Dennard v. State

• Decision Date: 18 April 1914
• Docket Number: (No. 5539.)
• Citation: 14 Ga.App. 485,81 S.E. 378
• Parties: DENNARD. v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

(14 Ga.App. 485)

81 S.E. 378

DENNARD.

v.STATE.

(No. 5539.)

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

April 18, 1914.

(Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)

Homicide (§ 269*)—Assault with Intent to Murder—Questions for Jury.

Where, on a trial for assault with intent to murder, committed by running an automobile against and over a person, though the evidence showed no ill will on the part of accused, it showed that he was an expert operator of an automobile, and there was no evidence that the machine became unmanageable or skidded, and no explanation of his conduct was apparent, unless he was actuated by a reckless disregard of human life, the question was for the jury, since malice may be presumed from a recklessdisregard of human life, without regard to the instrumentalities employed to effect a personal injury to another.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 503; Dec. Dig. § 209.*]

Error from Superior Court, Terrell County; W. C. Worrill, Judge.

Johnnie Dennard was convicted of assault with intent to murder, and he brings error. Affirmed.

M. J. Yeomans, of Dawson, for plaintiff in error.

R. T. Castellow, Sol. Gen., of Ft. Gaines, and R. R. Arnold, of Atlanta, for the State.

ROAN, J. This defendant was convicted under an indictment charging him with the offense of assault with intent to murder, in that he ran an automobile against and over one W. H. Morgan on a public road, with intent to kill him. The motion for a new trial was based solely upon the statutory grounds, that the verdict was contrary to law and the evidence, etc.

This is a very peculiar case. It is not shown that the defendant had any ill feeling for the man alleged to have been assaulted, no reason appears why be should have wished to run him down on a public highway, and no explanation of his conduct is apparent, unless he was actuated by a reckless disregard of human life. The presumption of malice may arise from a reckless disregard of human life, without regard to the instrumentalities employed to effect a personal injury to another. The defendant was shown to be an expert operator of an automobile, and there is no evidence that the machine became unmanageable or skidded in any way and injured Morgan by accident. There is no complaint that the court failed to submit the case fairly to the jury. The questions to be determined were purely questions for the jury; and, the trial judge having approved their verdict, we are not prepared to hold that he committed reversible error in so doing.

...