embezzlement in both instances was committed by one act of conversion. It was held that the single act constituted two separate and distinct offenses in that the two different trusts were violated. In such a case the defendant, as a trust officer, had reason to know that he was violating two separate trusts.
In the instant case, in the commission of an unlawful act the defendant drove his automobile into another automobile causing a wreck in which three persons were killed and two were injured, and he was convicted under three counts of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act, and two counts of assault and battery. Dennard v. State, 14 Ga.App. 485, 488, 81 S.E. 378. "Assault and battery may be committed by striking another with an automobile intentionally, or by driving the machine so recklessly as to justify a jury in finding that there was a reckless disregard of human life and safety." Tift v. State, 17 Ga.App. 663, 88 S.E. 41. See also in this connection Looney v. State, 41 Ga.App. 495 (2), 153 S.E. 372; Gallery v. State, 92 Ga. 463, 17 S.E. 863. Thus it is shown that a specific intent or a presumption of malice may arise from a reckless disregard of human life. Cornell v. State, 64 Ga.App. 202, 206, 12 S.E.2d 378, 380. "Every person is presumed to intend the natural and necessary consequence of his acts." Tift v. State, supra.
It is well to consider that a person driving along a public highway can be presumed to know that he will meet and pass other vehicles which are lawfully using the highway, and that these vehicles may carry one or many persons. There may be an automobile in which there is only the driver, while on the other hand there may be a bus in which twenty or more persons are riding. In presuming that a person "knew the natural and necessary consequences that would result," we think it follows that the defendant in the instant case can be presumed to have known that he would collide with an automobile in which five persons were riding, and that each might be affected by his unlawful act as a natural and necessary consequence. We see no reason why the presumption of knowledge of the exact consequences can not be imputed to the defendant as well as the presumption of malice and intent. By his unlawful act he placed himself in the position of impliedly intending to commit the crime, and, as he "knew the natural and necessary consequences that would result," it follows that he intended (by implication) to drive the automobile into the other car, and that he had knowledge (by implication) that the other carried five persons, three of whom would be killed and two injured by his unlawful act. In looking past the act to the result, we think this was not a situation where the intent was single, as in the case of a thief who at one time stole several articles owned by different persons, but it was a situation where the intent was several, as in the case of the public official who, by one act of conversion, committed separate and distinct offenses by the embezzlement of two separate trusts. We think the defendant was accountable for every offense charged in the indictment, and that the court did not err in overruling the motion for new trial.
Judgment affirmed.
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