Webber v. Olsen
| Decision Date | 06 April 2000 |
| Citation | 998 P.2d 666,330 Or. 189 |
| Parties | Lorene K. WEBBER, as personal representative on behalf of the Estate of Belden R. Webber, deceased, Respondent on Review, v. Georgene A. OLSEN, aka Georgene A. Webber, Petitioner on Review. Lorene K. Webber, fka Lorene K. Piper, Kenneth R. Webber, Stevan G. Webber, Michael T. Webber, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Georgene A. Olsen, fka Georgene A. Webber, and Anthem Life Insurance Company, a Texas corporation, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Timothy E. Brophy, of Brophy, Mills, Schmor, Gerking & Brophy, LLP, Medford, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With him on the brief was Mark Weaver.
Matthew Sutton, of Kellington, Krack, Richmond, Blackhurst & Sutton, LLP, Medford, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him on the brief was Douglas J. Richmond.
The issue in this action for breach of contract is whether the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for breach of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing and breach of an implied promise to notify in a stipulated decree of dissolution of marriage.1 Defendant moved for summary judgment on various grounds, including that a stipulated judgment is not a contract on which a breach of contract action may be maintained. The trial court granted defendant's motion and entered a judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims. The Court of Appeals reversed.2 Webber v. Olsen, 157 Or.App. 585, 971 P.2d 448 (1998). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On review of the summary judgment in this case, we view the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party, to determine whether defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or. 404, 420, 939 P.2d 608 (1997). The facts are not disputed. Defendant Georgene Olsen and decedent Belden Webber were married to one another for approximately 26 years. During that time, decedent had named defendant as the beneficiary of the proceeds of a life insurance policy that decedent had held, which contained a death benefit of approximately $78,000 at the time decedent died. In 1988, defendant and decedent entered into a stipulated judgment of dissolution of marriage. However, they did not enter into a separate property settlement agreement. Under the judgment, defendant received the parties' house in Talent, Oregon. The judgment also provided that decedent would maintain defendant as the primary beneficiary of the life insurance policy and that defendant would leave the house to decedent in her will. Additionally, the judgment provided:
"If [defendant] sells, mortgages, or in any way no longer has any interest in said property, then [decedent's] obligation to list [defendant] as the primary beneficiary under the insurance policies shall terminate."
In January of 1990, defendant sold the house. She did not inform decedent that she had sold it, but the sale was recorded in the real property records for Jackson County. Decedent married plaintiff in 1991. Decedent did not discover that defendant had sold the house until a few days before his death in 1993. When decedent died, defendant still was the primary beneficiary on decedent's life insurance policy, and she became entitled to the proceeds.
Plaintiff, as the personal representative of decedent's estate, brought this action for breach of contract. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant and decedent had "agreed in the [judgment]" that, if defendant sold the house, then decedent no longer would be required to name her as the beneficiary of the insurance policy. (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff's complaint also alleged that "[t]he [judgment] carried with it an implied covenant" that both defendant and decedent would act in good faith "to effectuate the reasonable expectations of the parties thereunder." (Emphasis added.) Finally, plaintiff's complaint alleged that "[i]mplicit in the terms of the [judgment] is an obligation of the defendant to notify the decedent in the event she sold the property." (Emphasis added.) According to plaintiff's complaint, defendant breached her implied promise to notify decedent when she sold the house without notifying decedent, and she breached the terms of the implied covenant and by claiming the proceeds of the life insurance policy even though she had sold the house before decedent died.
Defendant responded that a stipulated judgment is not a contract on which an action for breach of contract may be maintained and that defendant and decedent had not entered into a separate property settlement agreement that would support plaintiff's breach of contract action. According to defendant, plaintiff's sole remedy was under the judgment. As noted, the trial court agreed with defendant, granted her motion for summary judgment, and entered a judgment in her favor.
The Court of Appeals reversed. In that court's view, defendant and decedent had entered into a separate property settlement agreement that supported plaintiff's claim for breach of contract:
"Whether or not a separate document exists that embodies a contractual agreement between the parties does not determine whether the parties entered into a stipulated property settlement agreement."
Webber, 157 Or.App. at 596, 971 P.2d 448. Having held that defendant and decedent had a separate, albeit unwritten, property settlement agreement, the Court of Appeals further held that "the alleged obligation in question here is one involving a future act other than the payment of money." Id. at 595, 971 P.2d 448. That court also held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the settlement agreement included a good faith obligation on defendant's part to notify decedent of the sale of the house. Id. at 596-97, 971 P.2d 448. Accordingly, it held that the trial court had erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's breach of contract claim, and it remanded the case to the trial court. We allowed defendant's petition for review.
As a preliminary matter, we note that parties to a dissolution of marriage may and often do enter into separate agreements regarding the terms of the dissolution. Generally, if the parties ask the trial court to incorporate all or part of their agreement into the judgment, and the trial court agrees to do so, then the parts of the agreement that are incorporated into the judgment merge into the judgment. See, e.g., Rigdon v. Rigdon, 219 Or. 271, 276, 347 P.2d 43 (1959) (). The trial court is not required to incorporate into the judgment agreements that are "unfair to one or the other of the parties." McDonnal and McDonnal, 293 Or. 772, 778, 652 P.2d 1247 (1982). As a matter of law, agreements that call for the performance of future acts other than the payment of money do not merge into the judgment. See, e.g., Carothers v. Carothers, 260 Or. 99, 102, 488 P.2d 1185 (1971) (so stating).3
In this case, the parties concede that defendant and decedent did not enter into a separate property settlement agreement. None of the above-emphasized portions of plaintiff's complaint for breach of contract points to or relies on a property settlement agreement. Thus, the issue is not whether defendant and decedent had entered into a property settlement agreement that would support plaintiff's action for breach of contract, or whether such an agreement can be implied from their stipulations. Rather, the issue is whether a stipulated judgment of dissolution also is a contract upon which an action for breach of contract may be maintained.
Defendant argues that a stipulated judgment "should be treated the same as a judgment entered after trial." She contends that, if the Court of Appeals' decision is allowed to stand, then it will "give rise to claims for...
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MATTER OF MARRIAGE OF McINNIS
...to a dissolution proceeding "may and often do enter into separate agreements regarding the terms of the dissolution." Webber v. Olsen, 330 Or. 189, 194, 998 P.2d 666 (2000). The trial court is not obligated to approve such agreements; they always are subject to the court's review for fairne......
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Fleming v. SAIF Corp. (In re Fleming)
...a stipulated judgment. And, a stipulated judgment has the same effect as judgment after a trial on the merits. See Webber v. Olsen , 330 Or. 189, 196, 998 P.2d 666 (2000) ("A stipulated judgment has the same effect as a judgment that is entered after a trial on the merits of a claim.").From......
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Williams v. Philip Morris Inc.
...determination of the rights of the parties in a suit in equity, is no longer appropriate. See ORCP 2; ORCP 67 A; Webber v. Olsen, 330 Or. 189, 192 n. 1, 998 P.2d 666 (2000). ...
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Brown v. Brown, P0103-42; A120468.
...found in ORS 18.180(7), enacted by Or. Laws 2003, ch. 576, § 18). Respondent relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Webber v. Olsen, 330 Or. 189, 998 P.2d 666 (2000), in which the court declined to separately enforce as a contract an agreement embodied in a stipulated judgment of dissolu......